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1 – 10 of over 4000Ferdy Putra and Doddy Setiawan
This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.
Design/methodology/approach
This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.
Findings
The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.
Research limitations/implications
Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.
Originality/value
This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.
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This paper aims to examine the two different approaches adopted in the UK to regulate directors’ remuneration. The paper also aims to explore the two approaches to understand…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the two different approaches adopted in the UK to regulate directors’ remuneration. The paper also aims to explore the two approaches to understand which one better regulates directors’ pay and why. It provides an account of the two approaches’ evolution, effectiveness and challenges towards the regulation of directors’ remuneration. The paper will also make some recommendations on both approaches and the way forward to better regulate directors’ remuneration.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper reviews various corporate governance codes, its recommendations on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and the challenges it face in regulating directors’ remuneration. The paper also reviews provisions of the Companies Act 2006 on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and challenges faced.
Findings
The paper finds that corporate governance adopts a better approach to regulating directors’ pay than the Companies Act 2006 because it targets the pay setting process. However, the existence of grey areas and lack of enforcement procedure poses a challenge on its effectiveness. The Companies Act 2006 is unable to regulate directors’ pay adequately because it adopts a corrective approach and it considers directors’ remuneration as a management responsibility.
Originality/value
The paper offers an up-to-date assessment of the two approaches to regulating directors’ pay in the UK. It highlights the challenges faced by both approaches and which approach could regulate directors pay better and its challenges. The paper further makes recommendations on how the regulation of directors’ remuneration can be effective in the UK.
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Patti Cybinski and Carolyn Windsor
As a result of the Australian Government Productivity Commission's recommendation to mandate remuneration committee independence for ASX300 companies, this study aims to…
Abstract
Purpose
As a result of the Australian Government Productivity Commission's recommendation to mandate remuneration committee independence for ASX300 companies, this study aims to investigate whether voluntary remuneration committee independence aligns chief executive officer (CEO) total pay and bonuses with firm financial performance.
Design/methodology/approach
A series of hypotheses test the research question using multiple regressions for a sample of 143 ASX300 companies during 2001. This time was prior to strengthen corporate governance regulation, but after mandated executive remuneration disclosure, thus capturing varying levels of voluntary remuneration committee independence.
Findings
This study shows firm size is an influential factor in the relationship under investigation. ASX300 large firm remuneration committees link CEO total remuneration and bonuses to firm financial performance. Smaller ASX firm remuneration committees do not link either type of CEO remuneration to performance despite remuneration committee independence. Findings are mixed for medium-sized ASX300 firms.
Research limitations/implications
Limitations include the necessary time restriction to 2001 for sampling the ASX300 firms. The implication of this study's findings is that the proposed public policy for mandatory remuneration committee independence is not universally effective in linking CEO remuneration to firm financial performance for ASX300 firms.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the limited research on voluntary remuneration committee independence in relation to CEO remuneration and firm financial performance in the Australian context.
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Antonio Dell'Atti, Mariantonietta Intonti and Antonia Patrizia Iannuzzi
Following the subprime crisis and the detrimental role played by remuneration practices, an important reform concerned bank remuneration committees, especially in “significant…
Abstract
Purpose
Following the subprime crisis and the detrimental role played by remuneration practices, an important reform concerned bank remuneration committees, especially in “significant financial institutions”. In light of this consideration, this paper aims to investigate the scope and format of this renewal in order to verify whether and how those bodies are conforming to the new regulatory framework while improving their efficiency and functionality.
Design/methodology/approach
The study was carried out on 30 top European banks through the elaboration of a qualitative analysis model that takes into account both the procedural and the compositional aspects of remuneration committees. The model was used as a benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of the remuneration committees operating within a sample. This assessment was carried out according to the content analysis approach.
Findings
The results show a high diffusion of these bodies within the banks and a gradual expansion, during the time under investigation (three years 2008-2010), of the information provided by them on their tasks and decision-making. In the same time, the study highlights some important criticalities concerning both the composition of the banks' remuneration committees, how they carry out their functions, and the level of disclosure addressed to shareholders and the market in order to formalize the results of their work.
Originality/value
The added value of the analysis is related to the implementation of an “effectiveness remuneration committee rating” applied to a sample of top European banks during the financial crisis.
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Kingsley Opoku Appiah and Amon Chizema
This study aims to examine the role the structure of corporate boards plays in the failure of the firm. Specifically, it examines whether the remuneration committee is related to…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the role the structure of corporate boards plays in the failure of the firm. Specifically, it examines whether the remuneration committee is related to corporate failure in the UK.
Design/methodology/approach
The study uses 1,835 firm-year observations for 98 failed and 269 non-failed UK-listed non-financial firms between the periods of 1994 and 2011. This study used pooled cross-sectional, fixed and random effects LOGIT models to estimate whether corporate failure is related to remuneration committee in the UK.
Findings
The findings indicate that corporate failure is negatively related to the independence of the remuneration committee chairman and remuneration committee’s effectiveness but not remuneration committee’s presence, size and meetings. However, a positive and significant relationship was observed between corporate failure and remuneration committee independence.
Practical implications
The findings of the study provide support for the appropriateness of agency theory as analytical lens through which to study the efficacy of remuneration committee, especially the independence of the remuneration committee chairperson, as a board monitoring device, in the context of corporate failure.
