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Telecommunications after competition: challenges, institutions, regulation

Stanford Levin (Emeritus Professor of Economics at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, Edwardsville, Illinois, USA)
Stephen Schmidt (Chief Regulatory Legal Counsel at TELUS Communications Company, Ottawa, Canada)

info

ISSN: 1463-6697

Article publication date: 16 March 2010

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of the paper is to explore the remaining aspects of telecommunications service that might require continued economic and technical regulation even after competition is present to the maximum extent feasible. The paper further explores the regulatory institutions and practices that will best accomplish this required regulation.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper evaluates the traditional choices between a sector‐specific regulator and a competition authority, as well as ex post and ex ante regulation. In addition, the paper evaluates less traditional methods of regulation including laws of general application, such as consumer protection laws, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and self‐regulation. The characteristics of each of these means of regulation are identified, and, following a set of principles, the regulatory institutions and practices are matched to the areas of telecommunications requiring regulation.

Findings

The paper identifies five areas of telecommunications that will likely require continuing regulation and matches a regulatory institution or practice to each of the five areas of regulation. These five areas are retail regulation of local services in rural and remote areas with insufficient competition for forbearance, interconnection of competing networks and essential facilities, duty to serve (carrier of last resort and obligation to serve), subsidies for high‐cost or low‐income customers, and social regulation such as emergency service and message relay obligations.

Originality/value

Previous studies have not focused on the need for continuing regulation after competition develops to the maximum extent feasible. Also, studies typically consider the limited framework of a sector‐specific regulator or a competition authority and do not consider the other regulatory options or institutions available.

Keywords

Citation

Levin, S. and Schmidt, S. (2010), "Telecommunications after competition: challenges, institutions, regulation", info, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 28-40. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636691011027166

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2010, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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