Search results

This study investigates insurance demand in a two-period model when a decision-maker (DM) is averse to the ambiguity of loss distributions. This study derives sufficient conditions such that the ambiguity-averse DM purchases more insurance than an ambiguity-neutral one when the DM maximises the expected utility. It also derives each sufficient condition to increase insurance demand as ambiguity aversion, ambiguity and downside ambiguity increase, respectively.

This study aims to examine the effects of prior small-scale changes to wealth on subsequent risky choices.

The paper opted for a laboratory experiment in which subjects perform two sequences of risky tasks. In between these two sets, the author transfers money for real for a randomly selected half of the subjects. Data on choices before and after the transfer of money are used to estimate risk attitudes and analyze whether the transfer of money affected attitudes to risk.

The author finds that the money gain does not change subjects' risk preferences – neither in a within- nor in a between-subject design. This suggests that individuals' risky choices are consistent with their constant absolute (CARA) risk aversion preferences, a result that supports a key assumption in recent literature on the calibration critique of decision theories and the view that individuals engage in narrow framing.

Because of the relatively small transfer of money, the research results may lack generalizability.

The paper includes implications for the reference-dependent and other theories that explain how prior outcomes affect risk-taking behavior in sequential problems.

The results are relevant to the research community studying risk-taking behavior as the results shed new light on a well-known result put forward by a seminal paper by Thaler.

This paper fills in an identified gap in the literature which is the need to test the house-money effect in a more realistic setting (over repeated risk-elicitation tasks, with money given outside the lotteries and in a within-subject design).

The authors analyze the equilibrium effects of non-tradable assets on optimal policy portfolios. They study how the existence of non-tradable assets impacts optimal asset allocation decisions of investors who own such assets and of investors who do not have access to non-tradable assets.

In this theoretical analysis, the authors analyze a model with tradable and non-tradable asset classes whose cash flows are jointly normally distributed. There are two types of investors, with and without access to non-tradable assets. All investors have constant absolute risk aversion preferences. The authors derive closed form solutions for optimal investor demand and equilibrium asset prices. They calibrated the model using US data for listed equity, bonds and private equity. Further, the authors illustrate the sensitivities of quantities and prices with respect to the main parameters.

The study finds that the existence of non-tradable assets has a large impact on optimal asset allocation. Investors with (without) access to non-tradable assets tilt their portfolios of tradable assets away from (toward) assets to which non-tradable assets exhibit positive betas.

The model provides important insights not only for investors holding non-tradable assets such as private equity but also for investors who do not have access to non-tradable assets. Investors who ignore the effect of non-tradable assets when reverse-engineering risk premia from asset covariances and market capitalizations might severely underestimate the equity risk premium.

The authors provide the first comprehensive analysis of the equilibrium effects of non-tradability of some assets on optimal policy portfolios. Thus, this paper goes beyond analyzing the effects of market imperfections on individual portfolio choices.

The authors believe that comparing individuals to groups' decision making is crucial provided that many important choices in society are made by groups, i.e. committees, governing bodies, juries, business partners and families. This study aims to discuss the aforementioned topic.

The authors analyze risky decision making in the context of the television game show Deal or No Deal – Italian edition. Specifically, the authors scrutinize and compare individual (standard “Deal or No Deal” edition) and group (special edition) choices in the risky choice context provided by programe.

After analyzing contestant's behavior in the standard edition episodes plus a special edition the authors calculate a risk index observing that no statically significant difference is present between individuals' and groups' actions.

In the “Deal or No Deal” special edition contestant were groups of two strangers. It is not uncommon to have couples playing on TV, however the individuals usually know each other well and have relationships in real life. The special edition therefore provides a unique setting (absent to best of the authors’ knowledge in the literature) for investigation and could offer real-world insight. Indeed, in many instances the authors have to contract/make decisions with people the authors do not know/know very little (i.e. occasional business partners, representative at other companies/institutions, insurance/finance advisors, new work colleagues, etc.).

The purpose of this paper is to comprehensively examine the influence of formal and informal institutional differences on enterprise investment margin, mode and result.

This paper is based on 2,440 micro samples of large-scale outbound investment from 609 Chinese enterprises from the years 2005 to 2016.

The study has found that formal institutional differences have little impact on investment scale, but significantly affect investment diversification. In order to avoid the management risks brought by formal institutional differences, enterprises tend to a full ownership structure. However, the choice between greenfield investment and cross-border mergers and acquisitions is not affected by formal institutional differences. In contrast, the impact of informal institutional differences is more extensive. Both formal and informal institutional differences significantly increase the probability of investment failure. Further research found that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bridges the formal institutional differences.

The study concludes that developing the BRI, especially cultural exchanges with countries alongside the Belt and Road, will help enterprises to “go global” faster and better.

Climate risk greatly increases the risk exposure of global investments. Both the climate risks of home countries and host countries may affect international investment behaviors. The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of climate risk and climate risk distance on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and outflows. Targeted proposals are provided to promote international economic and trade cooperation and the authors provide suggestions for the FDI strategies of multinational enterprises.

The authors define “climate risk distance” as the difference in climate risks between two countries. This paper uses both a theoretical model and a generalized least squares test to investigate the impact of climate risk distance on FDI from the perspectives of FDI inflows and outflows. In addition, the authors subdivide the samples according to the sign of climate risk distance and rank the FDI share from home country to host country into four groups according to the host country’s climate risk index. Finally, the authors undertake empirical tests with outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) data to support the empirical results.

Investors from countries with low climate risks have the upper hand due to their competitive advantages, like their skills, trademarks and patent rights, which they can transfer abroad to offset the disadvantage of being non-native. This is generally defined as ownership advantage. The impact of climate risk distance on FDI depends on the sign of climate risk distance. Specifically, host countries with higher climate risks compared with the climate risk levels of home countries may experience insignificant reductions in FDI inflows. For investors from home countries with higher climate risks, they are less likely to invest in host countries with lower climate risks. The results for samples from emerging market economies are shown to be more significant.

This study advances the O (ownership advantage) part of the ownership, location and internationalization (OLI) paradigm by incorporating the climate risk distance between the home country and the host country into the influencing factors of FDI. Both the O part and the L (location advantage, the advantage that host countries offers to make internationalization worthwhile to undertake FDI) part of the OLI paradigm concerning climate risks are validated with FDI and OFDI data.