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Emerging markets are said to have sustained relatively well in the recent global crisis. There are several factors that help explain this popular view, such as, for example, perceived separation from key international financial centres. Still a lot is to be digested in the crisis aftermath with immediate implications for financial markets and real economy. This chapter offers a unique insight into dynamics within transition economies via an extended blended fiscal–monetary policy rules model with possibility of foreign reserves targeting and foreign currency-denominated debt dynamics. Calibration is based on actual data and is done under various targets and financial risk conditions. Prudent monetary policy and fiscal policy initiatives within current context drive the choice of targets. That may help dampen negative impacts of the crisis and thwart potential currency run. This chapter advances three possible post-crisis scenarios, each with unique solution for reserves, exchange rate, sustainable debt and output levels. Categorizing between net exporters and net importers based on countries' external positions, group-specific results are derived. While both groups are susceptible to exchange-rate risk affected by a multitude of shocks due to their fragile financial system, net importers risk high inflation, but net exporters over-borrowing. This chapter contributes to the literature on global financial crisis, macroeconomic policy, and role of nominal targets and foreign reserves in emerging markets.

Our paper presents an extension of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs to an open market economy. We examine domestic banks that are subject to potential runs by domestic depositors who worry that they will not be able to be repaid in full, because the domestic banks may not be able to refinance in the international financial markets. A loss in confidence in the banking system might precipitate a bank run. A bank run might be costly to safety net guarantors, for example, the central bank. Further, a bank run might lead to a breaking of the fixed exchange rate. Our model shows that adding central bank and International Monetary Fund guarantees, increasing long term debt as well as more equity financing reduces financial fragility, but consistent with economic intuition, these policy levers cannot eliminate the possibility of a bank run or a banking crisis leading to a currency crisis.

Several developing economies witnessed a large number of systemic financial and currency crises since the 1980s that resulted in severe economic, social, and political problems. The devastating impact of the 1982 and 1994–1995 Mexican crises, the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, and the ongoing financial crisis of 2008–2009 suggests that maintaining financial sector stability through reduction in vulnerability is highly crucial. The world is now witnessing an unprecedented systemic financial crisis originated from the USA in September 2008 together with a deep worldwide economic recession, particularly in developed countries of Europe and North America. This calls for devising and using on a regular basis an appropriate and effective monitoring and policy formulation system for detecting and addressing vulnerabilities leading to crisis. This chapter proposes a macroprudential/financial soundness monitoring, analysis, and remedial policy formulation system that can be used by most developing countries with or without crisis experience as well as with limited data. It also discusses a process for identifying and compiling a set of leading macroprudential/financial soundness indicators. An empirical illustration using Philippines data is presented. There is an urgent need for increased coordination, collaboration, and partnership among central banks, banking and financial market supervision agencies, and ministries of finance, economic, and planning for proper macroprudential monitoring. A high-level national financial stability committee under the auspices of the head of the state as well as a ‘‘regional financial stability board’’ needs to be established to complement and support the activities of an “international stability board.”

Post-crisis policy measures in Asia have focussed on banking sector and market reform. The paper argues that in order to propel growth, banking and market reform in Asia must be undertaken with the view that they are not mutually exclusive competitive tradeoffs. Rather banks and markets must be viewed as complementary supportive pillars in a financial system. Additionally, legal and functional reform must be undertaken simultaneously. The paper proposes that a likely consequence of doing so will enable creating a four-pillared multi-dimensional growth paradigm in the region to help restore and promote growth.

The article provides a comparative critique of the financial underpinnings of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the recent wave of financial crises. The collapse of the financial systems in many developing nations, the bankruptcies in the Anglo-Saxon corporate sectors and a threat of more sovereign defaults on behalf of emerging markets suggest that the current wave of global financial fragility and recession rivals that of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The paper examines key elements that account for the crisis-prone nature of global capitalism: the political discipline of neo-liberalism, debt-driven expansion of the privatised financial markets, and the profound disarticulation of the financial and real economies. These factors suggests that the risk of a global depression is by no means hypothetical, and unless effective and collaborative efforts are made to tame the inherently unstable regime of global finance, even major world economies are faced with a prolonged period of financial turbulence and economic stagnation. The paper concludes by pondering the possibility of a paradigmatic shift in the transnational political consensus that can prevent a global repetition of the 1930s. While the increased awareness of financial instability and crisis may indeed prompt some ad hoc adjustments in national and foreign economic policies of major capitalist powers, in the long run these measures will be insufficient to prevent a major financial and economic disaster.

At the time they occurred, the savings and loan insolvencies were considered the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Contrary to what was then believed, and in sharp contrast with 2007–2009, they in fact had little macroeconomic significance. Savings and Loan (S&L) remediation cost between 2 percent and 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the conservatorships of Fannie and Freddie actually made money for the US Treasury. But the direct cost of government remediation is largely irrelevant in judging macro significance. What matters is the cumulative output loss associated with and plausibly caused by failing financial institutions. I estimate output losses for 1981–1984, 1991–1998, and 2007–2026 (the latter utilizing forecasts and projections along with actual data through 2015) and, for a final comparison, 1929–1941. The losses associated with 2007–2009 have been truly disastrous – in the same order of magnitude as the Great Depression. The S&L failures were, in contrast, inconsequential. Macroeconomists and policy makers should reserve the word crisis for financial disturbances that threaten substantial damage to the real economy, and continue efforts to identify in advance financial institutions which are systemically important (SIFI), and those which are not.

This book is an attempt to reflect on what we have learned from financial policies and financial crises in Latin America. The 21 chapters in this volume capture the developments in various ways. They cover theoretical contributions, regional empirical studies, and specific inquiries on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. The breadth of methodologies implemented suggests that researchers are looking at Latin American financial markets through a variety of lenses. The chapters are divided into 7 parts, including, in Part I, an initial overview. Part II examines the foreign exchange markets in Latin America and their interactions with other markets. Part III discusses dollarization issues in the region. Part IV then takes up the issue of banking in Latin America. Equity and bond markets are considered in Parts V and VI, respectively. Lastly, Part VII considers pension systems in Latin America. Taken as a whole, the 21 chapters seize the excitement of studying Latin America and provide lessons that are applicable around the world.

A perplexing problem that has challenged emerging economies in their quest for sustainable economic development has centered around their ability in coping with currency crises. This chapter explores how emerging economies in parts of Asia and Latin America have learned to cope and in some cases overcome the problems associated with rapid growth on the one hand and foreign exchange difficulties on the other. The authors explain the Asian financial crisis of the late nineties through fundamental breakdowns in economic principles, the failure of the much admired East Asian miracle under Asian circumstances, and the instability introduced to the Asian environment through rapid, short term, quickreturn-seeking capital flows.

The paper discusses recent changes in conventional wisdom about the optimality of fixed and flexible exchange rates. It develops the important difference between traditional and hard currency fixing. The main part of the paper analyzes the traditional benefits and costs of fixed currencies, how they are changed by first modifications of and second fundamental challenges to the Keynesian paradigm. The last part reviews empirical finding that fixed currencies hard currency fixing leads to a higher economic growth.