Search results

The purpose of this study is to explore how the risk of management motives for fraud can be assessed in external audits.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 26 experienced external auditors to explore their perspectives on the methods they employ to assess the risk of management motives for fraud.

The study identifies six methods external auditors can use to assess management motives for fraud. It emphasises that assessing management motives requires auditors to go beyond understanding these motives and necessitates a sceptical and analytical mindset. Auditors need to identify the accounts most vulnerable to management manipulations, observe management attitudes and assess the credibility of management assertions. The auditors in this study highlight specific accounts frequently manipulated by management. Still, manual year-end journal entries are the most vulnerable to management manipulations as they are subject to fewer controls. They recommend increasing the sample size to 100% and assigning more experienced staff, particularly, those with qualifications in fraud examination or anti-fraud training, to audit these vulnerable accounts thoroughly. They also provided examples of how auditors can identify management motives for fraud, observe management attitudes and assess the credibility of management assertions.

Audit standards (e.g. ISA 240, SAS99) lack explicit guidance on assessing management motives for fraud, but auditors are required to consider it in fraud risk assessment. This study proposes guidance recommendations to improve auditors' ability to assess this risk, which could be integrated into professional audit standards and training materials to improve auditors' professional scepticism, ability to challenge management and skills in fraud risk assessment.

Assessing the risk of management motives for fraud in external audits has received limited attention in the literature. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to address this knowledge gap.

This study aims to examine the prevalence of transfer pricing and earnings management activities, and how they are impacted by corporate governance mechanisms.

Using the political cost theory, the study provides insights into how opportunistic managerial behaviours which have a strong link to profit shifting and tax evasion are driven by corporate governance using data from 16 listed firms for the period 2008–2020.

The results reveal that the transaction-based transfer pricing model is better than the index-based model and the accrual-based earnings management model suits the political cost theory more than the real earnings management metric. Board size and female CEO increase transfer pricing aggressiveness but board independence, CEO tenure, CEO nationality and female Board Chairwomanship reduce transfer pricing aggressiveness. The findings also reveal the role of multinational enterprise status, private ownership, industry type, firm size, financial leverage, asset tangibility and firm age. For accrual-based earnings management, board independence, CEO tenure, and female Board Chairwomanship significantly decrease earnings management. Other factors include private ownership, firm size, and firm age.

The findings of the study are relevant for shaping industry-level policies on earning management, transfer pricing and related-party transactions. Since these opportunistic managerial behaviours are the foremost drivers of tax avoidance and profit shifting, the findings of this study provide relevant insights for practitioners, tax and other regulatory authorities, policymakers and the academic community alike.

This is among the premier studies on the transfer pricing and earnings management nexus with corporate governance factors using the political cost theory, especially in the developing country context. It also reveals the significant impact of gender and suggests the need for gender diversity in corporate management.