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To explore the importance of the board of director nomination process (that is, who nominates a given director for a position on the firm’s board) for the voting outcomes, disciplining of management, and overall monitoring quality of the board of directors.

We exploit a recent regulation passed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requiring disclosure of the board nomination process. In particular, we focus on firms’ use of executive search firms versus allowing internal members (often simply the CEO) to nominate new directors to serve on the board of directors.

We show that companies that use search firms to find board members pay their CEOs significantly higher salaries and significantly higher total compensations. Further, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly less likely to fire their CEOs following negative performance. In addition, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and see abnormally low returns from this M&A activity. We instrument the endogenous choice of using an executive search through the varying geographic distance of companies to executive search firms. Using this instrumental variable framework, we show search firm-identified independent directors’ negative impact on firm performance, consistent with firm behavior and governance consequences we document.

Given the recent law passage, we are the first to directly analyze the nomination process, and show a surprisingly large predictive effect of seemingly arm’s-length nominations. This has clear implications for thinking carefully through how independence is defined in the director nomination process.

Using data from a top-five global executive placement firm, the authors explore how an organization's financial misconduct may affect pay for former employees not implicated in wrongdoing. Drawing on stigma theory, they hypothesize that although such alumni did not participate in the financial misconduct and they had left the organization years before the misconduct, these alumni experience a compensation penalty. The stigma effect increases in relation to the job function proximity to the misconduct, recency of the misconduct, and an employee's seniority. Collectively, results suggest that the stigma of financial misconduct could reach alumni employees and need not be confined to executives and directors that oversaw the organization during the misconduct.

The search for top executives is fraught with pitfalls. Understanding them will set the process off on a strong footing and maximize the chances of a sustainable hire. This chapter examines three aspects of the search dynamic: “stakeout,” “trust-building” and the search consultant’s “ambassador role.” We reveal nine important insights. Has digitization made headhunting any easier? We correct common misconceptions and reveal the difficulty of approaching top executives with role propositions, the building of trusted relationships with clients, and the ambassador role of the executive search consultant. We examine the need for empathy and deep discernment in reading candidates. We next go more deeply into the full search process: the selection of the search firm, the search itself, the presentation of the chosen candidate and onboarding. We reveal points of attention for clients and candidates that underpin best practice.

An earlier form of this chapter by the author was published in Dutch in “Bestemming Boardroom: over zoeken en gevonden worden” (Boom, Amsterdam, 2018).

Many in the private and public sectors see headhunting as a “necessary evil.” A tour of investors, business schools, executive and supervisory board directors throws up unflattering descriptions. Accusations of “opacity” are probably linked to the industry’s duty of discretion. Other observers signal a need for improvement: “pumping the same names around,” “emphasis on reputation, not merit,” “lack of quality” and “low innovation.” The battle to professionalize is underway. We look at the avenues ahead for executive hiring, the demise of the “old boys’ network” and the need for diversity and sustainability in modern organizations. We present the difficulties of running a headhunting firm, and distinguishing factors of the best players. We argue that selecting a headhunter demands the same rigor as choosing a lawyer, and six areas of improvement for executive search firms. Unpacking the Spartan marathon to the boardroom, we reveal the surprising estimates of the number of new high potentials entering the market annually. We conclude by looking at possible blind spots on both sides of the hiring equation that can undermine company interests, and continue to examine the march to professionalize the executive search industry.

An earlier form of this chapter by the author was published in Dutch in “Bestemming Boardroom: over zoeken en gevonden worden” (Boom, Amsterdam, 2018) and in English (online) by the Amrop Partnership (2021) as “Destination Boardroom 3: Mapping the Executive Search World.”

For a successful search, all members of the client–headhunter–candidate trio need to step up to the plate. How can clients better prepare for and engage in the search process? What are the current limits of client engagement and their rights vis-á-vis the headhunter? We explain why headhunting is different from recruitment, and why procuring executive search is as serious as other assets. We reveal the depth of questioning and bias management that it takes to reveal and attract the right candidate. We propose five points to build into the profile of the leader of the future. We next take a look at the clients of executive search firms – who come in all shapes and sizes. Van Eijck distinguishes four groups: multinationals, family businesses, private equity firms and public institutions. A tour signals points of attention for each group regarding a search process and some key points that apply across the spectrum – for example, how wildcard candidates can compromise a search process, the persistent problem of “no pay no cure” and why an appointment doesn’t always guarantee success. Finally, we move to the world of the executive candidate. Many make errors (also of judgment) when building their CVs. A seasoned headhunter can easily spot these. We present the keys to forging a robust story, working effectively with an executive search consultant and conclude with the features of the modern educational and work environment that can get in the way of a career.

