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This chapter will develop an understanding of what the logical conclusion of having English football clubs primarily existing as businesses: namely, those instances where clubs are treated not as community institutions but as any other business with set assets that can be disposed of at a profit. There is an unfortunate history of clubs being owned based on the value of the assets they possess (such as their stadium or training), a trend that has only seemed to accelerate in recent decades. The various forms asset stripping takes can be explored by examining what happened to clubs like Blackpool FC and Wimbledon FC, as well as many others. This chapter is an exploration of what happens when the entity that fans assume is something more than a business is dismantled for profit, the harshest of reality checks, and a reminder that football clubs in these contexts are little more than business assets.

This chapter addresses one of the most crucial areas for critical thinking: the morality of turbulent markets around the world. All of us are overwhelmed by such turbulent markets. Following Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2004, 2010), we distinguish between nonscalable industries (ordinary professions where income grows linearly, piecemeal or by marginal jumps) and scalable industries (extraordinary risk-prone professions where income grows in a nonlinear fashion, and by exponential jumps and fractures). Nonscalable industries generate tame and predictable markets of goods and services, while scalable industries regularly explode into behemoth virulent markets where rewards are disproportionately large compared to effort, and they are the major causes of turbulent financial markets that rock our world causing ever-widening inequities and inequalities. Part I describes both scalable and nonscalable markets in sufficient detail, including propensity of scalable industries to randomness, and the turbulent markets they create. Part II seeks understanding of moral responsibility of turbulent markets and discusses who should appropriate moral responsibility for turbulent markets and under what conditions. Part III synthesizes various theories of necessary and sufficient conditions for accepting or assigning moral responsibility. We also analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for attribution of moral responsibility such as rationality, intentionality, autonomy or freedom, causality, accountability, and avoidability of various actors as moral agents or as moral persons. By grouping these conditions, we then derive some useful models for assigning moral responsibility to various entities such as individual executives, corporations, or joint bodies. We discuss the challenges and limitations of such models.