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The first alternative is to enrich shareholding by management. The basic theory of this research is the agency theory. This study aims to examine the institutional ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and risk that are interconnected directly or indirectly. The research sample was a non-financial company from 2010 to 2014. Four variables will be tested using Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) in the SPSS application. The result of this study represents the overall interdependency relationship among institutional ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and risk. The research outcome signifies an interdependency relation for endogenous variables, even if some exogenous variables have no significant relation. In addition, the effects of substitution between institutional ownership and dividend policy, debt policy and dividend policy, and institutional ownership and risk. Meanwhile, institutional ownership and dividend policy, risk and dividend policy, and risk and debt policy have no substitution effect.

The Covid-19 pandemic has rekindled interest in sovereign debt crises amidst calls for debt relief for developing and emerging countries. But has debt relief lessened the debt burdens of emerging and developing economies? The purpose of this paper is to empirically address this question. In particular, the focus is on the implications of debt relief and institutional qualities for sovereign debt in emerging and developing economies.

The model extends the framework on the probability of default by incorporating the receipt of debt relief by a debtor country. Doing so allows to better explain movements of sovereign defaults relating to debt relief. The model is estimated via the regular probit regression.

The analysis shows that the debt relief provided, thus, far, failed to ease the debt overhang problems of developing and emerging countries and reduced investment. The current debt relief schemes may underscore the prospects of self-enforcing and self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises rather than eliminating the dilemma completely. Regarding the forms of debt relief, the analysis shows that debt forgiveness offers favourable prospects in terms of debt sustainability and economic outcomes than debt rescheduling. Perhaps, the sovereign debt crises, particularly in low-income countries, hinge on insolvency problems rather than transitory illiquidity issues.

Any debt relief mechanism should consider seriously the potential incentive effect that reinforces expectations of future debt-relief initiatives. Importantly, solving the sovereign debt problem requires a programme for sustained investment and economic growth, while not discounting the critical role of prudent debt management policies and institutions.

This study contributes a different angle to the debate on sovereign debt distress. Aside from the structural and economic factors, this study investigates the role of debt management policy in the debtor nation and the implications of debt relief benefits for sovereign risk. The framework also focuses on whether the different forms of debt relief exert distinctive impacts.

This paper examines the interrelationships among debt policy, dividend policy, and ownership structure using a simultaneous equation framework. Our approach allows us to test both the convergence of interests theory and entrenchment theory. Using a sample of publicly traded South Korean manufacturing firms, we find that debt policy and ownership structure have a positive impact on dividend policy. We also find that both debt and dividend policy are positively related to ownership structure. Our findings support both the theory of convergence of interests between management and ownership and entrenchment theory, and also explain why many studies have found conflicting results.

The purpose of the present paper is to examine the trade-off relationship between managerial ownership and corporate debts and whether this relationship is moderated by ownership structure and corporate tax rates, particularly in a transition and emerging market whose unique institutional characteristics considerably differ from those prevailing both in the West and East markets.

This research is semi-empirical in terms of method and practical in terms of purpose. The authors test their hypotheses by using simultaneous equations system methodology with two- and three-stages least squares regression (2SLS and 3SLS) and panel data technics on a sample of 952 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2011-2018.

The findings indicate that, contrary to the current line of research, there is no trade-off relationship between managerial ownership and debt concerning the reduction of agency costs. Likewise, the study finds no convincing evidence that either the controlling shareholder or the corporate tax rate could influence or moderate this interrelationship. The conjecture lies in the fact that the fundamental environmental variations between the Tehran Stock Exchange and the institutional assumptions underpinning the Western models have led to the formation of such unexpected results.

The implications drawn from this study are constrained by two primary limitations. First, the present study is conducted in an Iranian setting; therefore, the data used for the study only contain companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The utilization of listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange is likely to affect the generalizability of the study in an international context. Second, in this study, we were unable to extend the sample time period because of some major deficiencies in the Tehran Stock Exchange library and its supplementary software. The usage of an extended time period could have provided more generalizable results. However, extended time period, per se, may impair the validity of the results as well.

Because the fundamental institutional assumptions underpinning the Western and even East Asia capital structure models are not valid in the institutional environment of Iran, the findings of this study could provide substantial implications for the understanding of agency costs and capital structure literature. These significant institutional and ownership differences are the factors affecting firms’ leverage and capital choice decisions. Indeed, this study has laid some groundwork upon which a more detailed evaluation of the Iranian firms’ capital structure could be based. In addition, the examination of such relations may provide the ground for sound decision-making by various interested users of financial and accounting information.

The purpose of this paper is to assess and explain the leverage of Saudi companies (53 companies) during the period 2003‐2007.

This paper reviews two different classical capital structure theories, namely tradeoff theory and pecking order theory, to formulate testable propositions concerning the determinants of debt levels of Saudi companies. It develops a number of regression models (pooled OLS and panel techniques) to test the study's hypotheses.