An earlier form of this chapter by the author was published in Dutch in “Bestemming Boardroom: over zoeken en gevonden worden” (Boom, Amsterdam, 2018).

As the economy re-shapes, so too must the modern organization and its governance. We examine corporate governance codes and their limits in predicting an executive’s performance. We look at the Code of Professional Practice of executive search consultants, the in-built factors that have prevented the sector from becoming a qualified profession, and how to move beyond them. We examine how sustainability is migrating to the heart of modern governance, and present eight reasons to change existing codes and a call for tolerant governance. Mining engineer Henri Fayol is considered the founder of corporate governance. Despite dramatic changes in management during the past 100 years, much of his theory still holds. We take a tour of Fayol’s thinking, how management has evolved, and examine the unstructured shape of things to come: an organic architecture, an emphasis on knowledge capital and an agile leadership culture. We conclude with “change ability” – an evolutionary leap for the chair, CFO, supervisory board and organizations as a whole. The executive search profession finally comes under a harsh spotlight. What’s next for the profession, in light of digitization, its representation on boards, its effect on diversity? And why do executive search firms need to walk the sustainability talk in the way they seek and position leaders?

An earlier form of this chapter by the author was published in Dutch in “Bestemming Boardroom: over zoeken en gevonden worden” (Boom, Amsterdam, 2018).

This chapter examines collaboration among highly autonomous, powerful, professional peers to explain why the benefits of teamwork that scholars typically find in traditional teams may not apply. The chapter analyzes the perspectives of individual professionals to show that, in this setting, collaboration is often seen as more costly than rewarding for the individuals involved. It presents a conceptual framework exploring this paradox and suggests directions for future research to elaborate an underlying theory.

The chapter draws on extensive qualitative data from surveys and interviews in three professional service firms, including a top 100 global law firm, a boutique executive search firm, and a large, US-based commercial advisory firm. Findings are married integrated with organizational theory to develop testable propositions for future research.

Because senior professionals collaborate with peers who have the autonomy to choose to work collectively or independently, power and authority are not means to create a team or make it effective. Findings show how professionals interpret the relative costs and benefits of collaboration, and suggest that in most cases, senior professionals will not attempt it or give it up before collaborations can reap important benefits. Thus, short-term costs prevent opportunities to experience longer term benefits for many professionals. Yet, some professionals have figured out how to use “instrumental collaboration” to shift the balance in their favor. The chapter’s conceptual framework uses a longitudinal perspective to resolve this seeming paradox.

The chapter presents a nascent theory of instrumental collaboration, including five testable hypotheses, an emergent conceptual framework, and suggestions for specific future research directions.

Are White and Asian job applicants advantaged in access to professional jobs relative to Black and Latinx job applicants at the initial screening stage of the hiring process? And, are the mechanisms of advantage for White applicants different than the mechanisms for Asian applicants? In this chapter, the author proposes a theoretical framework of “parallel mechanisms” of White and Asian advantage during hiring screening – that White and Asian applicants are advantaged compared to Black and Latinx applicants, but that the mechanisms of advantage subtly differ. The author focuses specifically on mechanisms related to two important factors at the hiring interface: referrals and educational attainment. The author applies the concept of parallel mechanisms to a case study of software engineering hiring at a midsized high technology firm in Silicon Valley. The author finds that at this firm, White applicants are advantaged at initial screening relative to Black and Latinx applicants due to average racial differences in applicant characteristics – namely having a referral – as well as differences in treatment by recruiters. For Asian applicants, average racial differences in possession of elite educational credentials, as well as racial differences in recruiter treatment, explain the racial disparity in callbacks. The author discusses the implications of parallel mechanisms of advantage for racial inequality in a multiracial context, and for organizational policy meant to address racial disparities during organizational hiring processes.