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This study aims to discuss science governance in Europe and the network of associated nonprofit institutions. The authors posit that this network, which comprises both (partial) learning organizations and non-learning organizations, has been observed to postpone taking up “responsibility” as an issue in science governance and funding decisions.

This paper discusses the challenge of learning and policy implementation within the European science governance system. By exploring how learning on responsible innovation (RI) in this governance system can be provoked, it addresses the question how Senge’s insights in organizational learning can clarify discourses on and practices of RI and responsibility in research. This study explores the potential of a new organizational form, that of Social Labs, to support learning on Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in standing governance organizations.

This study concludes that Social Labs are a suitable format for enacting the five disciplines as identified by Senge, and a Social Lab may turn into a learning organization, be it a temporary one. Responsibility in research and innovation is conducive for learning in the setting of a Social Lab, and Social Labs act as intermediary organizations, which not merely pass on information among actors but also actively give substantive shape to what they convey from a practice-informed, normative orientation.

This empirical work on RRI-oriented Social Labs therefore suggests that Social Lab–oriented temporary, intermediary learning organizations present a promising form for implementing complex normative policies in a networked, nonhierarchical governance setting.

Based on this research funding and governance organizations in research, policy-makers in other domains may take up and create such intermediary organizations to aid learning in (science) governance.

This research suggests that RRI-oriented Social Labs present a promising form for implementing complex normative policies, thus integrate learning on and by responsible practices in various governance settings.

European science governance is characterized by a network of partial Learning Organization (LOs) and Non-Learning Organization (nLOs) who postpone decision-making on topics around “responsibility” and “solving societal challenges” or delegate authority to reviewers and individual actors, filtering possibilities for collaborative transformation toward RRI. social lab (SLs) are spaces that can address social problems or social challenges in an open, action-oriented and creative manner. As such, they may function as temporary, intermediary LOs bringing together diverse actors from a specific context to work on and learn about issues of science and society where standing organizations avoid doing so. Taken together, SLs may offer temporary organizational structures and spaces to move beyond top-down exercise of power or lack of real change to more open, deliberative and creative forms of sociopolitical coordination between multiple actors cutting across realms of state, practitioners of research and innovation and civil society. By taking the role of temporary LOs, they may support existing research and innovation organizations and research governance to become more flexible and adaptive.

This study aims to examine the relationship between self-perceived talent status (SPTS) and positive employee outcomes (work engagement and organisational commitment), mediated by organisational justice (distributive and procedural justice). The authors define SPTS as employees’ self-conceptualisation of talent, formed by inferring the organisation’s initiatives regarding training and development opportunities and through informal recognition by others.

The authors measured SPTS using eight items on a five-point scale. Through an internet survey company, the authors initially surveyed 1,207 full-time employees from 300 Japanese companies with ≥ 300 employees. In the second round of the survey, conducted after approximately two weeks, 876 (82.9%) responses were collected from the initial 1,207 respondents, which were used for the final analysis.

SPTS was directly and positively related to work engagement, organisational commitment, distributive justice and procedural justice. In learning organisations, SPTS was positively but indirectly related to work engagement and organisational commitment, mediated by distributive justice. In non-learning organisations, SPTS was positively but indirectly related to work engagement and organisational commitment, mediated by procedural justice.

Given SPTS’s positive impact on employee outcomes, to eliminate the information asymmetry between organisations and talent due to strategic ambiguity, organisations should increase SPTS by helping talents perceive the plethora of development opportunities in the talent pool.

The results demonstrate the utility of SPTS for improving employee outcomes based on strategic talent management (TM) mechanisms including talent rewards, talent development opportunities and promotions. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that distributive justice plays an important role in the build-based TM context of learning organisations.

In this paper it is held that a transformational learning organisation could be clearly distinguished from non‐learning organisations. This paper seeks to establish whether or not this is actually the case.

Case studies were developed for two organisations considering themselves to be learning organisations (Company 2 and Company 4) and two that did not (Company 1 and Company 3). To establish the balance of the learning behaviours within the firms according to Shivistrava's typology, a questionnaire was used to elicit information about learning behaviours and activities, and general understanding about what such terms as knowledge, information and learning meant to individuals within the firms.

The results of applying the Shrivastava model showed that most knowledge is action‐oriented and incrementally developed, in that it is developed in order to achieve a certain goal. Certain events will lead to a perceived need for certain behaviours and the organisational procedures and policies will encourage actions.

Shrivastava's typology outlines four perspectives of organisational learning: adaptation, developing knowledge of action‐outcome relationships, assumption sharing, and institutionalised experience. These definitions imply that they will reflect different knowledge bases.

To explore and analyse various learning organizations and to attempt to outline the form of a holistic learning organization.

The tool described in this article is a continuation of the work published in a Licentiate thesis in 1996 and developed further in a doctoral dissertation in 2001. The Learning Organization Diamond Tool is based on a holistic concept of a learning organization being regarded as a structure of related elements: driving forces, finding purpose, questioning, empowering and evaluation at two interconnected levels of individuals and the whole. Data from 686 respondents were gathered from 25 Finnish organizations in 1998.

