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The purpose of this study was to optimize meat slices for processing attributes to produce better sensory features in developed products from buffalo veal and chevon. The processing parameters such as meat particle size, fat content and binding ability without chopping were the subject of this study.

The study involved three experiments where the particle size, fat content and tumbling time were optimized for optimum binding and improvement in different sensory attributes of product followed by physico-chemical analysis.

The sensory scores clearly indicated that meat slices prepared from 3 mm meat particle size, 10% fat content and 1 h tumbling time were having best sensory features. The selected product was analyzed for different physico-chemical properties. Emulsion stability and cooking yield revealed significantly (p = 0.01) higher values of 91.6% and 89.7%, respectively, in buffalo veal than in values of 87.6% and 84.9%, respectively, in the chevon product. Similarly the results showed that buffalo veal slices had significantly (p = 0.01) higher (17.4%) protein than the chevon (15.2%), whereas chevon slices had significantly (p = 0.01) higher (10.3%) fat content. The texture profile analysis indicated that cohesiveness (p = 0.01) and chewiness (p = 0.05) were significantly higher in chevon product than in buffalo veal.

The study was conducted to explore the buffalo veal as a potential source of quality meat, as majority of buffalo meat produced in India from spent animals have compromised quality attributes. The comparison was done with chevon, the most popular red meat in the country for the comparative study.

Animal rights is a growing social justice movement opposed to all forms of animal exploitation and abuse. Animal rights is not animal welfare. It is not pet therapy, wildlife conservation, or the services of the local humane society. Although it shares concerns with other organizations interested in the welfare of animals, the animal rights movement is activist and progressive, rejecting the view that animals are resources to be used for human purposes.

The connotations, associations, custom and usages of a name often give to it an importance that far outweighs its etymological significance. Even with personal surnames or the name of a business. A man may use his own name but not if by so doing it inflicts injury on the interests and business of another person of the same name. After a long period of indecision, it is now generally accepted that in “passing off”, there is no difference between the use of a man's own name and any other descriptive word. The Courts will only intervene, however, when a personal name has become so much identified with a well‐known business as to be necessarily deceptive when used without qualification by anyone else in the same trade; i.e., only in rare cases. In the early years, the genesis of goods and trade protection, fraud was a necessary ingredient of “passing off”, an intent to deceive, but with the merging off Equity with the Common Law, the equitable rule that interference with “property” did not require fraudulent intent was practised in the Courts. First applying to trade marks, it was extended to trade names, business signs and symbols and business generally. Now it is unnecessary to prove any intent to deceive, merely that deception was probable, or that the plaintiff had suffered actual damage. The equitable principle was not established without a struggle, however, and the case of “Singer” Sewing Machines (1877) unified the two streams of law but not before it reached the House of Lords. On the way up, judical opinions differed; in the Court of Appeal, fraud was considered necessary—the defendant had removed any conception of fraud by expressingly declaring in advertisements that his “Singer” machines were manufactured by himself—so the Court found for him, but the House of Lords considered the name “Singer” was in itself a trade mark and there was no more need to prove fraud in the case of a trade name than a trade mark; Hence, the birth of the doctrine that fraud need not be proved, but their Lordships showed some hesitation in accepting property rights for trade names. If the name used is merely descriptive of goods, there can be no cause for action, but if it connotes goods manufactured by one firm or prepared from a formula or compsitional requirements prescribed by and invented by a firm or is the produce of a region, then others have no right to use it. It is a question of fact whether the name is the one or other. The burden of proof that a name or term in common use has become associated with an individual product is a heavy one; much heavier in proving an infringement of a trade mark.

Beginning an article with a chronology stresses the importance of the past to the topic at hand. In the case of the information resources of the European Community, it is intended to dispel the idea that the information impact of 1992 will be made in 1992.

In recent years, modern methods of agriculture have attracted criticism on the basis that they are no longer sustainable, and may prejudice the health of humans and animals. Examines these issues, which form the rationale behind organic farming, along with the associated consumer and retailer response. Also discusses the potential of MAFF and the EC to develop organic farming.

That ice‐creams prepared with dirty materials and under dirty conditions will themselves be dirty is a proposition which, to the merely ordinary mind, appears to be sufficiently obvious without the institution of a series of elaborate and highly “scientific” experiments to attempt to prove it. But, to the mind of the bacteriological medicine‐man, it is by microbic culture alone that anything that is dirty can be scientifically proved to be so. Not long ago, it having been observed that the itinerant vendor of ice‐creams was in the habit of rinsing his glasses, and, some say, of washing himself—although this is doubtful—in a pail of water attached to his barrow, samples of the liquor contained by such pails were duly obtained, and were solemnly submitted to a well‐known bacteriologist for bacteriological examination. After the interval necessary for the carrying out of the bacterial rites required, the eminent expert's report was published, and it may be admitted that after a cautious study of the same the conclusion seems justifiable that the pail waters were dirty, although it may well be doubted that an allegation to this effect, based on the report, would have stood the test of cross‐examination. It is true that our old and valued friend the Bacillus coli communis was reported as present, but his reputation as an awful example and as a producer of evil has been so much damaged that no one but a dangerous bacteriologist would think of hanging a dog—or even an ice‐cream vendor—on the evidence afforded by his presence. A further illustration of bacteriological trop de zèle is afforded by the recent prosecutions of some vendors of ice‐cream, whose commodities were reported to contain “millions of microbes,” including, of course, the in‐evitable and ubiquitous Bacillus coli very “communis.” To institute a prosecution under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act upon the evidence yielded by a bacteriological examination of ice‐cream is a proceeding which is foredoomed, and rightly foredoomed, to failure. The only conceivable ground upon which such a prosecution could be undertaken is the allegation that the “millions of microbes ” make the ice‐cream injurious to health. Inas‐much as not one of these millions can be proved beyond the possibility of doubt to be injurious, in the present state of knowledge; and as millions of microbes exist in everything everywhere, the breakdown of such a case must be a foregone conclusion. Moreover, a glance at the Act will show that, under existing circumstances at any rate, samples cannot be submitted to public analysts for bacteriological examination—with which, in fact, the Act has nothing to do—even if such examinations yielded results upon which it would be possible to found action. In order to prevent the sale of foul and unwholesome or actual disease‐creating ice‐cream, the proper course is to control the premises where such articles are prepared; while, at the same time, the sale of such materials should also be checked by the methods employed under the Public Health Act in dealing with decomposed and polluted articles of food. In this, no doubt, the aid of the public analyst may sometimes be sought as one of the scientific advisers of the authority taking action, but not officially in his capacity as public analyst under the Adulteration Act. And in those cases in which such advice is sought it may be hoped that it will be based, as indeed it can be based, upon something more practical, tangible and certain than the nebulous results of a bacteriological test.

In the debate on classification schemes there are, essentially, two conflicting groups, those who hold by the UDC system and those who do not. The latter group is on the whole, critical, not only of UDC but of hierarchical universal schemes in general.

While there has been increased attention to emotions and institutions, the role of denial and repression of emotions has been overlooked. We argue that not only the expression and the feeling of emotions, but also their control through denial contribute to stabilize institutional orders. The role denial plays is that of avoiding the emergence of disruptive emotions that might motivate a challenge to the status quo. Reflecting on the example of the livestock industry, we propose a theoretical model that identifies seeds for change in denied emotional contradictions in an integration of the cultural-relational and issue-based conceptions of organizational fields.