Social Licence and Ethical Practice: Volume 27

The concept of the ‘social licence to operate’ (SLO) is contested on almost every imaginable dimension. Stakeholders may decry it as an industry-created ploy to ethics wash their operations and strategically manipulate community relations, while some industry figures despair over what they perceive as the arbitrary and even unilateral power that the weaponized concept of the social licence gifts to activists who seek to malign and disrupt law-abiding commercial operators. Others have lauded the social licence as a heaven-sent ethical tool, an effective lever for action that motivates leaders at profit-seeking enterprises to seriously consider ethical issues and prioritize community engagement. Still others will worry that a concept that can mean everything to everyone must ultimately mean nothing at all, and that the social licence is an empty and unhelpful buzzword. As the contributions to this Special Issue show, in different contexts – and sometimes even in the same context but for different stakeholders – all these views can be correct. From an ethical perspective, dangers, promises and irrelevance all attend the social licence.

The social licence literature contains two quite different accounts of the concept. Sometimes social licence is presented as an essentially empirical matter; sometimes it is portrayed as having normative significance. Both advocates and critics assume that the normative version is easy to generate from the empirical version but the author argues that it is difficult to account for the normativity of social licence. It is commonly claimed that social licence is a ‘metaphor’ or ‘analogy’ drawing on familiar understandings of institutional licences, and standard accounts purport to ‘build in’ normativity. Neither strategy establishes the normativity of social licence. If that is correct, we have reason to be sceptical about the normative significant of claims about the possession of empirical social licence. The approval or acceptance by affected communities may be one factor to be taken into account in such analysis, but it will not itself settle whether a practice ought to be approved or accepted or licenced.

This chapter is a journey into the ontological significance of place in consideration of the Atlantic Tasmanian salmon industry and its challenges to the ethical discourse around the social license to operate (SLO) beyond the oxymoron of a name. It centres the discourse around the salmon itself. A once totem animal, responsible for the balance of Canada’s abundant ecosystem, now reduced to a mere source of protein, manipulated, and commodified by Tasmania’s ‘big business’ and against the SLO of Flanagan’s ‘Toxic’. It applies Ortega y Gasset’s mid-twentieth century solution to the problem of our western disconnection from place to the current neoliberal political framework. This welcomes an inclusive dialogue with kinship structures of the Mi’kmaq peoples reflected also in the ontological narrative of the First Nations people of Tasmania. This multidisciplinary journey necessitates a concept of the SLO founded upon ethical responsibility and a cultural license if it is to genuinely hold to account the corporate sovereign.

International humanitarian law (IHL) is struggling to catch up with military technological development. The international community is increasingly alarmed at the prospect of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) operating without a human interface. The international community’s concern with autonomous enabling technology in weapon systems is whether weapon systems with the ability to identify, select, and attack military targets with little to no human control can comply with existing IHL rules and be morally and ethically acceptable.

This chapter explores an expanded concept of social licence to operate (SLO) to regulate the development of LAWS. The authors believe that it is more efficacious to take a preventative and precautious approach by holding the developers accountable to IHL during the gestation period instead of following a post facto approach. The authors argue that the process involved in issuing or revoking an SLO for the developers of LAWS is already beginning to emerge in IHL. The SLO is only effective during the developmental cycle and would continue as soft law form in regulating the use of LAWS until a more concrete, treaty-based response emerges. In this sense, the SLO can be seen as a catalyst towards a concerted international response to regulate the development, deployment, and use of LAWS.

According to The Ethics Centre (2018) ‘[T]he social license to operate (SLO) is made up of three components: legitimacy, credibility, and trust’. These three components serve to frame the relationship that has emerged and continues to evolve, its root arguably dating back to the Enlightenment and Post-industrial ages, between the worlds of capitalist commercial and industrial operations, and the liberal-democratic citizenry/consumers of society. The ‘SLO’, it will be shown, has historical grounding that indicate the SLO is a broader translatable concept not limited to the business realm. The SLO, the evidence will show, is a multifaceted concept not least, a unifying vehicle utilized for the purpose of acceptance, to advance normative concerns, and resistance, against questionable and harmful practices. Evidently, many domains of human services operate sub-optimally with less than favourable outcomes. In effect, this translates to structural injustices as characterized by poor understanding, insufficient standards of practice, ineffective safeguard, and governance institutions, perpetuated by entrenched practices, allowing the rise of mediocre service providers no less enabled by deficient regulation. Accordingly, the ethical focus of this paper is on the healthcare system, the evident and unnecessary deficiencies, and the failings of the central governance institutions involved. The underlying characteristics of what constitutes a SLO arguably, whether in name or not, have been engaged to expose, challenge, and repel, unethical conduct that gave rise to multiple health care-related Royal Commissions across Australia; predominantly, impacting the Disability, Aged Care, and Mental Health (DAM) sectors to name a few of recent times.

Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) promise great benefits, including improving safety, reducing congestion, and providing mobility for elderly and the disabled; however, there are discussions on how they should be programmed to respond in an ethical dilemma where a choice has to be made between two or more courses of action resulting in loss of life. To explore this question, the authors examine the current academic literature where the application of the existing philosophical theories to ethics settings in AVs has been discussed, specifically the utilitarianism and the deontological ethics. These two theories are widely regarded as rivals, and are useful in demonstrating the complex ethical issues that must be addressed when programming AVs. We also look at the legal framework, specifically normative principles in criminal law used to regulate difficult choices in an emergency, which some have suggested as a plausible defence for manufacturers who seek to program AVs using a utilitarian framework. These include the doctrine of necessity, the sudden emergency doctrine, and the duty of care. The authors critique each theory, highlighting their benefits and limitations. The authors then make a case for programming AVs using a randomized decision system (RDS) and propose that it could be a viable solution in dealing with certain moral dilemmas. Finally using our assessment, the authors suggest certain objectives for manufacturers and regulators in designing and programming AVs that are technically viable, and would make them morally acceptable and fair.

We review the 2019 documentary Untouchable, directed by Ursula Macfarlane, about the allegations against Harvey Weinstein. (The film was made and released before Weinstein’s trial and conviction in early 2020.) Macfarlane, by examining the terrifying stories of the Weinstein’s accusers, provides a platform for women to voice their stories and stand in solidarity against sexual harassment in the workplace.

I review the 2019 film Bombshell, directed by Jay Roach. The film presents a fictionalized account of Fox News CEO Roger Ailes’s sexual harassment of his employees. Bombshell’s focus on the experiences of three women illuminates that sexual harassment affects individuals but that collective action can combat it.