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This paper aims to explain the fundraising and valuation processes of startups and discuss the conflicts of interest between entrepreneurs, venture capital (VC) firms and stakeholders in the context of startup corporate governance. Further, this paper uses the examples of WeWork and Zenefits to explain how a failure of stakeholders to demand an external audit from an independent accounting firm in early stages of funding led to an opportunity for fraud.

The methodology used is a literature review and analysis of startup valuation combined with the Fraud Triangle Theory. This paper also provides a discussion of WeWork and Zenefits, both highly visible examples of startup fraud, and explores an increased role for independent external auditors in fraud risk mitigation on behalf of stakeholders prior to an initial public offering (IPO).

This paper documents a number of fraud risks posed by the “fake it till you make it” ethos and investor behavior and pricing in the world of entrepreneurial finance and VC, which could be mitigated by a greater awareness of startup stakeholders of the value of an external audit performed by an independent accounting firm prior to an IPO.

An implication of this paper is that regulators should consider greater oversight of the startup financing process and potentially take steps to facilitate greater independence of participants in the IPO process.

Given the potential conflicts of interest between VC firms, investment banks and startup founders, the investors at the time of an IPO may be exposed to the risk that the shares of the IPO firms are overvalued at offering.

This study demonstrates how startup practices can be extended to the Fraud Triangle and issue a call to action for the accounting profession to take a greater role in protecting the public from startup fraud. This study then offers recommendations for regulators and standards entities.

There are few academic papers in the financial crime literature that link the valuation and culture of startup firms with fraud risk. This study provides a concise explanation of the process of valuation for startups and highlights the considerations for stakeholders in assessing fraud risk. In addition, this study documents an emerging role for auditors as stewards of proper valuation for pre-IPO firms.

This study aims to examine whether two periods of extreme market conditions – the governance crisis and Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulatory shock of 2002 and the 2007–2008 global financial crisis – incrementally impacted the self-fulfilling prophecy effect, by examining the propensity of US firms receiving going concern modification (GCM) opinions to go bankrupt relative to their non-GCM distress risk-matched counterparts during these two crisis periods.

To assess the potential influence of the governance/regulatory shock of 2002 and the global financial crisis moderate or mitigate the self-fulfilling prophecy effect, the authors use multivariate logit analysis, regressing t + 1 bankruptcy status on time t GCM and other bankruptcy determinants, interacting crisis period dummies with the GCM variable.

GCM firms were more likely to declare bankruptcy than their distressed non-GCM counterparts, confirming prior research documenting the existence of a self-fulfilling prophecy effect. The authors also find that the self-fulfilling prophecy effect was exacerbated by the governance crisis/Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulatory shock, but not the global financial crisis, a financial/banking sector shock.

This study contributes to the financial crisis and auditing literatures by examining whether exogenous shocks exacerbate the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. The present analysis and findings have implications for future academic research related to systemic shocks and for auditors in documenting the inducement effect arising from the issuance of GCMs during crisis periods.

This paper aims to investigate auditors’ pricing of excess cash holdings and the variation in their pricing decisions in light of the precautionary motives of cash holdings and certain firm-specific conditions and during periods of crisis.

The authors conduct the two-stage-least-squares multivariate analysis using a sample of publicly listed non-financial US firms for the period 2003 to 2021 (42,413 firm-year observations).

The findings show a significant positive relationship between excess cash and audit fee. Next, the authors find that audit pricing of excess cash is significantly higher for firms with lower financial constraints. However, the authors do not find evidence to suggest that auditors price excess cash significantly higher for firms with lower hedging needs. In additional analysis, the authors find evidence to suggest that auditors charge significantly less for excess cash in firms that report financial loss and firms operating in industries with high litigation risk. The additional analysis also reveals excess cash is not positively and significantly priced by auditors as a result of the global financial crisis and Covid-19 pandemic.

Most researchers have analyzed excess cash holding from the perspective of managers, i.e. agency conflict or managerial prudence, while somewhat neglecting auditors’ perception of the embedded risk of excess cash holdings. The authors provide new insights on auditors’ perspective of excess cash holding and identify certain factors/situation/conditions that cause variation in the audit fee premium. The findings offer useful insights for managers and shareholders who are interested in assessing the effects of excess cash holdings policies on the audit fee premium.

This paper aims to apply the Capital Market Liability of Foreignness (CMLOF) framework to the audit fees of a sample of foreign firms listed on US exchanges to examine whether American auditors price foreignness.

The four components of the CMLOF are institutional distance (civil versus common law system and enforcement), information asymmetry (disclosures and mandatory IFRS adoption), unfamiliarity (exports, English language and geographical distance) and cultural difference [Hofstede (1980) dimensions of culture]. These variables are examined in a regression model that explains audit fees to determine the auditor perception of risk associated with the CMLOF.

