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Some commentators suggest that the Wall Street views family firms with scepticism. The appointment of independent directors to form a majority on a firm's board of directors should constitute a strong signal to the market of a family firm's willingness to be monitored objectively and thus should alleviate Wall Street's scepticism. This is likely to be more important for the newly public family firms than for mature family firms since outsider-domination on the board pre-dates the involvement of other outsiders, such as underwriters, financial analysts, or institutional investors. Whether the presence of an independent board alleviates the market's scepticism may be evident in the responses of various external monitoring entities to the newly public family and non-family firms. Using a hand-collected sample of newly public firms, we cast brand-new light on whether an independent board provides any advantage to the newly public family firms in underwriter reputation, analyst coverage, and investment by institutional investors over newly public non-family firms. We find that independence of board of directors is overall a positive signal and that while the independence of board is more important than the independence of management for underwriters and financial analysts, the reverse is the case for institutional investors.

We examine the influence of ownership structure on a blockholder’s power in a firm. We first describe the presence and ownership stakes of blockholders in a comprehensive sample of US firms. We develop a measure of the influence of the ownership structure on a blockholder’s power and show that an average blockholder loses 12% of her potential power due to the presence and size of the ownership stakes of other blockholders. Further, the influence of ownership structure varies systematically with a blockholder’s rank and identity, with the second and nonfamily manager blockholders experiencing the largest loss of power.

This study seeks to explore the intricate relationship among supply chain transparency, digitalization and idiosyncratic risk, with a specific focus on newly public firms. The objective is to determine whether supply chain transparency effectively mitigates idiosyncratic risk within this context and to understand the potential impact of digitalization on this dynamic interplay.

The study utilizes data from Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on China’s Growth Enterprise Board (ChiNext) over the last five years, sourced from the CSMAR database and firms’ annual reports. The research covers the period from 2009 to 2021, observing each firm for five years post-IPO. The final sample comprises 2,645 observations from 529 firms. The analysis employs the Hausman test, considering the panel-data structure of the sample and favoring fixed effects over random effects. Additionally, it applies the high-dimensional fixed effects (HDFE) estimator to address unobserved heterogeneity.

The analysis initially uncovered an inverted U-shaped relationship between supply chain transparency and idiosyncratic risk, indicating a delicate equilibrium where detrimental effects diminish and beneficial effects accelerate with increased transparency. Moreover, this inverted U-shaped relationship was notably more pronounced in newly public firms with a heightened level of firm digitalization. This observation implies that firm digitalization amplifies the impact of transparency on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk.

This study distinguishes itself by providing distinctive insights into supply chain transparency and idiosyncratic risk. Initially, we introduce and substantiate an inverted U-shaped correlation between supply chain transparency and idiosyncratic risk, challenging the conventional linear perspective. Secondly, we pioneer the connection between supply chain transparency and idiosyncratic risk, especially for newly public firms, thereby enhancing comprehension of financial implications. Lastly, we pinpoint crucial digital conditions that influence the relationship between supply chain transparency and idiosyncratic risk management, offering a nuanced perspective on the role of technology in risk management.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between human resource (HR) executive representation in top management and the growth of newly public firms. It draws upon research on strategic leadership, strategic HR management and Penrose’s theory of firm growth to consider the role of HRs executives in addressing demands placed upon top managers in the pursuit of firm growth. This study attempts to extend the focus of research on the influence of HR executives on organizational outcomes

In order to test study hypotheses, this study analyses data from a sample of US newly public firms that underwent initial public offerings (IPO) during the 2007 calendar year. Study data were analyzed using ordinary least squares regression in order to test study hypotheses.

This study provides general support for study hypotheses. First, HR executive presence in top management was found to be positively related to post-IPO firm growth. Second, upper echelon size and the number of firm employees were found to weaken the positive effect of HR executive presence in top management on post-IPO firm growth.

As a consequence of study design, the results found in this study may be limited with respect to their external validity. Therefore, researchers and practitioners are encouraged to use caution before generalizing study findings to other contexts.

This study provides implications for top management team staffing and the pursuit of firm growth. Newly public firms appear to benefit in terms of firm growth by including HR executives in top management. The benefits of doing so appear to be reduced for newly public firms as the size of their upper echelons and number of employees increase.

This study extends research on the firm level consequences of HR executive presence in top management as well as research on factors which influence firm growth.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of the top management team (TMT) in determining whether IPO firms in high-tech industry will engage in acquisitions during the post-IPO period.

The authors collect IPO and TMT data from firm prospectuses, and acquisition and financial data from Securities Data Company Platinum and Compustat, respectively. Poisson regression analysis is applied to test the effect of TMT characteristics on acquisition activity.

Using 135 IPO firms, the authors find evidence that TMT composition directly influences acquisition activity of IPO firms during the post-IPO period. Specifically, the authors find that TMT experience serving as members other firms’ boards and TMT experience in senior level management positions are both positively associated with acquisition activity. TMTs with prior IPO experience and TMTs with longer organizational tenures are negatively associated with acquisition activity.

