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Recent policies designed to promote profit sharing in Great Britain are surveyed. Evidence on the extent of profit sharing in Britain is presented, and the economic impact of such schemes is assessed. It is found that there is little strong evidence to support the notion that profit sharing significantly improves either employment, profitability, productivity, investment or remuneration.

This article examines alternatives to a standard wage. It goes on to analyse the advantages and risks inherent in profit‐sharing.

This study investigates the relationship between financial participation plans, that is profit sharing, share plans and option plans, and firm financial performance using a longitudinal panel data set of non-financial listed companies for the period 1992–2009 comprising 2,216 observations. In addition, it makes a distinction between financial participation plans that are narrow based, directed to top management and executives only, and broad based, targeted to all employees. The panel data also allow us to take into account time lag effects, as profit sharing is usually said to have short-term effects while stock options and share plans are more targeted to longer term impact. Our results show that broad-based profit-sharing plans and combinations of broad-based profit sharing and share plans are positively related with many firm financial performance indicators relative to companies without these plans. However, the results consistently show negative associations between both narrow- and broad-based option plans and firm financial performance.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing decisions and earning potential of the software supplier and the smart device manufacturer in different software promotion strategies.

Based on game theory, the authors formulate two promotion models, that is, the supplier implements software promotion activities individually (SP model) or outsources the promotion activity to the manufacturer under profit-sharing contract (MP model) when taking different channel power structures into consideration. Besides, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions, the authors also extend the basic model to the following situations: (1) the customers have different price elasticity toward service fee and product price; (2) the revenue sharing contract is employed by the supply chain members; and (3) the manufacturer's product promotion practice is taken into consideration.

The optimal service fee (product price) of the supplier (manufacturer) under SP model is always lower (higher) than that under MP model. Surprisingly, if the supplier is the channel leader and the profit sharing ratio exceeds certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit decreases in profit sharing ratio, which remains robust in three extension models. Moreover, the supply chain's profit in supplier-led game is always lower than that in Nash game irrespective of the promotion strategy in profit sharing context. When revenue sharing contract is adopted, the result holds only when the revenue sharing ratio is relatively low.

The authors originally explore two promotion strategies of the software supplier when taking the channel power structures into considerations, which has not been explored in the literature to the best of the authors' knowledge.

With the rapid development of the sharing economy in manufacturing industries, manufacturers and the equipment suppliers frequently share capacity through the third-party platform. This paper aims to study influences of manufacturers sharing capacity on the supplier and to analyze whether the supplier shares capacity as well as its influences.

This paper deals with conditions that the supplier and manufacturers share capacity through the third-party platform, and the third-party platform competes with the supplier in equipment sales. Considering the heterogeneity of the manufacturer's earning of unit capacity usage and the production efficiency of manufacturer's usage strategies, this paper constructs capacity sharing game models. Then, model equilibrium results under different sharing scenarios are compared.

The results show that when the production or maintenance cost is high, manufacturers sharing capacity simultaneously benefits the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with high earnings of unit capacity usage. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, or both the rental efficiency and the production cost are high, the supplier simultaneously sells equipment and shares capacity. The supplier only sells equipment in other cases. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, the supplier’s sharing capacity realizes the win-win-win situation for the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with moderate earnings of unit capacity usage.

This paper innovatively examines supplier's selling and sharing decisions considering manufacturers sharing capacity. It extends the research on capacity sharing and is important to supplier's operational decisions.

Senior management in the newly privatized water companies have been keen to secure employee commitment to the new commercial goals they are now pursuing. Considers the use of profit sharing as a rhetorical device for this purpose. The introduction of profit sharing schemes was intended by management not only to assist in the construction of a new version of organizational reality, but more particularly to communicate to organizational members the quite different ideological conceptualization of organizational purposes and activities associated with the change in status from public sector water authority to private sector water company. Reports research based on documentary evidence and interviews with managers from six of the new water companies which provides scope for comparisons between the companies high‐lighting different interpretations of the role profit sharing may play in the processes of organizational change.

This purpose of this paper to examine how profit sharing depends on the underlying profitability of firms. More precisely, motivated by theoretical research on fair wages and unionized labor markets, profit sharing is estimated for six different profitability categories: positive, increasing, positive and increasing, negative, decreasing and negative or decreasing.