The outcomes of the study are mainly presented in the form of imaginary diamonds complying with the basic framework. In 24 organizations the individuals placed more trust in themselves and their own learning than in their organization as a learning environment. When comparing different business sectors the variation on the organizational side was clearly greater than on the individual side.

Developing a measurement instrument for learning organizations, administering it in practice, and analysing the “learning organization portrayals” created by this tool.

Aims to examine a model for overcoming traditional, culturally rooted resistance to change in educational administration programs. Universities that are unable to change operate as dysfunctional organizations and display symptoms that reflect addictive behavior. Healthy organizations facilitate change and adapt to evolving contexts. Conceptualizes change as having its genesis in a learning organizational model. The learning organization model aligns the three existing cultures inherent in universities and educational administration programs. By aligning the operator, engineer, and executive cultures within the university, microstructures such as educational administration programs are able to embrace the chaotic temperament inherent in the university and evolve into a generative environment that moves from linear construction toward a fuzzy adaptation to changing contexts.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that how HRD is undertaken needs careful consideration, since some HRD implementation schemes may actually prevent the acquisition of new knowledge, thereby developing stagnation.

The paper uses qualitative data derived from learning and non‐learning organisations. The data were collected from four companies via open‐ended questionnaires and structured interviews.

The paper demonstrates how strongly shared mental models may affect organisational HRD processes in such a way as to trigger closure to new knowledge and learning. The types of learning and knowledge present in the organisations are found to limit the possibility of radical change.

HRD implementation systems themselves may strengthen mental models, thereby allowing the difficulties to emerge because the learning and knowledge being developed will only support incremental change if any. The potential reversion of the direction of organisational learning is mooted, indicating that new ideas may either not enter the system or be rejected once they are perceived. HRD systems need to be designed to develop and maintain organisational openness.

The danger of HRD exacerbating organisational closure is explained. An alternative role for HRD professionals is outlined, with the new focus being on developing ongoing challenge at all times. The paper concludes that, although properly structured and thoughtfully implemented HRD can be a positive driver for organisational learning, HRD developments need to focus on the type of knowledge being developed as well as the level of learning.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the desirability and attainability of schools becoming learning organizations.

The paper presents a critical analysis based on a wide-ranging review of the “schools as learning organizations” literature.

The notion of learning organization applied to schools is fundamentally flawed. Most notably, schools as learning organizations are conceptualized in so many different ways that it is possible to claim almost anything; the political aspects of shared learning are inadequately handled; and poor quality scholarship is commonplace.

There are repeated claims in the educational improvement literature that that there are significant benefits for schools that become learning organizations and, as a result, school leaders should steer schools in this direction. However, this paper critically challenges these claims, concluding instead that schools and their leaders should ignore calls to become learning organizations.

Many scholars, together with agencies such as the OECD, have suggested that, for schools, the learning organization is both a desirable goal and an achievable endpoint. The value of this paper is that, for the first time, these claims are subjected to a comprehensive critical review, revealing them to be hollow rhetoric rather than attainable reality.

If building and nurturing a learning organization is not a random chance, the question of where organizations should start is patent. Because learning culture is one of the core components of learning organizations, it is wondered how individuals and organizations contribute to this phenomenon. Under an interactional perspective, the authors explore the cross-dynamics between learning resources, structure and support (organizational level), and self-directed learning (individual level).

The authors conducted qualitative and exploratory research in Spring 2021 in France. They used semi-structured interviews with HRMs and a Delphi panel as the main instruments. This dual approach brings a reflexive and complementary dialogue to the research question.

The results show that non-learning organizations took advantage of the Covid-19 period. They created a learning biotope and fostered learning dynamics. Although this biotope acted as a learning marketplace and lacked guidance, individuals interacted with this learning biotope. They took learning initiatives and developed their self-directed learning. This understanding argues for constant interaction and co-influence between organizations and individuals to build and nurture a learning culture.

There is little discussion on how individuals and organizations contribute to building and nurturing a learning culture from an interactional perspective. Furthermore, literature on learning organizations considers self-directedness as a whole, considering self-directed learning as a characteristic and a process sharpens thinking. On methodological concerns, the authors used a dual qualitative approach with interviews and Delphi for the first time in research on learning organizations.

Since the late 1980s, learning organisations have been deemed to have a number of advantages over non‐learning ones. One organisation that has been identified as “a premiere learning organisation”, is Royal Dutch Shell (RDS). Despite this, in 1998 its results were the worst in its history. Seeks to explain how and why this happened. Considers the advantages claimed for learning organisations, the features of them that enhance an organisation’s competitive advantage and those that can obstruct their effectiveness. Analyses the performance of RDS over a period of time in the light of the changing conditions in the oil industry. In particular examines a variety of learning methods used by RDS in the critical period prior to and during the 1990s. From this, addresses differences between the characteristics of RDS in the 1990s, compared with previously, on the one hand, and with those identified as significant for ensuring that learning organisations create competitive advantage, on the other hand, in an effort to explain RDS’s poor performance at the end of the 1990s.