The model provides an account of the trade-off between domestic and international conflicts generally, and specifies the conditions under which Challenger and/or Defender is advantaged in the international game with the presence of a domestic constraint in the form of Assassin ♯1 or Assassin ♯2. The model generates two striking results in particular. First, Assassin ♯1 can influence the behavior of some Challengers, whereas Assassin ♯2 can determine the behavior of some Defenders. Second, the Challengers who ultimately capitulate are more prone to initiate conflict, in the first place, than are the Challengers who will not capitulate.
Carlson, L. and Dacey, R. (2011), "International and Domestic Uncertainties in the Traditional Deterrence Game", Chatterji, M., Bo, C. and Misra, R. (Ed.) Frontiers of Peace Economics and Peace Science (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Vol. 16), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 37-58. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1572-8323(2011)0000016007Download as .RIS
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