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The purpose of this paper is to present a structural evaluation methodology to link key performance indicators (KPIs) into the strategy map of the balance scorecard (BSC) for Chinese science parks (CSPs). We establish the visualized strategy map with the logical links to improve the science parks’ (SPs’) performance.

Corresponding to the four BSC perspectives (finance, customer, internal process and employee learning and growth), KPIs for CSPs are synthesized and screened in the relevant literature. The application for Zhongguancun Science Park (ZSP) is provided as an example.

The research results show that the presented approach is an objective and feasible way to construct a more justifiable strategy map. The proposed framework can be applied to non-profit organizations, such as SPs.

This work provides a systematic method to establish strategy maps for SPs (non-profit organizations), based on the consideration of the intricate causal relationships among KPIs, and the analysis of the important strategic improvement paths and proposes the model of assessment of emphasizing the processes rather than outcomes.

The development of China's solar photovoltaic (PV) industry is in a transition period from pursuing scale and speed to focusing on efficiency and quality. “Smart PV projects” (SPVPs) were proposed by the ministries of the Chinese government in 2018 to encourage intelligent upgrading and to fill the gaps in traditional PV projects. However, only a small number of PV enterprises are in progress, and only a few SPVPs have been built. The intelligence level of China's PV projects needs to be improved. The purpose of this study is to analyze the willingness of the main participants to be involved in the intelligent upgrading of PV projects by establishing an evolutionary game model that includes three parties.

A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed that considers PV enterprises, project owners and the government. The evolutionary stability strategies of each party and the corresponding stable conditions are obtained. The parameters that affect the decision behaviors are also analyzed.

The four stages of the intelligent upgrade of PV projects and the effects of the government subsidy strategies are examined. At different stages, adopting different measures to promote cooperation among the three parties involved is necessary. Government subsidies should be provided to PV enterprises during the initial stage and should be biased toward project owners during the intermediate stage. During the peak stage, PV enterprises constantly need to decrease project costs and improve quality and service, thus helping project owners reduce their initial investments and obtain additional gains. The government's reputation drives it to continually adopt incentive strategies.

This research focuses on the interactions among the three parties. Based on evolutionary game analysis, several conditions that facilitate the intelligent upgrading of PV projects are illustrated. Implications for different developing stages are proposed from the perspectives of each party for the decision-makers of SPVPs.

With the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.

An evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.

First, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.

In this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.