This study provides a novel set of evidence that (i) communication may mitigate selfishness in social dilemmas and (ii) the source of this phenomenon may be linked to the emotional reaction that communication evokes in humans.
This paper previously circulated under the title “Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game” and is a thoroughly revised version of CES WP 2013.11 and WU Wien Economics WP 161. I wish to thank Enrique Fatas and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions, and Juergen Bracht, Tamás Csermely, Guillaume Fréchette, Yukihito Funaki, Daniel Houser, Nicolas Jacquemet, Frédéric Koessler, Martin Leroch, David Masclet, Ernesto Reuben, Rupert Sausgruber, Thomas A. Stephens, Jean-Marc Tallon, Antoine Terracol, Christian Traxler, Marie Claire Villeval, and Marc Willinger for inspiring discussions at various stages of my work. Participants at 2013 Mainz Workshop “Microfoundations of group conflict,” 2013 International Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory in Lisbon and 2014 ADRES PhD Meeting in Paris delivered helpful comments. Maxim Frolov and Ivan Ouss provided assistance in running the experiments. This work was supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR), through the program Investissements d’Avenir (ANR-10–LABX_93-01). This research was performed within the framework of the LABEX CORTEX (ANR-11-LABX-0042) of Université de Lyon, within the program Investissements d’Avenir (ANR-11-IDEX-007) operated by the French National Research Agency (ANR).
Zylbersztejn, A. (2015), "Nonverbal Feedback, Strategic Signaling, and Nonmonetary Sanctioning: New Experimental Evidence from a Public Goods Game", Replication in Experimental Economics (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 18), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 153-181. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-230620150000018006Download as .RIS
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