The paper exploits a high-quality linked employer–employee data set covering the universe of Finnish workers and firms. Endogeneity of profitability and self-selection of firms in different profitability categories are accounted for by an instrumental variables approach. The panel-structure of the data is used to control for unobserved heterogeneity (spell and individual fixed effects).

Profits are shared if firms are profitable or become more profitable. The wage-profit elasticity varies between 0.03 and 0.13 in such firms. However, profits are not shared if firms make losses or become less profitable. There is no downward wage adjustment.

Because of the instrumental variables approach the question of external validity arises. Further empirical research on profit sharing with an explicit focus on firm profitability is warranted. The results of the paper indicate a connection between rent sharing and wage rigidity, as suggested by union and fair wage theory.

This is the first paper to consistently estimate the extent of profit sharing depending on the underlying profitability of firms.

The predominant method by which workers in a business organization get compensated for their labour is that they earn a wage which has been guaranteed to them through an employment contract. By contrast, the earnings of the company (the firm, the owner) remains risky, since they earn the residual after making all the contractual payments to the different factors of production. The residual is a random variable because of production and market uncertainty, and the firm absorbs this risk while insuring the income risk of the workers. A modification of this payment scheme occurs when the earnings of the workers are made contingent upon either their productivity, or the profit of the company. A prominent example is the piece‐rate payment system in which the earnings of a labourer are directly related to the amount of output he or she produces. Profit sharing is another example of variable wage; in this system the workers are paid a share of the firm's profit.

This paper aims to focus on the deep‐seated ideological, economic, and social roots of the notion and practice of profit sharing in French enterprise, from a historical perspective. Although this practice is legally mandated in France today, this paper seeks to identify the historical roots of such practices and to locate them in the ideological, social, and economic domains of discourse.

The authors provide a brief review of the literature on profit sharing and identify the current knowledge on the relationship between profit sharing and firm performance, in addition to the motivations for implementing profit sharing and its non‐financial consequences.

From the mid‐nineteenth century onwards, profit sharing entailed more than just a few anecdotal experiments and actually raised a number of deep‐seated ideological, economic and social questions. The French practice of profit sharing has a profoundly “social responsibility” argument at its base. De Gaulle's argument for this was embedded in a broader rhetoric of finding a third alternative between unbridled capitalism and unrestricted socialism, and one that could ameliorate the human condition.

Psychological ownership among employees can be promoted through profit sharing and employee ownership programs.

It is critical for managers to ensure the success of profit sharing schemes by providing for higher levels of employee voice and including employee involvement programs.

Whereas the ideological basis (social responsibility), had a dominant impact in France, in the evolution of such practices leading up to their legislation other countries focused more on the instrumental and utilitarian benefits.

The authors use the approach of historical analysis of profit sharing practices in France to draw cross‐national lessons for today's managers around the globe.

The importance of service firms cooperating with digital platforms is widely acknowledged. The authors study three contractual relationships (fixed-cost, cost-sharing, and profit-sharing) between service firms (specifically hotels) and digital platforms in a highly fragmented service supply chain to examine which of these contract types optimizes profits.

The authors extend prior models analyzing the optimal expected total profit from the travel service firm (hotel)–digital platform relationship, providing new insights into each contract type’s ability to coordinate decentralized systems and optimize profits for both parties.

This study finds that fixed cost contracts cannot coordinate the decentralized system. Cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the decentralized system but only allow one channel profit split. In contrast, profit-sharing contracts may not always perfectly coordinate the decentralized system but support alternative profit allocations. Practically, both profit-sharing and cost-sharing contracts are preferable to fixed-cost contracts.

The paper includes implications for travel service firm managers to consider when structuring contracts with digital platforms to focus on profit optimization. Profit-sharing contracts are most preferable when cost and revenue data are fully shared between parties, while cost-sharing contracts are preferable over fixed-cost contracts.

This study extends prior investigations into the utility of different contract types on the optimal profit of a travel service firm (hotel)-digital platform provider relationship. The research fills a gap in the literature concerning the contracts used in these relationship types.