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Collusion between public procurers and suppliers in the context of japan’s public procurement: The role of the risks of “unsuccessful procurement”

Satoru Tanaka (Kobe City University of Foreign Studies.)
Shuya Hayashi (Nagoya University Graduate School of Law.)

Journal of Public Procurement

ISSN: 1535-0118

Article publication date: 1 March 2016

248

Abstract

This paper examines the economic forces which may lead to government-assisted or -facilitated bid-rigging (kansei-dango) in public procurement in Japan, and considers their implications. A public official may often worry about situations where his/her procurement project will not be successfully implemented. Based on a simplified theoretical treatment and on case studies of kansei-dango, it is argued that the desire to avert the risk of unsuccessful procurement resulting from the "experience goods" status of procured goods and/or services may be one reason for bid-rigging. Based on this understanding of kansei-dango, we discuss some implications for policies to restrain this type of corruption.

Citation

Tanaka, S. and Hayashi, S. (2016), "Collusion between public procurers and suppliers in the context of japan’s public procurement: The role of the risks of “unsuccessful procurement”", Journal of Public Procurement, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 291-311. https://doi.org/10.1108/JOPP-16-03-2016-B003

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2016 by PrAcademics Press

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