Rethinking corruption on fiscal decentralization and global competitiveness Nexus
ISSN: 1059-5422
Article publication date: 10 January 2020
Issue publication date: 10 September 2020
Abstract
Purpose
This study investigates the effects of fiscal decentralization on global competitiveness through the level of corruption. This study aims to clarify the causal impacts of fiscal decentralization policy on the achievement of competitiveness rank considering the degree of corruption in a country.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses an empirical study using both cross-country arithmetic mean and panel data, covering ten-year period (2005-2014). The analysis uses both linear and non-linear specification in search of actual intermediating effects of corruption with controlling the possible endogeneity.
Findings
The paper provides empirical insights about corruption effects of fiscal decentralization on global competitiveness. It suggests that increasing level of fiscal decentralization has a positive contribution to competitiveness for the less-corrupt countries. The adverse effects appear for corrupt countries where the delegation of fiscal authority should endanger the country competitiveness.
Research limitations/implications
This research exploits the well-known measurement of fiscal decentralization, the degree of corruption and competitiveness. Therefore, this measurement might be challenged for representing the real concept of decentralization, corruption and competitiveness, furthermore its relationship. Despite the limitation, this research explores the entanglement of fiscal decentralization, corruption and competitiveness.
Practical implications
The paper provides the implications for the national policymakers about decentralizing the fiscal authority to achieve higher competitiveness level, through assessing their state of corruption.
Originality/value
The research provides additional comments for Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem in connection to competitiveness, by adding corruption level as pre-requisite condition.
Keywords
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Nobuo Akai (Osaka University), Tsunehiro Otsuki (Osaka University), Yasuhiro Yamada (Osaka University) and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable advises and constructive comments. The author also thanks Secil Er for her assistance on language editing. Any errors in this paper are subjected to the author.
Citation
Chalil, T.M. (2020), "Rethinking corruption on fiscal decentralization and global competitiveness Nexus", Competitiveness Review, Vol. 30 No. 5, pp. 507-527. https://doi.org/10.1108/CR-04-2019-0039
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2020, Emerald Publishing Limited