Revenue from the Saints, the Showoffs and The Predators: Comparisons of Auctions with Price-preference Values

Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors

ISBN: 978-0-76231-301-3, eISBN: 978-1-84950-406-5

ISSN: 0193-2306

Publication date: 7 July 2006

Abstract

Traditional auction theory assumes that bidders possess values defined solely on the auctioned object. There may, however, be cases in which bidders possess preferences over the revenue achieved by the auctioneer. We present here a comprehensive framework of price-preference valuations, unifying several phenomena ranging from preference for charitable giving to shill bidding. We compare expected efficiency and revenue of first- and second-price auctions for some specific cases of key interest. We also incorporate heterogeneous bidder preferences and examine the effects of mis-specified beliefs and show that both are crucial for understanding these situations.

Citation

Salmon, T. and Isaac, R. (2006), "Revenue from the Saints, the Showoffs and The Predators: Comparisons of Auctions with Price-preference Values", Isaac, R. and Davis, D. (Ed.) Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 11), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 1-30. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11001-7

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2006, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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