This study is among the first to examine the impact of TMT demography on newly public firms’ acquisition activity. In doing so, it adds meaningfully to the understanding of the factors driving such firms’ strategic behavior.

The purpose of this study is to empirically examine those factors that enhance the value of newly public firms. The article presents a model for the market value of a newly public biotechnology firm. Explanatory variables include several intangible indicators of the scientific capabilities of the firm including firm citations, licenses, patents, products in the pipeline, and R&D intensity. Top management team variables are also examined. The results support the conclusion that scientific capabilities significantly impact the value of the firm as viewed by public equity markets.

Prior research on earnings management largely assumes that newly public firms manage earnings opportunistically around IPOs. However, only a few studies have empirically examined the real motives behind newly public firms’ earnings management. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of ownership dilution on earnings management among IPO firms. The authors chose the setting of security offerings in an emerging market, which is characterised by unique ownership structure, to examine the possible incentive of owners or pre-IPO shareholders to engage in earnings management.

The study employs accrual and real transactions measures to check the presence of earnings management among 409 IPO firms from India during the period 2000‒2018. Subsequently, using ordinary least squares regression models with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, this paper examines the relationship between earnings management and selling or dilution incentives of pre-IPO shareholders.

The study finds that the degree of earnings manipulation by issuer firms is positively associated with the ownership dilution at the time of IPO as well as around lockup expiration.

The findings of this study will help the investors and regulators to understand the practice of earnings management among IPO firms and how it is linked to the ownership dilution of pre-IPO shareholders.

The paper contributes to the limited stream of research that investigates the motives of earnings management among IPO firms. It empirically establishes an association between the selling incentive of pre-IPO shareholders and earnings management.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between IPO lockups and founder-CEOs’ compensation and incentives in newly public firms. The paper argues that existence and length of lockup agreements are affected by bargaining power of founders, which will consequently influence the determination of their compensation contracts.

Multivariate tests are constructed to examine the relationship between IPO lockups and executive compensation. OLS, fixed-effect panel data model, and the Heckman two-stage model are all utilized to conduct the tests.

The study finds that lockup existence and lockup length are negatively related to founder-CEOs’ total compensation and positively related to founder-CEOs’ equity incentives. The results hold after controlling for the endogenous decision to sign a lockup agreement at the IPO.

The paper's results suggest that the power of founders and other insiders is a crucial factor in the lockup determination process besides economic factors identified in previous studies. The paper's results also echo the political power theory in the management literature which suggests that an organization's decision making is heavily influenced by relative power of organizational members and reflects their preference.

The paper raises a new explanation for the determinant of IPO lockups that supplements the extant theories. The paper argues that existence and length of lockup agreements could be affected by bargaining power of insiders.

To determine what characteristics distinguish firms that conduct international business within three years of going public and six years from founding, and how these firms perform.

A logistic regression analysis is used to identify characteristics that distinguish firms that are international at the time they go public, versus those that are not. The paper also assesses post‐IPO performance and apply multivariate analysis to determine how performance varies among these firms.

Compared to firms of similar age who do not pursue rapid internationalization, born‐global firms are generally larger, more diversified, and have more venture capital backing. Their founders, board members and managers exhibit more international experience. The returns 12 and 18 months post‐IPO are significantly higher for born‐global firms than for a control sample of firms who do not engage in rapid internationalization. Furthermore, those born‐global firms with joint ventures or acquisitions in several countries perform better than those that only export within the first six years since their inception.

Managerial implications include having a board of directors with sound international business experience as well as using a venture capital firm to provide monitoring and oversight of operations at home and in the foreign market.

This paper is original in that it is the first to provide a financial markets‐oriented empirical investigation of the “born‐global” phenomenon using a sample of newly public American firms.

This study aims to investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) involvement on investment efficiency (IE) and its potential action mechanisms from the perspective of financial resource allocation.

Using data of Chinese firms between 2008 and 2020, and the propensity score matching–difference in differences method, the authors investigate the relationship between VC and IE.

The results show that VC involvement significantly promotes IE, and the effect exhibits an inverted U-shape dynamic over time. The authors find two mechanisms through which VC promotes IE: alleviating financing constraints and improving corporate governance. Supplementary tests indicate that VC institutions with high reputations play a significant role in enhancing IE; the promotion effect is more pronounced for firms in non-high-tech industries, firms facing higher industrial competition and firms located in areas with better property rights protection systems.

This study provides several original contributions. First, based on principal–agent and financing constraint theories, this study enhances the literature by revealing how VC drives the IE of newly public firms in China. Second, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt to identify the mechanisms between VC and IE; Third, from an empirical perspective, besides discussing the average and dynamic effect of VC on IE, this study also explores the impact of the interaction between VC and market competition and property rights protection on IE.