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This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basel Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. The pathology of the new “securitisation framework” is carefully highlighted to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions is incorporated, the author does not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework.

Asset‐backed securitization (ABS) is an interesting financial innovation whereby debt instruments backed by cash flows generated from income‐producing assets are issued for investment purposes in the capital markets. This study examines the characteristics of ABS transactions in Singapore and evaluates whether proper governance mechanisms have been developed to protect ABS investors. We examined the unique features of the Visor case, such as rental guarantee, large block ownerships of junior bonds, credit enhancement, embedded options, managerial relationships between the SPV and servicers, and critically evaluated the effects of these characteristics on the governance of ABS. Rules on separation of banks' participation in ABS and the accountant's requirement of “clean sale” that affect the ABS structure were also discussed. We also develop a simple information asymmetric model to evaluate the pecking order choice of two different financing methods: collateralized loans and ABS.

Asset‐backed securitization (ABS), which was brought into China in 2005 and followed by a rapid expansion, is an important financial instrument for real estate industry. The purpose of this empirical study is to assess the effects of asset securitization on stock market and equity holders' wealth by examining stock price changes upon securitization transactions in China from 2005 to September 2008.

Event study is implemented to test the wealth effects of ABS on shareholders. First, normal stock returns of companies with ABS issuance during the studied period are introduced by running the market model regression; excess returns to stockholders at the time that the securitization became public knowledge are then examined; finally, significance of the excess returns are tested and influencing factors including firm and transaction characteristics are discussed.

This paper finds that securitization generally does not have significant impact on wealth of stockholders; a considerable number of securitizations are even wealth destroying. The paper interprets these findings to mean that securitization is usually a negative signal to the stock market for first‐time securitizers, but indifferent or positive for frequent securitizers. Additionally, wealth effect of securitization on stockholders also largely depends on its underlying assets.

The outcome of this paper will assist companies, banks, and governments in understanding the effects of asset securitization, thus maximizing gains from securitization and enacting suitable polices and regulations. The paper suggests that companies and governments should examine market conditions and promote securitization only when the market is calm. Additionally, first‐time issuers of asset securitization should be cautious of possible losses caused by signs of the firm's insufficient funding, while subsequent issuance can be regarded as a relatively safe financial instrument.

The SEC has proposed rules governing offerings of asset‐backed securities (ABS) that will impose extensive new requirements for disclosure and periodic reporting, including substantial additional information regarding various parties involved in securitization transactions. When final rules are adopted, probably by the end of this year, ABS issuers will need to have the necessary information available to them to permit them to comply with the new rules. This article summarizes the proposed rules, with emphasis on provisions that have caused particular concern in the asset‐backed securities markets. The article suggests steps that ABS issuers and their counsel should take time now to ensure that they are in a position to comply with the new rules regarding disclosure and reporting about originators, servicers, credit enhancers, and others, so as to avoid finding themselves unable to securitize portfolio assets in a public offering.

The paper surveys the risks and rewards of asset securitisation and illustrates how this structured finance technique can lift credit constraints to small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) as banks to turn more conservative in their lending in response to more risk‐sensitive capital requirements for credit risk.

The mechanics of securitisation provide an analytical framework and perspective for our analysis of conditions for sustainable SME securitisation and its potential contribution to greater risk diversification of both issuers and investors. The paper also elicits lessons to be learned for essential regulatory and policy measures to guide a sound development of securitisation markets from an empirical review of SME securitisation in Germany.

The paper finds that the structural versatility of securitisation offers economic benefits irrespective of the configuration of the financial system. The development of a viable securitisation market for SME‐related claims in a bank‐based financial system is likely to require financial sector initiatives, whose scope and intensity might be enhanced by development agencies. Orchestrated policy efforts make for a benign strategy to incubate SME securitisation in a timely fashion, while keeping legal uncertainty and economic attrition to a minimum.

As opposed to previous papers, the paper defines and discusses SME securitisation from both the perspective of bank‐ and firm‐sponsored securitisation and issue hands‐on recommendations for its efficient implementation.

In August 2007 the Mainsail II SIV-Lite was frozen by its trustee as a result of the ongoing credit crisis. The state of Maine held $20 million of Mainsail commercial paper in its Cash Pool portfolio, a short-term portfolio that puts temporary, excess state revenues to work. When word of the potential loss became public, the Treasurer came under attack. The case introduces the functions of a state Treasury department, with particular emphasis on the investment objectives and guidelines for the cash pool as well as its composition. The case reviews the events leading up to and including August 2007, the month when the credit markets first began to seize and when the financial crisis effectively began. It examines securitization, structured finance, and the Mainsail SIV-Lite structure in some detail.

Before the 2007 financial crisis, securitized products accounted for half the credit market. Once regarded as one of the biggest financial innovations of the last century, securitization is now viewed as a contributory factor to the crisis. Until recently research has focused on the post-1970s mortgage securitization market. In this paper, I trace the earlier origins of securitization, from the 12th century Genoese compera through to early 20th century efforts. The historical examples highlight unifying themes on risk allocation and complexity. As the future securitization market remains uncertain, it is important to consider lessons to be learned from these historical episodes.

