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The Internet of Things (IoT) platform empowers the digital transformation of the manufacturing industry by providing information technology services. Simultaneously, it enters the market by offering smart products to consumers. In light of different service fee scenarios, this article explores the optimal decision-making for the platform. It investigates the pricing models and entry decisions of IoT platforms.

In this study, we have formulated a game-theoretic model to scrutinize the influence of the IoT platform ventured into the smart device market on the pre-existing suppliers operating under subscription-based and usage-based pricing agreements.

Our outcome shows that introducing an IoT platform’s smart device has a differential effect on manufacturers depending on their contract type. Notably, our research indicates that introducing the platform’s own smart device within the subscription-based model does not negatively impact the profitability of incumbent manufacturers, so long as there is a noticeable discrepancy in the quality of the smart devices. However, our findings within the usage-based model demonstrate that despite the variance in smart device quality differentiation, the platform’s resolution to launch their device and impose their pricing agreements adversely affects established manufacturers. Additionally, we obtain valuable Intel regarding the platform’s entry strategies and contractual inclinations. We demonstrate that the platform is incentivized to present its smart device when reasonable entry costs remain. Furthermore, the platform prefers subscription-based contracts when the subscription fee is relatively high in non-platform entry and entry cases.

These findings hold significant practical implications for firms operating in an IoT-based supply chain.

Abnormal behaviors such as rework, backlog, changes and claims generated by project organizations are unavoidable in complex projects. When abnormal behaviors emerge, the previously normal state of interactions between organizations will be altered to some extent. However, previous studies have ignored the associations and interactions between organizations in the context of abnormal organizational behaviors (AOBs), making this challenging to cope with AOBs. As a result, the objective of this paper is to explore how to reduce AOBs in complex projects at the organizational level from a network perspective.

To overcome the inherent limitations of a single case study, this research integrated two data collection methods: questionnaire survey and expert scoring method. The questionnaire survey captured the universal data on the influence possibility of AOBs between complex project organizations and the expert scoring method got the influence probability scores of AOBs between organizations in the case. Using these data, four organizational influence network models of AOBs based on a case were developed to demonstrate how to destroy AOBs networks in complex projects using network attack theory (NAT).

First, the findings show that controlling AOBs generated by key organizations preferentially and improving the ability of key organizations can weaken AOBs network, enabling more effective coping strategies. Second, the owners, government, material suppliers and designers are identified as key organizations across all four influence networks of AOBs. Third, change and claim behaviors are more manageable from the organizational level.

Project managers can target specific organizations for intervention, weaken the AOBs network by applying NAT and achieve better project outcomes through coping strategies. Additionally, by taking a network perspective, this research provides a novel approach to comprehending the associations and interactions between organizations in the context of complex projects.

This paper proposes a new approach to investigating AOBs in complex projects by simultaneously examining rework, backlog, change and claim. Leveraging NAT as a novel tool for managing the harmful effects of influence networks, this study extends the knowledge body in the field of organizational behavior (OB) management and complex project management.