Originality/value
The paper adds to existing literature on corporate governance by establishing the likely causes of corporate failure in the UK.
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Isabel Acero and Nuria Alcalde
This study investigates whether the proportion of proprietary directors (blockholders or their representatives) on the board's remuneration committee influences vertical pay…
Abstract
Purpose
This study investigates whether the proportion of proprietary directors (blockholders or their representatives) on the board's remuneration committee influences vertical pay inequality in Spanish listed companies and whether this relationship can be conditioned by the concentration of ownership.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample contains information on the individual compensation of 1048 directors of 57 Spanish listed firms during the period 2013–2018 making up an unbalanced panel with 3565 observations. Panel data regressions are used to study how the presence of proprietary directors on the remuneration committee influences the remuneration of directors, focusing not on their absolute remuneration levels, but rather on their relationship to the average remuneration of the organization's employees (as a measure of vertical pay inequality within the company). The authors also investigate whether this relationship is conditioned by firm ownership concentration.
Findings
The results indicate that the presence of proprietary directors on the remuneration committee acts as a mechanism to reduce vertical pay inequality, even in the context of high ownership concentration.
Originality/value
Unlike the majority of previous research dedicated to the independence of the remuneration committee, this study focuses on the role played by proprietary directors. The results help elucidate the importance of proprietary directors to properly monitor and restrain directors' compensation in contexts of high ownership concentration.
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Ling Jong and Poh-Ling Ho
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of family directors and independent directors on executive remuneration of listed family firms in Malaysia, and their…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of family directors and independent directors on executive remuneration of listed family firms in Malaysia, and their involvement in remuneration committee on executive remuneration.
Design/methodology/approach
Fixed effect estimation is employed to examine 1,395 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2014.
Findings
Family and independent directors do not have statistically significant influence on executive remuneration. Rather, family ownership exerts a significant positive influence on executive remuneration. This study also reveals that the interaction of family CEOs with the family directors on remuneration committee exerts a significant positive influence on executive remuneration.
Research limitations/implications
The measurement of executive remuneration excludes the share options due to the non-disclosure of this information in the annual reports.
Practical implications
The findings would be useful to the policy-makers and regulators in appraising the governance measures of remuneration arrangement.
Originality/value
This study premises on the Type II agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Independent directors could not mitigate the Type II agency conflict via the governance of executive remuneration. They are not the effective governance mechanism that the minority shareholders can rely on. The additional analyses provide theoretical implication that the pervasive Type II agency conflict is ameliorated when the CEOs do not have family relationships with the controlling family shareholders.
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This paper aims to explore an alternative approach to regulation for addressing governance problems relating to director and executive remuneration in publicly listed firms. The…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to explore an alternative approach to regulation for addressing governance problems relating to director and executive remuneration in publicly listed firms. The author investigates the development of hybrid regulatory framework, composed of state regulation and self-regulation, for remuneration governance in Australia.
Design/methodology/approach
The synthesis of constructs borrowed from agency and institutional theories and its contextual analysis examines the effectiveness of formal (state regulation) and informal (self-regulation) institutions for the development of a hybrid of regulation. Thereafter, the author examines the impact of hybrid regulation on remuneration disclosure behavior in Australia.
Findings
The author finds that improvement in disclosure is primarily driven by the establishment of remuneration committees and separate role of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairperson but weakened by the presence of CEO at remuneration committee and presence of remuneration consultant.
Originality/value
Global crises have called for greater transparency and protection of investors through state regulation alone. However, corporate governance, being a social practice that is shaped by diverse interests, calls for a holistic approach. A useful contribution of this study is that through an in-depth examination into the stages and actors of the government interventions involving the balancing of tension between conflicting forces, it provides insights for developing an effective regulatory hybrid which has greater acceptance for corporate governance. In conclusion, it implies the significance of priming the social arena through active engagement of diverse market forces prior to introducing state regulation.
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Michael Seamer and Adrian Melia
This paper aims to investigate the incidence of remunerating Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed non-executive directors (NEDs) with options and to determine whether…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the incidence of remunerating Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)-listed non-executive directors (NEDs) with options and to determine whether companies that fail to adhere to NED remuneration recommendations share a common corporate governance profile. Despite corporate regulators condemning the practice of remunerating NEDs with stock options, there is a paucity of evidence regarding its prevalence in Australia.
Design/methodology/approach
Focusing on ASX400 companies during 2008, a series of hypotheses relating NED stock option remuneration and corporate governance are tested using logistic regression.
Findings
The study shows that the prevalence and quantum of NED option payments during 2008 was considerable with 73 of the ASX400 companies, including options in NED remuneration (option payers). Comparison of the corporate governance characteristics of option payers to that of a matched control group (non-option payers) highlighted both the existence and independence of the remuneration committee as critical in ensuring NED remuneration practices comply with regulator recommendations.
Research limitations/implications
These results provide regulators and stakeholder groups with additional evidence to continue to call for corporate governance reforms to ensure that corporate remuneration practices are in the best interest of shareholders.
Originality/value
This study is the first to highlight the extent to which Australian-listed company NED remuneration practices fail to comply with regulator recommendations and adds to the limited research on remuneration committee effectiveness.
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