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The quest for a set of generic ethics principles remains a challenge, not least because the generation of new sets seems to be continuing unabated. This chapter has been developed from the first of a series of stimulus papers, delivered in symposia, organised as part of the Academy of Social Sciences’ initiative to promote discussion between learned societies aiming for a consensus on what might comprise generic ethics principles in social research.

In this chapter I build upon the case I argued in Volume 1 of this series (Carpenter, D. (2016). The quest for generic ethical principles in social science research. In R. Iphofen (Ed.), Advances in research ethics and integrity (Vol. 1, pp. 3–18). Bingley: Emerald). There I established arguments for eschewing principlism and other well-established theories of practical ethics, such as deontology and consequentialism, in favour of virtue ethics. I drew on the work of Macfarlane (2009, 2010) in making a case for virtuous researcher and virtuous research. In this chapter, I draw attention to the role and conduct of ethics committees in reviewing research. If we are to consider the ethics of research and researchers, then we might also consider the ethics of reviewing and reviewers. Whilst there is an abundance of codes and similar documents aimed at guiding research conduct, there is relatively little to guide ethics committees and their members. Given the argument that a virtue ethics approach might help committees evaluate the ethics of proposed research and researchers, it could equally be the case that virtue ethics could be useful when thinking about the work of committees and ethics review. In this chapter I attempt to relocate and develop Macfarlane’s work by examining its application to the work of ethics committees and the virtues of their members. In particular, I will consider the virtues that reviewers should exhibit or demonstrate when reviewing research, and what we might take as the telos of ethics committees.

This chapter presents the main findings of the EU-funded SATORI project on ethics assessment of research and innovation (R&I) in its first 18 months. It offers summarised descriptions of the ways in which ethics assessment and guidance of R&I are currently practiced in different scientific fields, in different countries in Europe, the United States and China, and in different types of organisations.

The main findings include the following. Although the most extensive institutions, policies and activities exist in the medical and life sciences, there is evidence of a growing institutionalisation of ethics assessment in non-medical fields. Increasing coordination and cooperation between ethics assessors can be observed at the EU and global levels. Each of 15 types of organisations that were studied performs an important role in ethics assessment, which may not always be well established and sometimes poses significant challenges. Although significant differences exist among the countries that were studied in terms of the degree to which ethics assessment of R&I is institutionalised, all seem to be expanding their ethics assessment and guidance infrastructures.

The findings are an important means by which partners in the SATORI project will take their next steps: the identification of best practices, the development of proposals for harmonisation and shared standards, and, to the extent possible, the proposal of common principles, protocols, procedures and methodologies for the ethical assessment of research and innovation in the European Union and beyond.

This chapter presents a virtue-based approach to research ethics which both complements and challenges dominant principle- and rule-based ethical codes and governance frameworks. Virtues are qualities of character that contribute to human and ecological flourishing, focussing on the dispositions and motivations of moral agents (in this case, researchers) as opposed to simply their actions. The chapter argues for the usefulness of ‘researcher integrity’, in the context of increasing interest internationally in ‘research integrity’ frameworks for regulating research practice. ‘Researcher integrity’ is analysed, including weak and strong versions of the concept (conduct according to current standards, versus reflexive commitment to ideals of what research should be at its best). Researcher integrity in its stronger sense is depicted as an overarching complex virtue, holding together and balancing other virtues such as courage, care, trustworthiness, respectfulness and practical wisdom. Consideration is given to educating researchers and university students as virtuous researchers, rather than simply ensuring that rules are followed and risks minimised. Several approaches are outlined, including Socratic dialogue, to develop attentiveness and respectfulness and participatory theatre to rehearse different responses to ethical challenges in research. Some limitations of virtue ethics are noted, including dangers of reinforcing a culture of blaming researchers for institutional failings, and its potential to be co-opted by those who wish to indoctrinate rather than cultivate virtues. Nevertheless, it is an important counter-weight to current trends that see research ethics as entailing learning sets of rules and how to implement them (to satisfy institutional research governance requirements), rather than processes of critical and responsible reflection.

