INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING AND THE STRUCTURE OF R&D JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS

Abstract

There is a tension between the literatures on incomplete contracting and transactions cost economics regarding the importance of ex post governance and the extent to which formal theories of incomplete contracting capture salient aspects of exchange relations. In this paper, we empirically examine how firms structure joint R&D agreements to illuminate how contracts can be incomplete and how governance can matter. We employ a dataset of 96 contracts to construct a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms firms use in organizing collaborative R&D, and indicate how groups of mechanisms line up with various types of contracting hazards. The results suggest that the allocation of property rights over innovations at the time of contracting between R&D partners is an important aspect of contract design. But they also suggest that weak property rights admit scope for other dimensions of contract. In particular, the research indicates that while knowledge spillovers may give rise to appropriability hazards, efforts to contain or channel knowledge spillovers may enable joint venture members to strategically block other members’ follow-on commercialization or research. Firms design joint R&D governance mechanisms to balance spillover hazards and strategic blocking.

Citation

Majewski, S.E. and Williamson, D.V. (2004), "INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING AND THE STRUCTURE OF R&D JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS", Libecap, G.D. (Ed.) Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship (Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth, Vol. 15), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 201-228. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-4736(04)01506-1