NTSB safety recommendations

Citation

(2006), "NTSB safety recommendations", Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Vol. 78 No. 6. https://doi.org/10.1108/aeat.2006.12778fab.014

NTSB safety recommendations

NTSB safety recommendations

Keywords: Aircraft industry, Transportation safety

Safety recommendation A-06-39 and -40

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

^.Issue a flight standards information bulletin to all principal operations inspectors of Convair 580 operators that familiarize operators with the circumstances of the Air Tahoma flight 185 accident, including the importance of closing the fuel tank shutoff valve for the tank not being used during fuel crossfeed operations (A-06-39).

^.Require Convair 580 operators to set the left and right fuel boost pump output pressure settings on their aeroplanes to the same setting (A- 06-40).

Safety recommendation A-06-41

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that Transport Canada:

^.Require Convair 580 operators to set the left and sight fuel boost pump output pressure settings on their aeroplanes to the same setting (A-06-41).

Safety recommendation A-06-36 through A-06-38

The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

^.Compile a list of safety-critical systems derived from the safety assessment process for each type certification project, and place in the official type certification project file the documentation for the rationale, analysis methods, failure scenarios, supporting evidence, and associated issue papers used to identify and assess safety-critical systems (A-06-36).

^.Amend the advisory materials associated with 14 Code of Federal Regulations 25.1309 to include consideration of structural failures and human aeroplane system interaction failures in the assessment of safety-critical systems (A-06-37).

^.Adopt Society of Automotive Engineers ARP5150 into 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 21, 25, 33, and 121 to require a program for the monitoring and ongoing assessment of safety-critical systems throughout the life cycle of the aeroplane. Safety- critical systems will be identified as a result of A-06-36. Once in place, use this program to validate that the underlying assumptions made during design and type certification about safety-critical systems are consistent with operational experience, lessons learned, and new knowledge (A-06-38).