Negativity Bias in Investors’ Reactions to Board of Directors’ Risk Oversight Disclosure

Abstract

This study investigates how disclosure of the board of directors’ leadership and role in risk oversight (BODs oversight disclosure) influences investors’ judgments when information on risk exposures is disclosed. The theoretical lens through which we examine this issue involves negativity bias. Sixty-two stock market investors who engage in the evaluation and/or investment of stocks on a regular or professional basis participated in our study. Our results reveal that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure (positive information) does not carry significant weight on investor judgments (i.e., attractiveness and investment) when financial statement disclosures indicate a high level of operational and financial risk exposures (negative information). In contrast, under the condition of a low level of risk exposures, BODs oversight disclosure causes investors to assess higher risk in terms of worry, catastrophic potentials and unfamiliarity about risk information and, in turn, make less favorable investor judgments. Our findings add to the literature on negativity bias and contribute to the debate on the usefulness of disclosures about risk.

Citation

Suh, I. and Ugrin, J. (2015), "Negativity Bias in Investors’ Reactions to Board of Directors’ Risk Oversight Disclosure", Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research (Advances in Accounting Behavioural Research, Vol. 18), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 33-68. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1475-148820150000018002