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The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and hedging strategies for interest rate risk

Ming Tsang (Department of Finance, University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, La Crosse, Wisconsin, USA)

Publication date: 9 October 2024

Abstract

Research methodology

This case was developed from published sources. Three types of data were used to develop this case. The accounting data were compiled by the case researcher from bank financial statements such as Form 10-K, Form 8-K and quarterly Financial Highlights issued by the bank. Market data were compiled from data providers such as FactSet, Yahoo! Finance, Pitchbook and the Federal Reserve System. Reports on market developments were gathered from major news outlets such as CNBC, The Wall Street Journal, Fortune and S&P Global.

Case overview/synopsis

Interest rate risk played a big role in the banking crisis of 2023. For Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), which specialized in providing banking services to venture-backed startups in the technology and life sciences sectors, its exposure to interest rate risk and the lack of hedging against interest rate risk had played a crucial role both directly and indirectly in the bank’s failure. This case study discussed the various channels that interest rate risk played in SVB’s failure as well as other risk factors that include an unusually high percentage of uninsured deposits and a high securities-to-asset ratio compared to its industry peers.

In the low interest rate years of 2020 and 2021, startups were able to fundraise a record amount of funding from venture capital (VC) investors. As many startups deposited their funds at SVB, they became an important and concentrated depositor base for the bank and held large deposit accounts that easily exceeded the $250,000 limit insurable by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. SVB benefited from the large deposit inflows in 2020 and 2021. The bank used some of the deposits to fund its loan portfolio, but most of the deposits were used to purchase debt securities such as US Treasuries and agency-used mortgage-backed securities. In fact, SVB’s investments in securities as a percentage of total assets were more than double its peers in the large banking organization (LBO) group, while the amount of loans funded as a percentage of total assets was almost half of its LBO peers.

As interest rates increased rapidly throughout 2022, bond prices fell. SVB experienced unrealized losses of $15.2bn in its held-to-maturity securities portfolio, which was almost equivalent to its equity of $16bn at the time. However, SVB implemented little or no hedging against the risk of rising interest rates. At the same time, fundraising activities slowed in the VC sector amid high interest rates and, thus, SVB’s startups clients had to draw on past deposits to continue to fund their operations. This resulted in SVB experiencing significant deposit outflows throughout 2022.

On March 8, 2023, SVB announced that it had sold all $21bn of its available-for-sale securities portfolio and suffered an $1.8bn in realized losses, which was greater than its entire last year’s net income. Markets jittered following the news. Over the next two days, depositors rushed to withdraw $142bn of deposits that represented 82% of its last year’s total deposits. Unable to withstand the crippling weight of deposit withdrawal, on March 10 the parent company of SVB filed for bankruptcy.

Complexity and academic level

Given the multiplexity of the banking crisis of 2023, this case study specifically discussed the collapse of SVB, which was the second largest bank failure at the time of its collapse. This case would be valuable for finance and economics students to learn how various risk factors interact that precipitated SVB’s failure. While there were many risk factors at play, this case study homes in on how SVB’s exposure to interest rate risk and the lack of hedging contributed to its downfall. For purpose of pedagogy, this case also explains how a bank could use on-balance-sheet as well as off-balance-sheet methods to hedge interest rate risk. This case is appropriate for courses in Risk Management, Derivatives as well as Financial Markets and Institutions with a focus on interest rate risk and its corresponding hedging methods. A course in Money and Banking may also find this case relevant. Before starting, it is assumed that students have already taken foundational finance and macroeconomics courses, have a basic understanding of financial statement analysis and its interpretations, derivative instruments such as futures and swaps, as well as have prior experience with basic duration calculations.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

Disclaimer. This case is intended to be used as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a management situation. The case was compiled from published sources.

Citation

Tsang, M. (2024), "The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and hedging strategies for interest rate risk", , Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/TCJ-05-2024-0168

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2024, Emerald Publishing Limited

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