The effect of CEO control on compensation risk management through golden parachute adoption

Abstract

Considers the factors affecting chief officers’ (CEOs’) compensation risk and control, develops hypotheses on the relationship between the two and tests them on data from a sample of Fortune 500/Fortune Service 500 companies from 1984 to 1989. Describes the characteristics of the sample and confirms that the relationship between compensation risk and CEO control (measured by board stock ownership/control) is piece‐wise linear. Shows that CEOs in larger firms are likely to have low control (under 8.25 per cent board stock holdings) and higher salaries; while those in the middle control range (8.25 per cent to 23.75 per cent) have the highest proportion of stock‐based compensation and golden parachutes; and those in the high control range have the lowest proportion of both stock‐based compensation and golden parachutes. Compares the results with other research findings and supports the ideas of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) that equity values decline in the middle range of control because of management entrenchment. Concludes that above a certain threshold of control CEOs can manage their compensation risk by including golden parachutes in their contracts even though this may cause negative returns for shareholders.

Citation

Toyne, M.F. and Millar, J.A. (1998), "The effect of CEO control on compensation risk management through golden parachute adoption", Managerial Finance, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 14-29. https://doi.org/10.1108/03074359810765354