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The aim of this article is to explore how the employees of a Danish family-owned company identify with the heritage identity of their company. More specifically, the purpose is to study how the employees interpret certain historical events and values in their efforts to make sense of which heritage identity traits have remained meaningful for them over the passage of time and what these historical events and traits mean to their identification with the company.

The investigation is based on 19 in-depth interviews with employees. A critical discourse analysis approach is adopted to uncover the discursive dynamics appearing across the employees' interpretations of historical events and values.

The study indicates that heritage identity represent a complex and dynamic resource for employees' organizational identification. Therefore, this article argues that it could be a challenge for management to maintain a stable and enduring heritage identity, because the employees' interpretations and consequently their organizational identification is subject to continual revision and under influence by a dynamic and constantly changing social context.

The findings of this study is limited to the specific context of one company. Further research could investigate the same topics when interviewing employees across the national borders of a global family company in times of change.

Management need to identify whether different generations of employees develop a strong or weak identification with certain heritage identity traits and whether there are competing or compatible targets of heritage identification among these generations.

This study illuminates the potential challenges related to the maintenance and preservation of heritage identity in a company with roots to a strong founding family, which operates in a constantly changing environment.

This pilot is a pre/post comparative assessment of a leadership course developed and delivered using an innovative, ontological/phenomenological model of education. Participants in the course delivered in Singapore in July of 2014 provided measures of the effectiveness of their leadership before and after the course, using a scale from 1 (least effective) to 10 (most effective). The difference in scores from pre- to post-course was the unit of measure. Of 167 participants, 72% provided pre- and post-course measures. Average scores forparticipants’ effectiveness as leaders in the domains of Relationships, Vocation, Avocation, and Self increased from pre- to post-course by 1.9, 1.86, 1.64, and 1.85 respectively (p < 0.0001). Future research of this innovative model of leadership education will include long-term follow-up.

The present article aims to evaluate the performance of ten domestic balanced mutual funds operating in the Greek financial market over the period 1/1/1995‐31/12/1998. In doing so, the sample mutual funds were ranked on the basis of their return, total risk, coefficient of variation, systematic risk, and the techniques of Treynor, Sharpe and Jensen. The ten mutual funds achieved lower return than the General Index of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). However, the mutual funds achieved satisfactory return in relation to the total and systematic risk undertaken. The sample mutual funds followed defensive investment policy that was in line with their objectives. The General Index of the ASE appeared to be a close approximation of the market portfolio. To some extent the ranking of the mutual funds varied among the techniques of Treynor, Sharpe and Jensen, although certain mutual funds were ranked in the same order regardless of the technique used. According to Jensen, seven mutual funds had superior performance, while the remaining three demonstrated poor performance.

Assesses the 1995‐1998 performance of 17 equity mutual funds operating in the Greek financial market, explains the calculations involved and reviews relevant research. Ranks the funds by daily, weekly, monthly and total return for the period and compares them with the general Athens Stock Exchange index. Goes on to rank them by total risk, coefficient of variation and systematic risk before applying Treynor’s index, Sharpe’s index and Jensen’s approach. Presents the results in detail and summarizes the main findings.

The importance of the market for corporate control as a disciplining device has received considerable research interest in recent years. Since the advent of event study methodology pioneered by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), and the availability of machine readable returns data from the Center of Research on Security Prices, the effects of various control related corporate events have been well documented. Jensen and Ruback (1983) in their review of the empirical literature on the market for corporate control report that the findings in general support the hypothesis that outside takeover mechanisms do act efficiently to limit managerial departures from the objective of maximising the economic well‐being of its shareholders. They further point out that studies using the event study methodology cannot distinguish between the different sources of gains in the takeover process, namely those due to synergies, or those due to lack of efficient management in the acquired firm.

Assesses the 1995‐1998 performance of ten domestic balanced mutual funds in the Greek financial market using daily net asset value per unit. Ranks them on the basis of daily average return, total risk, coefficient of variation, systematic risk, Treynor’s index, Sharpe’s index and Jensen’s alpha. Shows that their risks and returns were lower than the Athens Stock Exchange index, that they followed defensive investment policies, that some achieved high returns with low risk and that there was some variation of ranking according to the techniques used.

Recent studies have shown that the level of insider holdings and firm value are related in a nonlinear manner. Other studies find that the level of debt in a firm's capital structure declines with increases in its growth options. The principal‐agent relationship maintains that an increase in the equity stake of insiders reduces the agency costs of issuing debt. Extension of this premise suggests, however, that the agency costs of debt rise with extremely high levels of insider holdings as insiders consume perquisites to the detriment of outside stakeholders, revealing a nonlinear relation attributable to agency costs. We examine the relation between debt financing and insider holdings for 1894 firms at the end of 1989. In keeping with the hypothesized relation, the cross‐sectional regressions of leverage on insider holdings reveal significant nonlinearities. Leverage first rises with insider holdings and then declines. The positive relation between leverage and insider holdings returns as inside ownership approaches 100 percent. These results hold for two different measures of leverage and after controlling for industry differences in leverage, tax shields, firm size, growth options, and earnings or return volatility. The results also hold when regulated firms are excluded from the analysis.

The history and divestiture of the Bell System is of immediate importance to several economies around the globe, especially those undergoing the change from state owned operations to private ownership. Similarly, those economies experiencing rapid expansion of telecommunications can also learn from the experiences of AT&T's development, maturity, and subsequent divestiture. In addition to a brief history, this study examines preliminary empirical evidence which suggests agency costs, particularly those associated with free cash flow, were reduced following the divestiture.

Responding to a public outcry about the level of executive compensation in many corporations as well as the apparent weak linkage between performance and pay, on October 15, 1992, the SEC (US Securities and Exchange Commission) adopted new rules affecting corporate disclosure of compensation. These rules require that executive compensation and company performance be clearly presented, and that the compensation committee of the board of directors explain how they arrived at their compensation decisions. The new rule affects the 1993 proxy statements of all but the smallest publicly‐traded US corporations, and applies to results from the 1992 fiscal‐year.