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Shang and Croson (2009) found that providing information about the donation decisions of others can have a positive impact on individual donations to public radio. In this study, we attempted to replicate their results, but found no evidence that social information affected donation decisions. However, most of our donors were renewing members, a group which Shang and Croson also found was not influenced by social information.

While prior work has focused on the importance of visual access and visual cues to targets of deception, this article highlights its importance to deceivers. We introduce a new approach for conceptualizing deception and distinguish between two types of lies according to the relative value to the deceiver of being able to monitor the target's reaction to the lie; deceivers telling monitoring‐dependent lies benefit significantly more from being able to monitor their target than do deceivers telling monitoring‐independent lies. We examine this distinction and its implications for the strategic use of deception, by manipulating visual access in a negotiation experiment with teleconference and videoconference media. We find consistent differences between deceivers use of and consequences of these two types of lies as a function of visual access. First, the use of monitoring‐dependent lies was significantly greater with visual access than without it, while the use of monitoring‐independent lies was unaffected by visual access. Second, consistent with our conceptu‐alization, participants who lied were trusted less by their counterpart than were participants who did not lie, except when participants with visual access told monitoring‐dependent lies. In these cases deceivers were actually trusted more by their counterpart than participants who did not lie. These results support our conceptualization and suggest that visual access may actually harm potential targets of deception—by increasing their risk of being deceived and inappropriately increasing their interpersonal trust.

This paper investigates the use of deception in two negotiation studies. Study 1 (N = 80) demonstrates that direct questions and solidarity curtail deception. Study 2 (N = 74 dyads) demonstrates that direct questions are particularly effective in curtailing lies of omission, but may actually increase the incidence of lies of commission. These findings highlight the importance of misrepresentation to the negotiation process and suggest approaches for contending with deception.

This paper examines the impact of social comparisons on fundraising and charitable contributions. We present results from a field experiment involving contribution to a public radio station. Some callers are told of the contributions decisions of others, and other callers are given no such information. We find that providing ambitions (high) social comparison information can significantly increase contributions.

The success of a supply chain is highly reliant on effective inventory and ordering decisions. This paper systematically reviews and analyzes the literature on inventory ordering decisions conducted using behavioral experiments to inform the state-of-the-art.

This paper presents the first systematic review of this literature. We systematically identify a body of 101 papers from an initial pool of over 12,000.

Extant literature and industry observations posit that decision makers often deviate from optimal ordering behavior prescribed by the quantitative models. Such deviations are often accompanied by excessive inventory costs and/or lost sales. Understanding how humans make inventory decisions is paramount to minimize the associated consequences. To address this, the field of behavioral operations management has produced a rich body of research on inventory decision-making using behavioral experiments. Our analysis identifies primary research clusters, summarizes key learnings and highlights opportunities for future research in this critical decision-making area.

The findings will have a significant impact on future research on behavioral inventory ordering decisions while informing practitioners to reach better ordering decisions.

Previous systematic reviews have explored behavioral operations broadly or its subdisciplines such as judgmental forecasting. This paper presents a systematic review that specifically investigates the state-of-the-art of inventory ordering decisions using behavioral experiments.

Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good. They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels, reduces shirking (free riding). This chapter experimentally tests this claim. Participants are informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about their team's total contribution. Average group contributions in the two treatments are the same. However, group contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are discussed.

The recent surge in behavioral studies on the coordination mechanisms in supply chains (SCs) and advanced methods highlights the role of SC coordination (SCC) and behavioral issues associated with improving the performance of the operations. This study aims to critically review the behavioral aspect of channel coordination mechanisms.

Following a systematic literature review methodology, the authors adopt a combination of bibliometric (to reflect the current state of the field), content (using Leximancer data mining software to develop thematic maps) and theory-oriented qualitative analyzes that provide a holistic conceptual framework to unify the literature’s critical concepts.

The analysis confirms the plethora of risk-oriented publications, demonstrating that the second largest category of studies is concerned with social preferences theory. Most studies were based on experiments, followed by analytical modeling, revealing the impact of heuristics and individual preferences in SC decisions and suggesting promising managerial and theoretical avenues for future research.

The study sheds light on behavioral decision theories applied to SC coordination by categorizing the literature based on the adopted theories. The methodological contributions include using automated content analysis and validating the outcome by interviewing leading scholars conducting active research on “behavioral operations management and SC contracts.” The authors also propose several directions for future research based on the research gaps.

This chapter investigates the difference between ultimatum games over gains and over losses. Although previous research in decision making has found that individuals treat losses and gains differently, losses have not previously been investigated in strategic situations. In the field, however, the problem of negotiating over losses is as unavoidable and problematic as the problem of negotiating over gains. In addition, data on how we bargain over losses can shed some theoretical light on fairness preferences. Two experiments use within-subject designs, the first in the U.S. and the second in the U.S., China and Japan. We find that offers and demands are higher in losses than in gains, and that these results hold across the three countries. We adapt Bolton's (1991) model of fairness to explain the results. Specifically, we extend prospect theory's loss aversion to unfairness, suggesting that unfairness in losses looms larger than unfairness in gains.

We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the USA and Spain – each of which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find that when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, there are no cross-cultural differences in giving. When uninformed, however, Americans give less than the Spanish. This difference persists even after controlling for beliefs, personal characteristics, and values.