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This paper empirically investigates the relationship between financial availability and crime by measuring it across five dimensions: banking, securities, insurance, private lending and digital inclusive finance.

The study utilizes 2011–2017 data from prefecture-level cities as a representative sample. Moreover, these findings remain robust after addressing endogeneity through the use of the historical distance between cities and the railroad network as an instrumental variable.

The findings demonstrate a significant negative relationship between financial accessibility and crime rates. Heterogeneity exists in the inhibitory effect of different types of financial accessibility on crime, with banking finance exhibiting a stronger inhibitory effect compared to private lending. Areas affected by natural disasters and infectious diseases exhibit a stronger inhibitory effect of financial accessibility on crime rates, particularly in areas with severe shocks of natural disasters and epidemics. This effect is attributed to the low financing threshold and easy access to private lending, which plays a more effective role than bank finance when people face extreme risks.

There should be stricter regulations imposed on private lending markets and the introduction of more rational legislation aimed at guiding a healthy development within these markets; such measures serve as effective and complementary means for individuals from all walks of life to access credit financing.

The regulation of financial resources by the government should always prioritize ensuring the accessibility of financial policies to cater to the needs of the majority population.

This study is for the first time in an emerging economy context, the causal relationship between financial accessibility and crime. To provide a more comprehensive measure of financial accessibility in a region, this paper proposes a five-dimensional methodology.

There is a growing support for the view that the private sector is at least as efficient as the public sector in managing investment risks of large projects. Governments forget that it is the taxpayer who bears all the risks in a public finance scenario of investments. So, it seems unfounded that governments should neglect the cost of investment risk in obtaining finance as the taxpayer might be seen as a shareholder in (public) investments, which by definition are risky. It is this taxpayer-is-shareholder perspective that will be criticized in this paper. This taxpayer approach neglects the variety of funding and financing positions that might be taken by the various actors in investment projects. The paper concludes that some prudence is recommended in supporting private finance initiatives

In this chapter we study internal and external, formal and informal, financing sources of Chinese firms during the period 1997–2006, by analyzing balance sheet data from the Chinese Industrial Surveys of Medium-sized and Large Firms for 2000–2006 and survey data from the Large-Scale Survey of Private Enterprises in China conducted in 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.

The following stylized facts emerge from our analysis: (1) State-owned firms continue to enjoy more generous external finances than other types of Chinese firms. (2) Chinese private firms have resorted to various ways of overcoming financial constraints, including reliance on the increasingly more mature informal financial markets, cost savings through lower inventory and other working capital requirements, and greater reliance on retained earnings. (3) Substantial variations exist in financial access among private firms, with small private firms facing more financial constraints whereas more established firms having financial access more equal to their SOE counterparts. (4) Although not as accessible as for SOEs, the Chinese formal financial sector does provide Chinese private firms with substantial financial resources, especially for their short-term needs during daily operations. (5) The most pressing financial constraint facing Chinese private firms is their limited ability to secure long-term funds to invest for growth, and resolving this issue should be one of the top goals of financial reforms in China.

Maximising real efficiency benefit (REB) is currently being replaced with access to private finance as core public–private partnership (PPP) adoption motive. This later choice focusses on short-term performance, compromising REB and the procurement of infrastructure that meets the need of the present and future generations, which the former accomplishes. The paper aims to review these observed changes to understand the rationales and significance behind such switch.

Secondary data powered exploratory study. Deployed X-inefficiency theory to triangulate and reduce bias and select country cases to provide the proper foundation for the descriptive “what happened?” question, such as “what was the failure concerns with a particular adoption choice?”

The shift to accessing private finance adoption motive against REB failed to improve PPP project performance or meet efficiency and sustainability. Instead, it allows the private sector to assume financial risk without synergistic monitoring from the government to determine their contractual and commitment trust level, which would help achieve the five-dimensional sustainable performance measurement system for PPP. This led to the struggles of PPP projects in Portugal and Spain, where cost overruns and high demand forecast led to project failures. A recommendation, blended finance with its technical assistance additionality, is considered pivotal to addressing access to private finance motive shortcomings.

This study improves best practices for new and existing adopters by systematically establishing that adoption ideology is a cardinal variable that influences PPP project success. When not correctly adopted, it can make the most successful structured projects face complexities and uncertainty.

This study aims to examine whether debt financing creates incentives for private firms to engage in earnings management via classification shifting. Especially, the authors examine whether debt-induced financial reporting incentives differ depending on the type of debt (i.e. public bonds versus private loans) and whether such incentives are influenced by the characteristics of external auditors (i.e. initial audits and auditor size).

The study uses data on 93,427 Korean private firms from 2001 to 2016. Classification shifting is measured by the positive correlation between non-core expenses and unexpected core earnings estimated with ordinary least squares.

The empirical analyses reveal that private firms engage in classification shifting as do public firms. Importantly, classification shifting is observed only in private firms that have outstanding debt, but not in private firms without debt. Among debt-financing private firms, classification shifting is more prevalent for firms that issue public debt than for firms that only use private debt. In addition, classification shifting of debt-financing private firms is more successful when they are audited by new auditors that are one of the non-Big 4 firms.

The study provides evidence of classification shifting in private firms, which is novel to the literature. However, the inferences in the study depend on the validity of the model for detecting classification shifting.

This study helps lenders enhance their understanding on the financial reporting behaviors of borrowing firms. The results in this study suggest that lenders should be cautious in using core earnings for their investment decisions.

This study contributes to the literature by providing novel evidence of classification shifting in private firms. In addition, the authors contribute to the literature on debt-induced incentives for financial reporting.

This study examines the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decisions by constructing proxies for managerial overconfidence based on the track records of earnings forecasts in Japanese listed firms. We find that managers have the stable tendency to forecast overly upward earnings compared to actual ones and that their upward bias decreases the probability of issuing equity in the public market by about 4.7 percent per one standard error, which economically has the strongest impact on financing decisions. This tendency is observed when we employ alternative measures for managerial overconfidence and other model specifications. However, in private placements, the choice to offer equity is not always avoided by managers. This implies that managers place private equity with the expectation of the certification effect

The purpose of this paper is to test the effect of informal finance and trade credit on the performance of private firms.

Based on a survey to private firms in 19 cities, the paper empirically tests the promoting effects of informal finance and trade credit on the performance of private firms in China.

It was found that informal finance and trade credit have positive effects on private firms' performance measured by ROA. The net income reinvestment rate of private firms is positively related to whether or not the firm adopts informal financing or trade credit financing. A private firm having limited access to formal finance is more inclined to rely on self‐funds and is more limited by financing choices. Informal financing and trade credit can relieve the tension of cash flow chain but cannot solve the financing constraints. The empirical results also show that bank credit is still not the main financing choice for private firms and has not yet played a promoting role in private firms' performance and growth. Informal finance is more important to promote performance in manufacturing industry, while trade credit is more effective in wholesale and trading industry. The results show the coexistence viability of informal financing channels and formal financial institutions in China.

The policy implication is the Chinese Government should take careful steps to regulate informal financing sources.

After some theoretical literature, such as Lin and Sun, this paper explores for the first time the effect of informal financing channels on the performance of private firms.