OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND SHAREHOLDER VOTING ON BOARD STRUCTURE CHANGES

Abstract

We examine voting outcomes on shareholder governance proposals that seek annual elections for all the directors on the corporate board. We relate these voting outcomes to different ownership structure characteristics and a series of variables that are publicly available. The pattern of support indicates that proposals are generally successful when they are supported by large activist groups and when institutions hold a significant fraction of shares outstanding. Our evidence casts some doubt on the efficacy of the Rule 14A-8 mechanism, which limits the amount of information that can be provided to shareholders as part of the proposal.

Citation

John, T.A. and Vasudevan, G.K. (2003), "OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND SHAREHOLDER VOTING ON BOARD STRUCTURE CHANGES", Advances in Financial Economics (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 8), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 113-125. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(03)08005-8