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Do Financial Conglomerates have an Incentive to Prevent Managers of other Firms from Pursuing their Own Interest?

Institutional Investors in Global Capital Markets

ISBN: 978-1-78052-242-5, eISBN: 978-1-78052-243-2

ISSN: 1569-3767

Publication date: 27 September 2011

Abstract

Originality/Value of paper – We develop a theoretical framework to explain the absence of activism of institutional investors integrated in financial conglomerates in the governance of listed firms.

Keywords

Citation

Alves, C. and Mendes, V. (2011), "Do Financial Conglomerates have an Incentive to Prevent Managers of other Firms from Pursuing their Own Interest?", Boubakri, N. and Cosset, J.-C. (Ed.) Institutional Investors in Global Capital Markets (International Finance Review, Vol. 12), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 187-204. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3767(2011)0000012010

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2011, Emerald Group Publishing Limited