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This paper proposes a simple model to classify economists according to their preferences towards quality and/or quantity of their publications. When more emphasis is placed on quantity they are defined as r‐strategists. When they put more effort in the quality of their papers targeting top journals, they are defined as K‐strategists. It is shown that prestigious departments tend to select K‐strategists. By analyzing which strategy maximizes the influence of an economist in the profession, the paper shows that neither r‐, nor K‐strategists are the winners. The paper conjectures that the economists more likely to be successful in the profession follow the Samuelson‐strategy, which is characterized by a balance between quality and quantity.

With the expanded use of forensic economists by the legal system has come a heightened awareness within the profession of potential and actual unethical behaviour by its members. Examines the arguments explaining unethical behaviour in detail and shows that their descriptive and empirical foundations have been excessively narrow. The market does not consist solely of trial testimony, as the literature would lead one to believe, but in the entire array of uses of forensic economists, especially in writing reports of economic damages. Asserts that the ethical conduct of most forensic economists appears to be unimpeachable. Moreover, there are strong competitive pressures in the market to obtain countervailing opinions which, ultimately, serve to minimize incompetence and unethical behaviour on the part of forensic economists. Recommendations to improve the market further include the provision of additional information about the quality of forensic economists′ work, and promotion of a code of ethics for the profession. Concludes with a proposal that might be considered if ethical conduct among forensic economists were to take a turn for the worse: creation of an expert registry that would assign economists to a case, without the economist knowing which side employed him.

A collection of essays by a social economist seeking to balance economics as a science of means with the values deemed necessary to man′s finding the good life and society enduring as a civilized instrumentality. Looks for authority to great men of the past and to today′s moral philosopher: man is an ethical animal. The 13 essays are: 1. Evolutionary Economics: The End of It All? which challenges the view that Darwinism destroyed belief in a universe of purpose and design; 2. Schmoller′s Political Economy: Its Psychic, Moral and Legal Foundations, which centres on the belief that time‐honoured ethical values prevail in an economy formed by ties of common sentiment, ideas, customs and laws; 3. Adam Smith by Gustav von Schmoller – Schmoller rejects Smith′s natural law and sees him as simply spreading the message of Calvinism; 4. Pierre‐Joseph Proudhon, Socialist – Karl Marx, Communist: A Comparison; 5. Marxism and the Instauration of Man, which raises the question for Marx: is the flowering of the new man in Communist society the ultimate end to the dialectical movement of history?; 6. Ethical Progress and Economic Growth in Western Civilization; 7. Ethical Principles in American Society: An Appraisal; 8. The Ugent Need for a Consensus on Moral Values, which focuses on the real dangers inherent in there being no consensus on moral values; 9. Human Resources and the Good Society – man is not to be treated as an economic resource; man′s moral and material wellbeing is the goal; 10. The Social Economist on the Modern Dilemma: Ethical Dwarfs and Nuclear Giants, which argues that it is imperative to distinguish good from evil and to act accordingly: existentialism, situation ethics and evolutionary ethics savour of nihilism; 11. Ethical Principles: The Economist′s Quandary, which is the difficulty of balancing the claims of disinterested science and of the urge to better the human condition; 12. The Role of Government in the Advancement of Cultural Values, which discusses censorship and the funding of art against the background of the US Helms Amendment; 13. Man at the Crossroads draws earlier themes together; the author makes the case for rejecting determinism and the “operant conditioning” of the Skinner school in favour of the moral progress of autonomous man through adherence to traditional ethical values.

The author′s purpose is to show by reference to Schmoller′s own writings that he can be classified as a social economist. Schmoller rejected the study of economics in isolation, but preferred a holistic approach. He eschewed laissez‐faire and thought little of self‐seeking entrepreneurs who made no contribution to the common good.

It is suggested that the approach of the social economist to social problems, if followed, would lead to The Good Society, one in which the lot of our “human resources” would be considerably ameliorated. For the social economist the goal of the economy is not private profit nor is it improvement in the fertility of the soil nor capital accumulation for their own sakes and that of their owners, but the material, moral and spiritual well‐being of homo sapiens. The social economist is concerned with the efficiency of the capitalist system relative to the broad goals of society, rather than the maximisation of private property.

“Communism has never concealed the fact that it rejects all absolute concepts of morality. It scoffs at any consideration of “good” and “evil” as indisputable categories. Communism considers morality to be relative, to be a class matter… It has infected the whole world with the belief in the relativity of good and evil.” Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 1975.

The purpose of this article is to suggest a solution to the quandary from which the economist appears unable or unwilling to extricate himself. The quandary is his own production. On the one hand, the economist is jealous of his position as scientist, a disinterested pursuer of the truth, and on the other hand, he has an irresistible urge to use his knowledge as an economist for the purpose of relieving society, and, indeed, civilisation of its social ills. To suggest how social ills may be cured is to define goals to be reached. To choose goals is to make value judgements. There is no quandary where the economist as economist simply makes value judgments and still adopts the posture of the scientist. Such dualism, however, incurs the displeasure of those of a critical turn of mind. It actually brings forth censure and suggestions that value judgments should be openly made.

Allyn Young′s lectures, as recorded by the young Nicholas Kaldor, survey the historical roots of the subject from Aristotle through to the modern neo‐classical writers. The focus throughout is on the conditions making for economic progress, with stress on the institutional developments that extend and are extended by the size of the market. Organisational changes that promote the division of labour and specialisation within and between firms and industries, and which promote competition and mobility, are seen as the vital factors in growth. In the absence of new markets, inventions as such play only a minor role. The economic system is an inter‐related whole, or a living “organon”. It is from this perspective that micro‐economic relations are analysed, and this helps expose certain fallacies of composition associated with the marginal productivity theory of production and distribution. Factors are paid not because they are productive but because they are scarce. Likewise he shows why Marshallian supply and demand schedules, based on the “one thing at a time” approach, cannot adequately describe the dynamic growth properties of the system. Supply and demand cannot be simply integrated to arrive at a picture of the whole economy. These notes are complemented by eleven articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which were published shortly after Young′s sudden death in 1929.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

In this article we shall argue that the Keynesian revolution was a revolution in the sense of Kuhn and that Kuhn's conceptual framework provides a better understanding of the convulsive changes that took place in macro‐economics in the twenties and thirties than alternative growth of knowledge theories that are being discussed in the economics literature at the present time. In the last ten years or so economists have become increasingly interested in the various growth of knowledge theories that have been developed by philosophers of science such as Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos and others. This heightened interest on the part of economists is to be explained by the fact that these new theories are based on the actual behaviour of scientists. The new philosophers of science devote their attention not to “correct scientific method” but to the actual behaviour of scientists. It is because of this revolution in the historiography of science that economists have been able to relate these new theories to their own work and to the development of economic theories in the past.