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The purpose of this paper is to develop a synthesis for investor relations (IR) research on how to understand, conceptualize and build trust relationships between companies and the financial community within the practice of IR. In doing so, a working definition of the role of trust for IR, a conceptual model as well as strategies on how to establish, maintain and foster trust relationships within IR are proposed. Furthermore, a brief research alley is sketched to inspire more corporate communication scholars to conduct empirical studies in this field of research.

The paper is based on a thorough literature review on empirical and theoretical work in the field of IR, strategic financial communication as well as related disciplines such as public relations, marketing and business research. Furthermore, the literature from other disciplines dealing with trust in the organizational context (economics, psychology, sociology) has been reviewed to develop a working definition for the role of trust in IR.

The following supposition for the role of trust in IR has been worked out: “Trust relationships within investor relations manifest themselves on a micro-, meso-, and macro-level and involve interactions with various individual actors, groups of people, organizations, institutions, and systems. Within these trust interactions, investor relations presents itself simultaneously three-fold: as a discipline, an organization and as individual practitioners.”

To support the establishment, maintenance and fostering of trust relationships, IR needs to provide honest, transparent, comprehensive and coherent information to be in continuous, direct and mutual contact with stakeholders (e.g. investors, analysts, CEOs) and to endeavor a fair representation of the company in the media and among the public.

Facing recent changes in the media, regulatory and corporate environment, this conceptual paper provides a thorough discussion of the role of trust in the field of IR. The working definition, the conceptual model as well as the practical strategies to build trust relationships provided in this paper might help IR to overcome these challenges. The call for more research in this area and the actual employment of the suggested trust building strategies might contribute to fostering trust relationships in the financial markets, thereby contributing to a more sustainable financial system in the long run.

This chapter focuses on testing optimal capital structure theory: The role of intervening variable debt to equity ratio (DER) on the influence of the financial performance, Ownership Structure of Independent Board of Commissioners (IBCO), Audit Committee (ACO), and Institutional Ownership on Firm Value. The research design was explanatory research using path analysis. Using purposive sampling, 61 manufacturing companies, observation period from 2014 to 2018 with 286 N samples. The research novelty empirically can prove the role of intervening variable DER on the effect of return on assets (ROA) on firm value and shows the market response to the ROA is fully reflected by DER, indicating the existence of an optimal capital structure. The role of DER on the effect of ROE and IBCO on firm value is a partial mediation with the inverse direction. This phenomenon shows that the mechanism of forming a balance between the responses of investors and creditors relates to debt financing.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate impacts of governance characteristics and bilateral inter‐organizational learning on performance in the context of corporate venture capital (CVC) activity.

Based on a dataset of 232 CVC investments, the author examined how characteristics such as autonomy, incentive scheme, and broad representation of a CVC program and the knowledge inflows and outflows of the corporate investors impacted the corporate investor's innovativeness and the portfolio company's performance.

The results show that knowledge outflows from corporate investors can help enhance their portfolio companies' performance. In addition, incentive scheme and autonomy may facilitate knowledge inflows from portfolio companies to corporate investors, and influence the performance of both corporate investors and portfolio companies.

The paper's findings contribute to the inter‐organizational learning literature by empirically analysing the mutual learning processes in the context of corporate venturing. The paper extends corporate venturing literature by linking governance characteristic to the underlying mechanism of inter‐organizational learning between the corporate investors and the portfolio companies, as well as their performance.

Emerging biotechnology firms rely on a network of socio‐economic partnerships that can be classified as “interimistic” or close, collaborative but relatively short‐lived. Few studies have assessed the importance of relational governance to the performance of these partnerships. The purposes of this research were to determine the effect of relational governance on the performance of financial partnerships and to compare biotechnology manager assessments of their financial and non‐financial partnerships.

Interviews were conducted with managers of emerging biotechnology companies and lead investors in Canada, France and Germany. Relational governance was assessed by relational norms such as flexibility, information sharing, solidarity and fairness. Performance was assessed by overall effectiveness and partnership benefits. First, the contribution of relational governance to partnership effectiveness and benefits was examined. Second, for the financial partnerships, the perceptions of both biotech managers and lead investors were compared. Third, the biotech manager perceptions of their financial and non‐financial partnerships were compared.

Relational governance is positively associated with performance. Communication (information sharing) was most predictive of partnership performance. Biotech managers view their financial partnerships as being less relational than do their lead investors. Also, biotech managers view their financial partnerships to be less relational than those with their non‐financial partners.

The findings extend our knowledge of the positive influence of relational governance from longer lasting exchanges to “interimistic” technology partnerships. The communication of pertinent and timely information is particularly relevant for both biotech managers and lead investors and can allay fears of opportunistic behaviour and develop trust and commitment.

This study aims to examine the impact of digital transformation on firms’ value and explore the mediating impact of ESG performance and moderating impact of information interaction.