David Carpenter argues in favour of Internal Review Boards taking a virtue ethics approach to their reviews of research proposals. Carpenter views principle- and code-based approaches as in competition with virtue ethics, and he describes reliance on principles and codes as neither necessary nor sufficient. We agree with Carpenter’s thesis that a virtue ethics approach would be beneficial and even necessary for exemplary review of research proposals. We disagree with Carpenter, however, about the weight that should be given to principles and codes. We defend here our view that principles and regulations are indispensible to ethical review of research, in spite of the fact that principles often conflict with each other. In those situations, the reviewer’s virtue of practical wisdom is necessary to adjudicate between competing ethical claims.

This chapter considers the current standards that exist for the conduct of research and whether these standards are being met. Issues of scope and terminology are discussed and debated. Also considered are the reasons and benefits to the Academy of Social Sciences and other professional and disciplinary bodies by being involved in developing generic ethics principles in social science research.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to resolve some unclarity about the nature and character of intercultural information ethics (IIE).

By survey of some of the relevant literature, the paper identifies and explains the distinctive projects of IIE. In addition, to facilitate the achievement of these projects, the paper attempts to identify the most fruitful metaphysical and meta‐ethical assumptions about truth and moral truth. In particular, to identify and determine which of objectivist theories of truth and morality or intersubjectivist theories of truth and morality provides a better theoretical foundation for IIE.

Two projects are identified: a descriptive project and a normative project. It is argued that moral objectivism provides a better foundation for the normative (project than moral intersubjectivism (or, as it is sometimes called, normative cultural relativism) in the sense that objectivism provides a more solid ground for the principle grounding the normative project – namely that agreement among cultures on principles of information ethics is good or desirable. In other respects, it is concluded that moral objectivism and moral intersubjectivism do equally well in grounding the normative project.

The paper is the first to compare the two methodological approaches and points in the direction of the most fruitful approach to take in pursuing IIE.

The developing academic field of machine ethics seeks to make artificial agents safer as they become more pervasive throughout society. In contrast to computer ethics, machine ethics is concerned with the behavior of machines toward human users and other machines. This study aims to use an action-based ethical theory founded on the combinational aspects of deontological and teleological theories of ethics in the construction of an artificial moral agent (AMA).

The decision results derived by the AMA are acquired via fuzzy logic interpretation of the relative values of the steady-state simulations of the corresponding rule-based fuzzy cognitive map (RBFCM).

Through the use of RBFCMs, the following paper illustrates the possibility of incorporating ethical components into machines, where latent semantic analysis (LSA) and RBFCMs can be used to model dynamic and complex situations, and to provide abilities in acquiring causal knowledge.

This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics. Nonetheless, to ensure that a machine with an ethical component can function autonomously in the world, research in artificial intelligence will need to further investigate the representation and determination of ethical principles, the incorporation of these ethical principles into a system’s decision procedure, ethical decision-making with incomplete and uncertain knowledge, the explanation for decisions made using ethical principles and the evaluation of systems that act based upon ethical principles.

To date, the conducted research has contributed to a theoretical foundation for machine ethics through exploration of the rationale and the feasibility of adding an ethical dimension to machines. Further, the constructed AMA illustrates the possibility of utilizing an action-based ethical theory that provides guidance in ethical decision-making according to the precepts of its respective duties. The use of LSA illustrates their powerful capabilities in understanding text and their potential application as information retrieval systems in AMAs. The use of cognitive maps provides an approach and a decision procedure for resolving conflicts between different duties.

This paper suggests that cognitive maps could be used in AMAs as tools for meta-analysis, where comparisons regarding multiple ethical principles and duties can be examined and considered. With cognitive mapping, complex and abstract variables that cannot easily be measured but are important to decision-making can be modeled. This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics.