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This chapter discusses several testable implications of Lazear's (1979) model of mandatory retirement and tests whether they are consistent with the data, using a sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men. Empirical evidence on the close association between firm pension programs and mandatory retirement programs can be interpreted to lend support to Lazear's model. However, estimates from an econometric model of retirement behavior reject an important implication of the model concerning the relationship between mandatory retirement and the propensity to retire early.

Purpose – This chapter examines the licensing behavior of patent pools when they are unconstrained by antitrust rules.

Design/methodology/approach – Patent pools allow competing firms to combine their patents and license them as a package to outside firms. Regulators today favor pools that license their patents freely to outside firms, making it difficult to observe the unconstrained licensing strategies of patent pools. This chapter takes advantage of a unique period of regulatory tolerance during the New Deal to investigate the unconstrained licensing decisions of pools. Archival evidence suggests that – in the absence of regulation – pools may not choose to license their technologies.

Findings/originality/value – Eleven of twenty pools that formed between 1930 and 1938 did not issue any licenses to outside firms. Three pools granted one, two, and three licenses, respectively, to resolve litigation. Six pools issued between 9 and 185 licenses. Archival evidence suggests that the pools studied in this chapter used licensing as a means to limit competition with substitute technologies.