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This paper examines how board structure influences real earnings management and the interaction effect of CEO narcissism on board structure-real earnings management relationship.

The authors used panel data derived from secondary sources from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002–2017. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that board independence, board tenure and size have significant negative effect on real earnings management, while CEO duality positively affects real earnings management. Further, the interaction results show that CEO narcissism moderates the relationship between CEO duality and real earnings management.

The results suggest that real earnings management reduces when boards are independent, large and comprising of long-tenured members. However, when the CEO plays dual role of a chairman, real earnings management increases. The authors also find that when CEOs are narcissists, the monitoring role of the board is compromised.

The study adds value to the understanding of how board structure and CEO narcissism influence the monitoring role of the board among firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange.

Existing studies have shown that all kinds of audit risks greatly affect audit pricing for accounting firms. However, it is still unclear whether environmental risks caused by environmental violations lead to a high audit fee. This study aims to investigate whether accounting firms raise audit fees after client firms have violated environmental regulations or have been punished for such violations.

This study selects listed firms with environmental violations between 1994 and 2018 as the treatment sample and match the treatment group with a control group of firms from the same industry, of similar asset size and with no environmental violations for the same time period. Then, this study constructs a difference-in-difference (DID) model to explore the impact of firm environmental violations (or punishment for environmental violations) on the audit pricing.

This study finds that accounting firms tend to raise audit fees after client firms have violated environmental regulations or have been punished for such violations, and this increasing effect is different due to environmental regulation intensity, regional span and internal control defects. Further evidences show that environmental violations influence audit fees through financial restatement, whereas environmental punishments impact audit fees through earnings management and risk-taking.

This study enriches the literature on determining factors of audit fees and economic consequences of environmental violations and provides empirical supports to understand the pricing behavior of accounting firms.