Climate rights and economic modeling

Abstract

Conservationists claim that future generations are morally entitled to enjoy the benefits of stable climatic conditions. Libertarians argue that polluters are entitled to emit greenhouse gases in the absence of undue regulation. This chapter explores the implications of these competing value judgements in a numerically calibrated overlapping generations model. Although short-term welfare is significantly higher under a laissez faire scenario in which greenhouse gas emissions remain unregulated, the stabilization of current climatic conditions confers substantial benefits on future generations that augment long-run economic growth. The finetuning of greenhouse gas emissions to achieve Pareto efficiency generates net gains that are small in comparison with the welfare differences between the laissez faire and climate stabilization paths.

Citation

Howarth, R.B. (2001), "Climate rights and economic modeling", Hall, D.C. and Horwarth, R.B. (Ed.) The Long-Term Economics of Climate Change: Beyond a Doubling of Greenhouse Gas Concentrations (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Vol. 3), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 315-336. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3740(01)03025-5