Data was collected from companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange between 2012 and 2020 with 21,488 observational samples, featuring a selection of 3,348 companies. Panel data regression techniques were used to test the mediating role of ESG performance and the moderating role of information interaction.

The study found that digital transformation can improve firms’ ESG performance, which in turn positively affects their value. The firms that engage in more interaction with outsiders benefit more from digital transformation and have a higher value.

This study provides new theoretical insight into improving firms’ value through digital transformation and ESG performance. It is the first to discuss and study the moderating role of information interaction in the relationship between digital transformation and firms’ value.

Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.

The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a focus group session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology.

Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.

Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection.

Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.

The purpose of this paper is to show the role of educational diversity in improving investor relations (IR) quality and examine how this impacts the number of shareholder activism incidents a firm encounters.

The paper reviews literature on marketing, finance, and corporate communications to develop a conceptual framework which is tested using a combination of secondary data and primary data collected through a survey amongst IR professionals working at companies in the Euronext 100 stock index.

The empirical results support the conceptual framework, showing higher IR quality levels and lower shareholder activism intensity for companies with educationally diverse IR teams. In particular, the presence of marketing and communication experts in IR teams contributes to higher IR quality and lower shareholder activism.

Future research may investigate the robustness of the results with larger and internationally diversified samples and examine how, besides educational diversity, other organizational arrangements through which finance professionals work together with marketing and communication professionals impact IR quality.

The results suggest that to improve their IR quality and minimize shareholder activism, companies should check and when necessary increase the educational diversity of their IR teams.

This is the first paper investigating the role of educational diversity on IR quality and the impact on shareholder activism, developing and testing an innovative conceptual framework that integrates marketing, finance, and corporate communication theory.

Introduction:Shareholder activism comprises a range of activities by public companies’ shareholders who desire some change in the corporation and intervene in the management’s decisions. The goals of activists are various. They may seek to change the company’s strategy, financial structure, management, or board in general. More specifically they may seek to change the capital allocation strategy (stock buybacks, dividends, or company’s acquisitions policies), the board composition, the company’s executive compensation plans, or the company’s certain functions (risk management, audit).

Purpose:The purpose of this literature review research study is to explore the concept of shareholder activism. According to a point of view, these activist actions stimulate better corporate governance practice in the companies and ultimately lead to an increase in the company’s stock price in the short term. The others claim that activism increases the company’s share price volatility in the long term. In the near future, the impact of shareholder activism will continue to rise and the ways how the companies respond to it is gaining importance. This study sheds light on the types of shareholder activism, when they are likely to approach a company and which tactics they most likely use.

Methodology:Considering the rapid expansion of shareholder activism concept in the world the author makes a review of literature on shareholder activism. The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the characteristics of shareholder activism are introduced. Second, the theoretical background of this concept is given in detail. Third, the types of shareholder activism are discussed. Finally, the conclusion comprises a summary of shareholder activism.

Findings:The study finds out that shareholder activism has started to have a significant influence on corporate governance policy that a firm adopts in recent years. Shareholder activism increases levels of shareholder engagement in firm decisions and fosters a long-term corporate governance culture. As institutional investors get a higher portion from global equity investments, their role in shareholder activism will increase. There are opinions suggesting that investor activism will lead to better corporate governance practices in firms, leading to an increase in firm share prices in the short term. The shareholder activism phenomenon seems to be on the agenda of all companies in the near future.

This study seeks to examine the peculiarities of the venture capital market in China and seeks to compare it with Western markets.

The paper provides insights based on both the practitioner and academic literature in the field.

It is noted that different cultural norms, corporate governance structures, a lack of appropriate exit strategies, and governmental intervention are important factors that set the markets apart and should be taken into consideration when making venture capital investments in China.

The paper should be of interest to practitioners considering investing in China and to academics doing research in this area.

The paper is to the best of the authors' knowledge the first to provide a detailed and comprehensive review of the Chinese venture capital market.

This study aims to examine the extent to which board size, the use of power by venture capital investors and entrepreneurs’ interpersonal tactics such as persuasion to sway board decisions, influence the long-term survival of start-ups.

This study used a mixed-methods approach. The quantitative part is based on data collected from 179 chief executive officers (CEOs) of high-tech start-ups community financed by venture capitalists (VCs) in Israel of which 59 did not survive. To achieve a better understanding of these findings, semi-structured interviews with 12 entrepreneurs were conducted.

Smaller boards were positively associated with venture survival. The use of power by VC investors positively influenced start-up survival. CEO persuasion had a negative effect on venture survival; however, its interaction with board size suggests that it had a lesser effect on very small boards.

Although investors’ control over decision-making contributes to long-term survival, entrepreneurs should be aware of the possible detrimental effects of exercising a high level of persuasion in board processes. The findings also suggest that a small board size is preferable for start-up survival.

Exploring the effect of board processes on venture survival is considered complex. A unique sample of high-technology start-ups consisting of both surviving and failed start-ups was analyzed to explore the effects of persuasion and power in board processes.