Management Entrenchment and Stock Option Backdating

Abstract

Using the L. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index (E-index), the authors examine the relation between management entrenchment and the probability of a firm being implicated in the stock option backdating scandal. The authors conduct the analysis of this study using logistic regression, and they document a negative relation between the E-index and the probability of a firm being implicated in the stock option backdating scandal. The results of this study are consistent with the view that management entrenchment is advantageous to shareholders as it protects managers from short-term reporting pressures and egregious opportunistic behavior that can be detrimental to firm value.

Citation

Amoah, N.Y., Bonaparte, I., Lamptey, E.K. and Kelly, M. (2020), "Management Entrenchment and Stock Option Backdating", Lehman, C.R. (Ed.) Resistance and Accountability (Advances in Public Interest Accounting, Vol. 22), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1041-706020200000022001