Examining the factors that mitigate perceived agency costs, this investigation determines that auditors price risk according to each component of the liability of foreignness. Audit fees are higher for shareholders of firms headquartered in countries exhibiting greater institutional distance, unfamiliarity and cultural distance. Audit fees are higher for firms when their home country requires additional disclosures or the adoption of IFRS to reduce information asymmetry.

CMLOF is costly for capital market participants and has implications for auditors, shareholders of foreign firms and managers considering listing in the US Auditors, and investors should carefully assess this risk for pricing and valuation, and managers should take action, to the extent possible, to reduce the firm-specific level of unfamiliarity and increase transparency.

This paper is the first to apply the CMLOF to examine whether auditors price aspects of foreignness of their non-US-headquartered clients.

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the design of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation generates incentives to engage in managerial behavior that enhances customer satisfaction and whether these incentives, in turn, lead to higher firm value.

A unique dataset combining customer satisfaction and executive compensation data was used, and the relationship between option sensitivity, customer satisfaction and performance was modeled using simultaneous equations modeling with industry and year fixed effects.

Findings suggest that CEO compensation plays an important role in explaining the variation in customer satisfaction and firm value. Specifically, CEO short-term compensation (salary or bonus) has no affect on customer satisfaction or firm value; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes is positively related and also exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with customer satisfaction; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes interacts negatively with CEO longevity and industry concentration but positively with advertising expenses in affecting customer satisfaction; the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to both stock price changes and customer satisfaction positively affect firm value; and the sensitivity of CEO wealth from long-term incentive compensation to stock price changes interacts positively with customer satisfaction to affect firm value.

This study suffers from several limitations. First, the sample is limited to firms with ACSI scores available. Second, this study is limited to only publicly traded firms, which limits our ability to generalize regarding customer satisfaction, option sensitivity and firm value.

This study has several important implications for researchers and managers. The first is that the corporate board appears to view investment in customer satisfaction as similar to an investment in other intangible assets or technology, in that they reward managers with a nonlinear payoff profile. To encourage managers to invest discretionary funds wisely, incentive compensation is important. Second, compensation committees of corporate boards should not allow the option sensitivity to reach extreme levels because, at some point, managers’ incentives appear to shift more toward short-term earnings objectives and away from investment in intangibles, which have a longer-term payoff. Third, if boards are concerned about customer satisfaction and market value, when designing compensation packages, they should shift their focus from the structure of pay to the sensitivity of pay to performance. The exception to this is that for CEOs with very long tenures (or for those close to retirement), high levels of option sensitivity may distort incentives away from a focus on customer satisfaction. Finally, our results indicate that strategies that enhance customer satisfaction provide an incremental benefit in terms of firm value, beyond incentive compensation strategies.

The results indicate that a “stakeholder focus” which includes customers is value adding for shareholders as well. The results also imply that perhaps using a “balanced scorecard” approach to assessing performance in terms of customer satisfaction outcomes, or at least acknowledging the drives of customer satisfaction explicitly, could be an alternative to using highly sensitive incentive-based compensation when such compensation schemes are less desirable.

Prior research has found that the structure of fixed versus incentive-based compensation impacts customer satisfaction. However, this is one of the first papers to investigate the relationship between the sensitivity of CEO compensation and customer satisfaction. Findings have important implications for boards who seek to structure CEO pay so that CEOs have incentives to enact policies that benefit customers and, in turn, firm performance.

The aim of this paper is to provide additional insights on the association between real earnings management (REM) and crash risk, particularly from the perspective of an emerging market economy. It also examines the moderation role that internal and external corporate governance may play in this area.

Relying on archival data from the RESSET and CSMAR databases over a timeframe from 2010 to 2018 of China listed company, the authors test the hypotheses by regressing common measures of crash risk on the treatment variable (REM) and crash risk control variables identified in the prior crash risk literature. The authors also introduce monitoring proxies (internal controls as an internal governance and institutional ownership as an external governance) and assess how effective internal and external governance moderate the relation between REM and stock price crash risk.

The results suggest firms with higher REM have a significantly greater stock price crash risk, and that this association is mitigated by external monitoring. That is, greater institutional ownership, particularly pressure insensitive owners, mitigates the impact of REM on stock price crash risk. However, internal control does not mitigate the association between REM and stock price crash risk.

Following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, prior research has documented an increase in the use of REM and a positive association between REM and cash risk. The authors demonstrate that they persist in one of the largest emerging markets where institutional regulations, market conditions and corporate behaviors are different from those in developed markets. Also, the assessment of the moderation effect of internal and external governance mechanisms could have meaningful implications for investors and regulators in Chinese and other emerging markets.