DYNAMIC SIMULATION OF THE GAME OF CHICKEN

Abstract

The evolution of the conflict of “blackmail” between two individuals is dealt with—both for symmetric and asymmetric contests. State—space diagrams are presented illustrating the dynamical coevolution of the cooperathe propensities of the partners when the games are played inductively—and learning takes place via storing the result of the previous outcome. By changing the three parameters of the game α, č, k (the probability of yield— “chicken”—the tempting factor and the coefficient of mutual loss, respectively) we can modify drastically the probability of “locking‐in” at the cooperative state as well as the dynamical repertoire for each contestant (i.e. the number of states between which his strategy undergoes transitions as well as the probabilities of these transitions). Finally, we study the result of additive white noise on the trajectories of the cooperative propensities, both in the symmetric and the asymmetric case.

Citation

NICOLIS, J.S., MILIAS‐ARGITIS, J. and CARABALIS, D. (1983), "DYNAMIC SIMULATION OF THE GAME OF CHICKEN", Kybernetes, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 9-20. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb005634