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Patent litigation consists of non-market actions that firms undertake to access intellectual property rights defined by prior legislation and enforced by the courts. Thus, patent litigation provides an interesting context in which to explore aspects of firm’s non-market strategies. In contrast with prior non-market strategy research that has largely focused on how political institutions define the rules of the game for market competition, non-market actions within patent litigation primarily seek to access and apply these broad policies to specific situations, products, or assets that matter to the firm. Furthermore, because such non-market actions are directly influenced by the firms’ market strategies, they represent a promising area for research on integrated (market and non-market) strategies as well.

The goal of this paper is to explain how generic patent strategies that firms use to support their competitive advantage in the product-market influence non-market outcomes related to the timing of patent litigation resolution. In contrast with prior research that has studied settlement in patent litigation essentially as a one-shot bargaining game, this paper seeks to explain litigation resolution as an outcome of the competing mechanisms of settlement and adjudication that operate continually during litigation. Using a large sample of patent litigations in research medicines and computers, I model the timing of patent litigation resolution in a proportional hazards framework, wherein settlement and adjudication are competing risks. The evidence found is consistent with the proposition that the speed with which patent litigation is resolved by either settlement or adjudication reflects the use of proprietary, defensive, and leveraging patent strategies by firms. These findings also help to explain unexpected and anomalous findings regarding the settlement of patent litigation reported in prior research.

We examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation. Recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to R&D. Yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid-1980s. We explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 U.S. semiconductor firms during 1979–1995. The results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of U.S. patent rights spawned “patent portfolio races” among capital-intensive firms, but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms.

Scholars of business, economics, and law have long recognized that rights to intellectual property (IP) intimately shape innovative activity and the pursuit of profits. More than 60 years ago, Michal Polanyi voiced the following concerns about awarding property rights to creations of the “intellect”:The law…aims at a purpose which cannot be rationally achieved. It tries to parcel up a stream of creative thought into a series of distinct claims, each of which is to constitute the basis of a separately owned monopoly. But the growth of human knowledge cannot be divided into such sharply circumscribed phases. Ideas usually develop gradually by shades of emphasis, and even when, from time to time, sparks of discovery flare up and suddenly reveal a new understanding, it usually appears that the new idea has been at least partly foreshadowed in previous speculations. (Polanyi, 1944, pp. 70–71)

Patent litigation has been rising rapidly in the United States since the mid-1980s, and particularly so in high-technology industries. The strategies pursued by firms with their patents have a significant influence on their decisions to file suit, and on the outcomes within litigation. The influence of strategic motivations on settlement outcomes is studied in two illustratively different industries – computers and research medicines. Evidence is found for two types of influences – the use of patents (as isolating mechanisms) to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their “defensive” role in obtaining access to external technologies (through mutual hold-up).

This article explores the effect of technological similarity in acquisitions on invention quantity and quality. In doing so, we confirm previous findings in the literature suggesting that technological similarity exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovative output and a negative relationship with average invention quality. However, we identify the nature of the technology as an important moderating factor for both relationships. We distinguish between two types of technologies, complex and discrete, and suggest that at high levels of technological similarity, invention quantity and average quality increase more in complex technology industries as compared to discrete technology industries. These effects are attributed to innovation cumulativeness and the interdependencies developed between patent rights in complex technology settings. A study of acquisition and patenting activity in two industries over a sixteen-year period provides empirical support to our claims.

In this chapter a typology is presented that typically describes strategic patent management practices in four development categories. The underlying framework integrates patent functions with strategic planning attitudes. Policy makers can apply it to survey the actual use of patents in order to identify the potential for improvement in SME-owned patent exploitation. Managers of these organisations can use it to evaluate the current patent management practice for taking the next step towards a more active use of patents. Operationalisation of the framework into a questionnaire is grounded in a pilot study of three biotechnology firms, differing in size and age. The result has consequently been applied in a case study consisting of 16 small-sized biopharmaceutical companies in the Netherlands. After presenting results from this sample of patent management practices, we present our findings and discuss the validity and use of the typology for the above-mentioned purposes.

This chapter explores the extent to which an innovator is able to capture innovation rents. After examining the two main drivers of such rents, the strength of the appropriability regime and the ownership of specialized complementary assets, the chapter examines how their interaction is so critical in affecting imitation, commercialization options, and firm performance. After reviewing the underlying conceptual framework and empirical evidence, and using a perspective that cuts across both time and industries, the authors then discuss the implications of innovation profits for the resources to be devoted to the discovery of new or improved product and processes.

Purpose – Firm acquisitions have been shown to serve as a way to gain access to international markets, technological assets, products or other valuable resources of the target firm. Given this heterogeneity of takeover motivations and the skewness of the distribution of the deal value we show whether and how the importance of different takeover motivations changes along the deal value distribution.

Methodology/approach – On the basis of a comprehensive dataset of 652 European mergers and acquisitions in the period from 1997 to 2003, we use quantile regressions to decompose the deal value at different points of its distribution.

Findings – Our results indicate that the importance of technological assets is higher for smaller target firms while the importance of non-technological assets seems to be higher for larger targets. The findings support the view on small acquisition targets to complement the acquirer's technology portfolio while larger acquisition targets tend to be used to gain access to international markets.

Research limitations/implications (if applicable) – Our findings suggest that the average firm as a reference for study might not be appropriate to address as the size of the target firm influences the value attribution to the target's assets.

Practical implications (if applicable) – Managers in the acquiring firm should be aware that they might overpay for the technological assets of a small firm. However, the acquisition of larger targets requires a well-developed integration strategy.

Originality/value of paper – For the first time, the broad merger motive of technology acquisition has been further qualified according to the size of the target which exhibits a considerable impact.

Innovation is a key driver of a firm’s ability to survive in the financial market. Previous studies typically consider a firm dead once its shares are delisted from the stock exchange. Despite its negative connotation, delisting may be a strategic decision and therefore be a positive outcome for the company. We study how a firm’s innovative activity, in terms of R&D investments and number of patents, shapes its survival profile, taking into account the heterogeneous nature of delistings. Using a sample of high-tech small and medium enterprises (SMEs) going public in Europe during 1998–2003, we find that more innovative firms, both in terms of patents and R&D investments, have a higher probability to be taken over. However, while firms with a rich portfolio of patents are less likely to voluntarily delist, higher R&D investments increase a firm’s likelihood of being delisted due to compliance failure.

Intellectual property (IP) and the legal protection thereof are of paramount importance in innovation. IP plays an important role in each of the four fundamental nodes of the Cyclic Innovation Model (CIM). While no one can claim property rights on knowledge in the science node, intellectual property rights (IPR) are essential in the development of new technology-based products (technology node and product node), because it prohibits competitors who did not incur the cost of R&D from unauthorized copying.