The results suggest that a firm's capital structure is positively affected by profitability, size, growth opportunities, and institutional ownership. It is negatively impacted by tangibility, government ownership, family ownership, business risk, dividend payment, and liquidity.

Cost of capital is one of the pillars of corporate competitive advantage. Knowing which factors have the potential to influence capital structure can be essential to minimizing the cost of capital.

This is the first study of the determinants of capital structure in Saudi Arabia that considers dividend payment, ownership structure (as a proxy for agency problems), and risk. This work also contributes to the current debate regarding theories of competitive capital structure.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of financial distress costs, corporate growth rate, and flexibility on the interaction between ownership structure and corporate debt policy.

The authors test the hypotheses by employing simultaneous equations system methodology with two-stage least squares regression and panel data technics on a sample of 786 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2010-2015.

The results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between corporate debt level and managerial ownership in the Iranian listed companies. The authors also find no convincing evidence that either the firm’s growth or financial health could influence or moderate this interrelationship.

The implications drawn from this study are constrained by two primary limitations. First, the present study is conducted in an Iranian setting; therefore, the data utilized for the study only contain companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The utilization of listed companies on the Tehran Stock exchange is likely to affect the generalizability of the study in a national context. Second, the authors were unable to extend the sample time period due to some major deficiencies in the Tehran Stock Exchange library and its supplementary software.

Since the fundamental institutional assumptions underpinning the western and even East Asia capital structure models are not valid in the institutional environment of Iran, the findings could provide substantial implications for our understanding of capital structures as well as debt policy literature.

This is an innovative research in terms of the mutual relationship between debt and ownership structure and the use of equations system to measure the interaction between them.

This study empirically examines, from the first quarter of 1981 until the fourth quarter of 2017, the relations across customary domestic issuer credit ratings (long-term, short-term and subordinate) and three popular corporate risk-taking measurements (the variability of operating profitability, net profitability, and research and development expenses).

The author deploys categorical regressions and robustness tests with control variables, interaction terms, fixed effect variables, lag variables and delta variables.

The author documents that both short-term and subordinate domestic credit ratings are key determinants of the volatility of operating profitability. The author also identifies long-term credit ratings as secondary factors, yet they do affect broader corporate risk-taking behavioral features (along all three measurements). Furthermore, the author finds that the higher (lower) the credit ratings assigned, i.e. the superior (inferior) the credit quality externally judged, the more (less) overall risk firms tend to undertake.

It is the first research to examine both the inclusive influence and the granular effects of credit ratings on corporate risk-taking (CRT) behavior. It is also the only enquiry to inspect the specific relationships along three types of domestic issuer credit ratings: long-term, short-term and subordinate ratings.

The study aims to investigate the comparatively under‐researched relationship between ownership structure and capital structure in an emerging market. It is also one of the first studies to apply both single and reduced‐form equation methods using a panel data approach. Design/methodology/approach – The study applies econometrics modelling using both single equation and reduces equation models for panel data.

The results demonstrate that Jordanian firms follow the same determinants of capital structure as occur in developed markets, namely: profitability, firm size, growth rate, market‐to‐book ratio, asset structure and liquidity. In addition, institutional ownership structure is found to be determined by: assets structure, business risk (BR), growth opportunities and firm size. Finally, the results reveal that assets tangibility, firm size, growth opportunities and BR are considered to be joint determinants of ownership structure and capital structure.

The practical implication of the study is that investors and managers should consider both capital structure and ownership structure when they take their investment decisions.

This is the first study of the interaction between institutional ownership and capital structure in Jordan where there are differences, as regards institutional and financial structures, relative to those in developed markets.

The aim of this paper is to analyse how financial decisions influence corporate ownership structure of Spanish family and non‐family controlled firms.

The authors derived two models in line with financial theory, which have then been estimated by using a sample of Spanish companies. Panel data methodology and estimation by the generalized method of moments allow the unobservable heterogeneity to be eliminated and the endogeneity problem controlled.

The main findings are as follows. First, increases in debt lead outside owners and managers to limit the risk they bear by reducing their holdings. Such reductions are also found in family controlled firms. Second, both outside owners and managers are encouraged to increase their stakes in the firm in view of higher dividends. This reaction is also observed in family controlled firms, and it is even stronger in the managers of family controlled firms. Third, outside owners in non‐family firms increase their holdings when a new investment project is undertaken, whereas the reaction of family controlled firms is the opposite. The expected positive effect of investment on insider ownership is only observed in family controlled firms.

When analysing the determinants of corporate ownership structure, the analysis should be controlled for family ownership.

Overall, this paper contributes to the strand of literature on the determinants of corporate ownership structure in two ways: first, by focusing on the role played by financial decisions; and second, by accounting for family control.