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This paper focuses on two books that Robert Heilbroner wrote with Peter Bernstein on public finance – A Primer on Government Spending (1963) and The Debt and the Deficit (1989). It also discusses how the economic world changed between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, and how these changes affected their books. Primer introduced Keynesian economics, and the possibility that government policy and deficits could be forces for good in the world. Debt focused exclusively on government deficits and public debt. Changing circumstances made this work a more difficult undertaking. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, government budget deficits were small, growth was sluggish, and Keynesianism was the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics. Primer explained Keynesian public finance, why tax cuts would spur spending and growth, and why we should not worry about government debt under these circumstances. By the 1980s, Keynes was vanquished, deficits were ballooning, and Keynesian public finance was under attack. Contrary to the conventional wisdom at the time, Debt advocated government deficits along the lines proposed by Keynes but not along the lines enacted during the Reagan administration. Nonetheless, there were many similarities in these two works. Both made a case for an active government role in creating a good society; and both argued that when done correctly deficit spending created no economic problems and had many benefits.

Several years after the regularization of microfinance activity in Côte d’Ivoire, smallholder farmers’ access to microfinance credits still remains marginal. The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze key determinants of access to microfinance credit in Sassandra-Marahoué District.

A total of 150 smallholder farmers were randomly sampled using an interview guide and semi-structured questionnaires. Univariate statistics and Probit binary modeling were employed for data analyses.

Results revealed that socio-economic/demographic characteristics of smallholder farmers and credit requirements imposed by microfinance institutions (MFIs) are key determinants of smallholder farmers’ access to microfinance credits in the district.

Although, the authors shed light on the determinants of microfinance credit access for smallholder farmers in this district, the study focused on a single source of financial credit. Future research will need to explore the determinants of credit demand and the choice between different sources of rural credits in Côte d’Ivoire.

The findings suggest that MFIs seldom take into account smallholder farmers who are not engaged in off-farm income-generating activities and savings account; and those with low level of education. Sensitization programs on the importance of savings mobilization and credit policy by MFIs will potentially increase smallholder’s knowledge on credit access requirements and thereby increased access.

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study investigating determinants of smallholder farmers’ access to microfinance credits in Côte d’Ivoire specifically in the Sassandra-Marahoué District. The results of this study will serve as a guide for MFIs for improving smallholder farmers’ access to credit.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Alvin Hansen and John Williams’ Fiscal Policy Seminar at Harvard University is widely regarded as a key mechanism for the spread of Keynesianism in the United States. An original and regular participant, Richard A. Musgrave was invited to prepare remarks for the fiftieth anniversary of the seminar in 1988. These were never published, though a copy was filed with Musgrave’s papers at Princeton University. Their reproduction here is important for several reasons. First, it is one of the last reminiscences of the original participants. Second, the remarks make an important contribution to our understanding of the Harvard School of macro-fiscal policy. Third, the remarks provide interesting insights into Musgrave’s views on national economic policymaking as well as the intersection between theory and practice. The reminiscence demonstrates the importance of the seminar in shifting Musgrave’s research focus and moving him to a more pragmatic approach to public finance.

This chapter is devoted to fiscal policy theory and to how its evolution influenced the policy principles implemented from the end of the World War II to the present. It shows how the theoretical foundations evolved, from the Keynesian theory according to which public expenditure was conceived as an instrument to sustain aggregate demand and achieve full employment, to the present theoretical framework in which, following the intertemporal approach, it has been downgraded to an external shock. The public debt issue is examined with the aim of explaining why sound public finance represents a primary policy objective in the Eurozone.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is room for a stabilising fiscal policy, through an analysis of the supporters of the new classical economics and the supporters of the new Keynesian economics. There are no reliable results on the Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policies. As such, the policy-mix becomes a problem of theoretical approach, in the sense of a strategic game between monetary authorities and tax authorities (among them). This points to the problem of coordination between budgetary authorities as being the central debate within the Eurozone. The end-result is that without fiscal policy coordination, Eurozone member states are working on a series of non-cooperative games that are inefficient, because no player can improve its position by unilaterally changing its strategy.

The analysis starts from the experience of three countries in the 1980s, these are Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. In all three cases the adoption of restrictive budget policies has provoked a strong, rapid and enduring resizing of public debt, and growth did not weaken, moreover it accelerated. In all three cases the logic behind the policy-mix actions allowed the individualisation of the respective roles of fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal policies were joining with fiscal instruments and reduction in public spending and furthermore monetary policy was accommodated in respect of the budget contraction.

First, the authors were not able to identify an analytical method that can ensure the success of a fiscal policy. Second, analysing fiscal policies within the Eurozone implies also that the authors reflect on the need for a coordination of these policies. In fact, the authors have shown how the possible coordination of economic policies in the Eurozone would result in major benefits for all member countries.

In the absence of fiscal policy coordination, member states are engaged in a series of non-cooperative games that prove inefficient, when no player is able to improve its position by unilaterally changing its fiscal policy. The coordination of national fiscal policies generates a collective advantage, bringing each state to consistently change its strategies.

This chapter discusses the evolution of German views on public debt 1850–1920, referring to three strands of secondary literature: (1) German retrospectives on public finance, (2) the historical literature with a public choice perspective, and (3) contributions to public/constitutional law, mainly referring to Lorenz von Stein. The skeptic view of public debt endorsed by authors of the second half of the period is shown to be related to politico-economic issues of state agency combined with new state functions, rather than to the rejection of Dietzel’s Proto-Keynesian macroeconomic reasoning.

J. Zijlstra was Dutch Minister of Economics (1952‐1958), Minister of Finance (1959‐1963, 1966‐1967), Prime Minister (1966‐1967), and President of the Central Bank of The Netherlands (1967‐1981). During his terms of office he followed a Keynesian policy that placed on the government the responsibility for sustaining full employment. His policy involved not only the finance of the public sector but also the maintenance of equilibrium between production and expenditure. To achieve this he introduced a standardization of budget policy ‐ structural finance. The essence of this budgetary policy, which the Dutch Government pursued from 1960 to 1978, was to manage the national expenditure in a designed manner. The article deals with this approach and suggests an explanation why it eventually failed to produce the expected results.

The editorials of the then-new Business Week during the 1929–1933 contraction offered sophisticated Keynesian policy prescriptions: against a laissez-faire response, against deflation, against balanced-budget fetishism, for monetary expansion. These editorials, which seem to have been largely forgotten, likely played a considerable role in the dissemination of Keynesian economics in the United States in the 1930s. This chapter reviews the editorials and their congruence with Keynes’s writings. The magazine’s archives, including surveys of their readers, suggest that the editorials were among the most read and most valued parts of the magazine. The magazine cultivated an elite executive readership at that time, so the editorials may well have been important in gaining business support for Keynesian policies in the early New Deal.