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Kuhn, Lakatos, and the History of Economic Thought

Elias Khalil (Southwest Missouri State University)

International Journal of Social Economics

ISSN: 0306-8293

Article publication date: 1 March 1987

541

Abstract

This article attempts to tackle a fundamental methodological question in economics. The task is to investigate whether competing traditions in the history of economics are commensurable or not, that is, whether there is a firm ground on which a researcher could adjudicate the truth content of a theory. Thomas Kuhn in philosophy and Donald McClosky in economics among others are understood to advance the thesis that theories are incommensurable since there is no empirical ground to resort to in order to resolve disputes among traditions in economics. Karl Popper in philosophy and Mark Blaug in economics among others argue that theories are commensurable since there is a sharp and distinct criterion which could determine the scientific content of a theory. A more sophisticated version of Popper's falsificationism has been advanced in philosophy by Imre Lakatos and has been correspondingly followed in economics by Spiro Latsis, E. Roy Weintraub and others.

Citation

Khalil, E. (1987), "Kuhn, Lakatos, and the History of Economic Thought", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 14 No. 3/4/5, pp. 118-131. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb014052

Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1987, MCB UP Limited

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