Moral sentiments and equilibrium moral codes
International Journal of Social Economics
ISSN: 0306-8293
Article publication date: 1 September 2003
Abstract
This paper shows that the consistent way of modeling sentiment‐driven moral behaviors in a setting of social interaction is to derive the equilibrium moral code that is mutually consistent with the optimal moral behavior of each player. To do this, it is necessary that moral sentiments be introduced explicitly into the utility function so that an individual could choose the optimal moral behavior that balances his/her narrow self‐interest against the avoidance of moral dissonance. It then demonstrates how the various equilibrium moral codes are derived from the key moral sentiments of love, guilt and envy.
Keywords
Citation
Lim, C. (2003), "Moral sentiments and equilibrium moral codes", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 30 No. 9, pp. 985-999. https://doi.org/10.1108/03068290310487540
Publisher
:MCB UP Ltd
Copyright © 2003, MCB UP Limited