Total Force in Iraq: A Failure of Policy or Implementation?

Abstract

In 1992 and 1993, I published several articles on the “Total Force” armies of Canada and the US in an attempt to evaluate the worthiness of the concept (see Thompson, 1993). Ideally, a Total Force Army is one in which both regular and reserve units are supposed to be equals, well-integrated, harmonious, synergistic, functional, and interdependent. To achieve this, the two components must work together, train together, respect each other, and function seamlessly with identical equipment, training, and procedure. Since most reserve units in the US, Canada, and the UK, for example, train mostly on weekends, and typically have older equipment, this would necessarily involve the improvement and maintenance of reserve force training, retention, and equipment. It also really means that reserve forces will need time to reach these standards, but for some reason, some governments do not think about this basic fact. This is true not only for the US, but for the Canadian, UK, and other allied forces, as well.

Citation

Thompson, R. (2005), "Total Force in Iraq: A Failure of Policy or Implementation?", Caforio, G. and Kümmel, G. (Ed.) Military Missions and their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Vol. 2), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 415-423. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1572-8323(05)02023-0