PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS AND CONFLICTUAL PREFERENCES IN COLLECTIVE DECISION‐MAKING: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION OF NOVEMBER 1981 IN CANADA

Abstract

Based on a formalization of the 1981 constitutional negotiation in Canada, this article analyses the impact of procedural constraints on collective decisions. Four procedural constraints are considered: voting procedures, voting rules, decision rules, and the order of presentation of options to the vote. Sincere voting (voting according to a voter's preference scale), complete information, and free communication are assumed in the first part of the analysis. The assumption of sincere voting is relaxed in the second part where strategic voting is considered The analysis shows that (1) a collective decision is determined by some interaction of voters' preferences, procedural constraints, and voting strategies, and (2) procedural constraints can be ordered in terms of their relative impact on the collective decision (in decreasing order: decision rules, voting rules, order of presentation, voting procedures). In the conclusion, a general model of the determination of collective decisions is presented.

Citation

Imbeau, L.M. (1992), "PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS AND CONFLICTUAL PREFERENCES IN COLLECTIVE DECISION‐MAKING: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION OF NOVEMBER 1981 IN CANADA", International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 181-206. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022711