Search results

We examine why some groups use violence while others use nonviolence when they push for major political change. Nonviolence can be less costly, but nonstate actors must mobilize a large number of people for it to be successful. This is less critical for violent rebellion, as successful attacks can be committed by a small number of people. This means that groups that believe that they have the potential to mobilize larger numbers of people are less likely to use violence. This potential is related to the lines along which the group mobilizes. Campaigns mobilized along ethnic or Marxist lines have fewer potential members and are most likely to use violence. Prodemocracy campaigns have a higher number of potential members and are more likely to use nonviolence. For movements against a foreign occupation, campaigns in larger countries are more likely to use nonviolence. These predictions are supported in a multilevel logit model of campaigns from 1945 to 2006. The mechanism is tested by looking at the interactive effect of democratic changes on the likelihood of nonviolence and looking at a subsample of 72 campaigns that explicitly draw from certain ethnic or religious groups.

A growing literature links oil to conflict, particularly civil war. Greed/opportunity, grievance, and weak state arguments have been advanced to explain this relationship. This chapter builds on the literature on oil and conflict in two important ways. First, I examine a novel dependent variable, domestic terrorism. Much is known about the effect of oil on the onset, duration, and intensity of civil war, though we know surprisingly little about the potential influence of oil on smaller, more frequent forms of violence. Second, I treat oil ownership as a variable, not a constant, coding oil rents based on ownership structure. This is contrary to other related studies that assume oil is necessarily owned by the state. Using a large, cross-national sample of states from 1971 to 2007, several key findings emerge. Notably, publicly owned oil exhibits a positive effect on domestic terrorism. This positive effect dissipates, however, when political performance and state terror are controlled for. Privately owned oil, on the other hand, does not correlate with increased incidences of terror. This suggests that oil is not a curse, per se.

In recent years, economics has turned its serious attention to the explaining of conflicts and a peaceful resolution of conflicts. Some interesting and powerful microeconomic models have been developed, yet it seems there are gaps that motivate the current research. As our discussion shows below, the existing models are robust in explaining an equilibrium defence spending of a nation in a general equilibrium setting. Yet, there is little that we know about the regional distribution of defence spending that is likely to give rise to serious rent-seeking activities, politicking and consequent economic consequences in terms of regional disparity and inequality. In this work, we posit that defence spending is like a local public good that impacts on a regional, or local, economy. To be more specific, our model suggests that defence spending offers public infrastructure to a regional economy that, in turn, impinges on the costs of production of local firms, which thereby influence the competitive positioning of the regional economy in the national, or global, market. The goal of the work is to explore how the politics of allocation of defence spending can create an equilibrium regional inequality within a nation, which may in turn drive internal conflicts. Since an allocation of defence spending impacts on regional inequality, regional inequality becomes endogenous in our model. We establish an equilibrium inequality in our model that depends on the optimal allocation of defence spending across regions, which is driven by the electoral motive of an incumbent government.