This is primarily a survey article that utilizes historical documents to compare/contrast features of securitization with the recent crisis.

Improved disclosure is the key element to address recent securitization flaws, but disclosure does not really matter if the entire process is not understood. An examination of historical episodes can be instructive. Forging ahead, any securitization reform needs to address why securitization markets formed, why they failed and how the securitization market can be improved.

As the future securitization market remains uncertain, it is important to consider lessons to be learned from these historical episodes.

To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first research papers that surveys the history of securitization as far back as the twelfth century.

To highlight that the risk retention rules associated with the holding of securitization investments, commonly thought to apply only to the sponsors and manufacturers of securitisations, also affect EU institutional investors and potentially impact non-EU fund managers that invest in these assets.

To address which classes of investor are affected and then to provide an overview of the obligations on affected investors that do invest in securitization investments.

There is much that is straightforward about the relevant obligations but there are a number of quirks that have not necessarily been fully appreciated by the market: these include the applicability to investors on a “look through” basis that may, inter alia, affect US credit fund managers with EU institutional investors.

EU institutional investors that do invest in this asset class should be considering the need to take practical steps to prepare written due diligence materials; non-EU credit managers that run e.g. ABS funds offered into the EU or in which there may be EU institutional investors should consider if they may have any obligations under the EU Securitization Regulation.

The aspects of the Securitization Regulation that affect institutional investors and regular fund managers have not been addressed as thoroughly as they have by the main securitization sector (banks, CLO managers and similar). This article seeks to remedy that and should prove of value to compliance, legal and other professionals at those types of institution.

The development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is vital to the economy, as such the financing of SMEs has become the focus of government and enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to find the operational and financial strategies of the supplier and retailer in supply chain.

In a Stackelberg game, supplier moves first setting wholesale price, while the retailer follows, setting the ordering quantity. Enterprises maximize their profits by optimization. When measuring profit targets, the capital constraints and income taxes of two companies are considered. In the portfolio financing model, the retailer can obtain products from suppliers through trade credit, and the supplier can use asset-backed securitization (ABS) to solve his/her financing problems.

The wholesale price is a decreasing function of retailer’s initial cash balance, and the supplier’s financing interest rate is a decreasing function of his/her own capital, the incentive effect of the supplier’s price discount strategy on retailer is more intense in the supply chain with high-priced product or high-capital retailer. And in a capital-constrained supply chain, an increase in tax rate or financing rate does not necessarily motivate the supplier to increase wholesale price. Most importantly, if the supplier’s markup is moderate, portfolio financing has value for both retailer and supplier, while solving the financing problems of both parties.

Future research can consider the explicit and implicit interest when supplier provides trade credit to retailer. It is also possible to consider the portfolio financing when multiple retailers are facing financial constraints.

It provides guidance for supply chain enterprises with financing needs, helping them find optimal decisions. With financial interest, enterprise income tax on the enterprises’ financing factors will produce a tax shield effect; thus, a cost–benefit analysis with the tax shield effect can provide more accurate picture when making corresponding decisions.

Government takes feasible adjustments of tax rate for the sake of motivation on financial SMEs tax shield. Furthermore, ABS calls for service from financial institutions, which will, in turn, expedite financial institutions revenue.

The authors provide insights on enterprise financing models, combining ABS with trade credit, expanding enterprise financing channels and enriching the theory of financial supply chain and supply chain management. The authors analyze in detail the influence of tax factors on enterprises by introducing tax factors into traditional process of enterprise operation and financing strategy.

Sukuk restructuring primarily aims at offering a debtor more latitude, in form and time, to settle his obligations. To meet Shari’ah requirements of transferring assets to Sukuk holders in asset-based Sukuk, the originator usually transfers the beneficial ownership to the issuer special purpose vehicles (SPV). However, in asset-backed Sukuk, the originator sells the underlying asset to an SPV and Sukuk holders do not have recourse to the originator in the event of defaults. Among some key unresolved Shari’ah issues in this regard is whether a change of contract necessitates entering a new contract. Other related issues that conflict with the tenets of Shari’ah are: (1) Sukuk structuring on tangible assets and debts; (2) receiving the full title by the Sukuk holders to the underlying assets in the event of default in case of securities that are publicized as asset backed; (3) Sukuk’s similarity with interest bearing conventional bonds: (a) capital guarantee by the originator or third party, (b) the originators’ promise to repurchase Sukuk at face value upon their redemption, and (c) providing internal and external credit enhancement. The Shari’ah-compliance of the above-mentioned clauses and structures of Sukuk remain debated among the Shari’ah scholars. Based on some specific cases, this study examines the Shari’ah viewpoint on sukuk restructuring and potential solutions to these unresolved Shari’ah issues in light of the past and recent declaration of some Sukuk defaults as non-Shari’ah complaints. Undoubtedly, resolution of these and other unresolved issues pertaining to Sukuk defaults can help strengthen the confidence of investors in Islamic capital market structures.