The partisan theory and macroeconomic policy under unscheduled regime transfers: a case study of an LDC

A‐M.M. Abdel‐Rahman (King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia)

Journal of Economic Studies

ISSN: 0144-3585

Publication date: 1 August 1997

Abstract

Investigates the possible occurrences of patterns in macroeconomic policy targeting and instruments use in some less developed countries where unscheduled regime transfers may occur. The patterns are held to correspond to those stipulated by Hibbs in his Partisan Theory for advanced democracies after due allowance is made for the nature of government and modes of regime transfer. Undertakes an investigation of Sudan, a country which has witnessed dramatic political changes that assumed the forms of eight alternating regimes in the shape of civilian democracies and military dictatorships since its independence in 1956. Traces, in particular, the evidence on quasi‐political business cycles in output growth and inflation; and on quasi‐political budget cycles in deficits and instruments of finance. Studies patterns on the form of use of policy instruments through reliance on monetary policy surprises. Obtains empirical results which generally point to the possible presence of eco‐political patterns similar in principle to those operable in the case of developed countries but with some distinct differences in nature and rhythm.

Keywords

Citation

Abdel‐Rahman, A. (1997), "The partisan theory and macroeconomic policy under unscheduled regime transfers: a case study of an LDC", Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 222-241. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443589710188966

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1997, MCB UP Limited

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