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The first company under the Amara Raja Group was established in 1984, i.e. Amara Raja Electronics Limited (AREL) followed by Amara Raja Batteries Limited (ARBL). Its founder leveraged the presence of his family in Renigunta, a rural village in South India, and chose to start the industry there to create employment opportunities. Preference is given to local population in all ARG enterprises. Despite its strong people orientation, the HR department/function at ARG got strengthened only after Jaikrishna strived to make it central to business. The department's evolution has been demarcated in three phases. The first and second phase saw few initiatives, and during the third phase the HR department was structured according to the Dave Ulrich Strategic HR Model. While this structure had been successful until now, certain sections in ARG still doubted its sustainability.

The case was developed from two 2-h interviews with the Chief Operating Officer of A-Basin, Alan Henceroth; there is no CEO of A-Basin. The second interview was recorded on a Zoom call to provide accuracy of quotations and information. A variety of secondary sources were used in terms of better understanding the current state of the ski industry, as well as its history.

Arapahoe Basin (A-Basin) is a historic, moderately sized, ski area with proximity to metropolitan Denver, Colorado. For over 20 years A-Basin partnered with Vail, allowing skiers to use the Vail Epic Pass, for which A-Basin received some revenue from Vail for each skier visit. The Epic Pass allowed pass holders unlimited days of skiing at A-Basin. More and more skiers were buying the Epic Pass, thus increasing the customer traffic to A-Basin. However, the skier experience was compromised due inadequate parking, long lift lines and crowded restaurants. The renewal of the contract with Vail was coming due, and A-Basin had to consider whether to renew the contract with Vail. The case is framed primarily as a strategic marketing case. The authors use Porter’s five forces model to assess the external environment of A-Basin, and the authors use the resource-based view and the VRIO tool to assess A-Basin’s internal strengths. Both frameworks provide useful analysis in terms of deciding whether to continue A-Basin’s arrangement with Vail or end the contract and pursue a different strategy. In 2019, after consultation with the Canadian parent company Dream, A-Basin made the decision to disassociate itself from the Epic Pass and Vail to restore a quality ski experience for A-Basin’s customers. No other partner had ever left its relationship with Vail. An epilogue details some of A-Basin’s actions, as well as the outcomes for the ski area. Generally A-Basin’s decision produced positive results and solidified its competitive position among competitors. Other ski areas have since adopted a similar strategy as A-Basin. A-Basin’s success is reflected in a pending offer from Alterra, Inc., to purchase the ski area.

The A-Basin case can be used in both undergraduate and graduate strategic (or marketing) management courses. It is probably best considered during the middle of an academic term, as the case requires students to apply many of the theoretical concepts of strategy. One of the best books to enable students to use Porter’s five forces is Understanding Michael Porter by Joan Magretta (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012). Magretta was a colleague of Porter for many years and was an Editor of the Harvard Business Review. For a discussion of the VRIN/VRIO concept, see Chapter 4 of Essentials of Strategic Management by Gamble, Peteraf and Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2019).

The pandemic induced lockdown lead to supply and manufacturing disruptions that were swiftly dealt with by the Indian Pharma Industry through successful industry-government collaboration. By May 2020 production was back to normal and exports were higher than the same period in May 2019. The case deals with the processes that enabled this to happen, the policy responses and the changes that happened in the period from March 2020 to August 2020.

The case study will help improve systemic gender-related challenges for women in STEM, male-dominated nontraditional workplaces, such as mining, and contribute to CASE FOR WOMEN database of women-centered business teaching cases.

The learning objectives are as follows: discuss gender issues in nontraditional science, technology, engineering, mathematics (STEM)–related male-dominated industries; conduct a strategic competitive strengths and weaknesses, the opportunities and threats analysis and political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental analysis; evaluate relevant information and decision criteria to assess the options; provide recommendations for strengthening vision mission and strategy; and analyze the business model using the Business Model Canvas.

Alicia Woods (she/her), founder of Covergalls Inc., was facing an unexpected challenge during the COVID-19 worldwide pandemic restrictions and lockdowns which had created an unprecedented disruption to her business. Should Covergalls continue on its current path, or was it time to branch out?

This case is suitable for diversity, equality and inclusion, strategic management, entrepreneurship, marketing or leadership courses at the undergraduate BBA and graduate MBA level on campus or online.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CCS 3: Entrepreneurship.

UrbanClap was setup in October 2014 to address the opportunity of bringing the workforce from the unorganised sector into the mainstream using the power of technology. It was an on-demand marketplace for services available through a mobile app. In the initial years, UrbanClap, developed as horizontal marketplace, saw intense competition from existing and new players who were operating in the hyperlocal services space. It competed in the on-demand service marketplace by categorising its services into a lead generation business (where it connected customers with the service provider and charged a fee for matchmaking) and a fulfilment business (where UrbanClap took end-to-end responsibility for quality of service delivery). After three and half years of operations, the three co-founders wondered if it was time they moved out of lead generation and instead focussed on the fulfilment business.