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At the time they occurred, the savings and loan insolvencies were considered the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Contrary to what was then believed, and in sharp contrast with 2007–2009, they in fact had little macroeconomic significance. Savings and Loan (S&L) remediation cost between 2 percent and 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the conservatorships of Fannie and Freddie actually made money for the US Treasury. But the direct cost of government remediation is largely irrelevant in judging macro significance. What matters is the cumulative output loss associated with and plausibly caused by failing financial institutions. I estimate output losses for 1981–1984, 1991–1998, and 2007–2026 (the latter utilizing forecasts and projections along with actual data through 2015) and, for a final comparison, 1929–1941. The losses associated with 2007–2009 have been truly disastrous – in the same order of magnitude as the Great Depression. The S&L failures were, in contrast, inconsequential. Macroeconomists and policy makers should reserve the word crisis for financial disturbances that threaten substantial damage to the real economy, and continue efforts to identify in advance financial institutions which are systemically important (SIFI), and those which are not.

This paper aims to examine the current financial crisis, suggesting that most analyses have attributed the crisis to a lack of business ethics, the rise of greed and lax regulation. Prescriptions offered to address this crisis draw accordingly on the need for greater regulation of market behaviour, business practices and boardroom pay. Whilst these reforms are necessary, they fail to recognise that such business practices have their roots in an extreme political and economic ideology – neoliberal market fundamentalism. This paper seeks to suggests that a greater appreciation of the nexus between politics, philosophy and economics is critical in order to develop a different practice. As such, the author provides a socio‐historical and political context for understanding the present crisis before offering a critique and reform of the business educational agenda. The author argues that such a context would engender greater understanding of business practices and systems for both students and practitioners and would go some way in enabling them to fashion a more critical reflexive and engaged practice.

The paper draws on a critical‐historical review of the literature on the crisis. In so doing, the paper opens up the analysis to philosophical and political approaches to understanding financial crises.

The paper finds that explanations for the crisis can be found through a critical appreciation of philosophical and political texts. This finding also suggests that current business and management education and practices can benefit from an incorporation of these historical strands of thought.

In drawing on various strands in philosophy, politics, economics and sociology, the paper finds that a singular account for the crisis is flawed. The paper also finds that a richer and deeper appreciation of the crisis can be found through a critical‐historical positioning of the crisis. This necessitates an understanding of politics and philosophy in business practices and education.

In explaining the crisis, the paper suggests that many of the current financial “innovations” are problematic and a more critical approach is needed to engage with these “new” innovations.

The paper seeks to open up new vistas for business education and practices. Through a critical‐historical interrogation of the crisis, the paper opens up new spaces for understanding international economics and business practices. This reflexivity is often missing in international business studies and most management practices.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a cohesive review of the major findings in the literature concerning the Global Financial Crisis.

Papers published in top-rated finance and economics journal since the crisis up to the present were reviewed. A large number of these were selected for inclusion, primarily based on the number of citations they had received adjusted for the amount of time elapsed since their publication, but also partly based on how well they fit in with the narrative.

Much has been done to investigate the causes of the Global Financial Crisis, its effects on various aspects of the financial system, and the effectiveness of regulatory measures undertaken to restore the financial system. While more remains to be done, the existing body of research paints an interesting picture of what happened and why it happened, describes the interrelationships between the mortgage markets and financial markets created by the large scale securitization of financial assets, identifies the problems created by these inter-linkages and offers possible solutions, and assesses the effectiveness of the regulatory response to the crisis.

This study summarizes a vast amount of literature using a framework that allows the reader to quickly absorb a large amount of information as well as identify specific works that they may wish to examine more closely. By providing a picture of what has been done, it may also assist the reader in identifying areas that should be the subject of future research.

Systemic risk has been one of the most interesting issues in banking and financial literature during the last years, particularly in evaluating its effects on the stability of the whole financial system during crises. Differently from other studies which analyze systemic risk focusing on European countries, we explore the determinant of systemic risk in other regional or continental banking systems, as Latin America. Using the CoVaR approach proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), we study the impact of corporate variables on systemic risk on a sample of 30 Latin American banks belonging to seven countries, continuously listed from 2002Q1 to 2015Q4. We investigate the contribution of the corporate variables over different economic periods: the Subprime crisis (2007Q3–2008Q3), the European Great Financial Depression (2008Q4–2010Q2), and the Sovereign debt crisis (2010Q3–2012Q3).

The purpose of this research is to examine the growth rates of commercial banks and credit unions around the financial crisis and recovery. Credit unions are analyzed as a group and by field of membership. Specifically, this research analyzes the growth rates of assets, deposits, and loans.

This research employs univariate tests of differences to examine the median growth rates for commercial banks and credit unions. Unbalanced pool regressions analyze growth rates during the pre-crisis, crisis, and recovery periods, controlling for size, net charge-offs, and unemployment.

Univariate test results that control for size show that banks grow at faster rates than credit unions for most of the pre-crisis years. However, medium sized credit unions grow at faster rates for most of the crisis and recovery years. Results of unbalanced pool regressions suggest that, overall, credit unions grow at slower rates than do banks. However, during the crisis and recovery, credit union growth is significantly greater than that of banks, after controlling for net charge-offs, size, and unemployment. Credit union growth varies by field of membership type.

Although a large volume of research examines commercial bank performance around the financial crisis, only a few papers assess the performance of credit unions. And very few papers compare commercial banks and credit unions. This paper explores how the recent financial crisis influenced the growth of commercial banks and credit unions from 2005 to 2013.

Whereas much of the renewed interest in Polanyi’s Great Transform-ation speculates that the rebalancing of economy and society he foresaw might now be emerging in the context of the financial crisis, the systems theory perspective adopted in this article concludes that there are good reasons to believe that such a shift may be no closer. From an examination of credit default swaps and corporate bonds, the article suggests that finance may best be understood as an internally differentiated subsystem of the economy and thus perhaps peculiarly proof against efforts to exert control over it. Concluding that Polanyi’s analysis lacks the conceptual tools to cope with contemporary conditions when compared to systems theory, the article nevertheless suggests that his approach may usefully be extended by adding a fourth fictitious commodity – risk – to the familiar trio of land, labor, and money.

Literature indicates that global geographic diversification (GD) has mixed effects on a multinational corporation’s (MNC) performances. The purpose of this paper is to examine how an MNC’s GD influences its stock market and financial performances directly and indirectly via operational performance (i.e. changes in inventory levels).

Using firm-level data collected from Compustat database for the period 2000-2011 and estimating a mediating regression model, the authors examine the direct and indirect effects of GD on an MNC’s stock market (Tobin’s q) and financial performances (ROA), with inventory level being a mediator. Additionally, the examination is implemented separately under two economic situations: financial crisis vs without financial crisis.

The results show that GD enhances an MNC’s stock market performance, while deteriorating its financial performance in the presence of a financial crisis. In contrast, GD has little direct impact on an MNC’s stock market and financial performances during periods without financial crisis. The indirect effects of GD are mediated by changes in inventory levels.

This study suggests that MNCs need to carefully weigh the benefits and costs of global strategy obtained through GD. The results also indicate that GD is highly appreciated by the stock market investors during economic downturns and tighter inventory management may further enhance firm values.

This paper is the first empirical research to estimate both direct and indirect effects of GD via inventory in the operations management literature, highlighting the value of GD depending on the different economic situations and echoing the role of operations in implementing GD.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the reasons why some financial crises do not result in extensive criminal prosecutions.

The authors examine three major events: the crash of 1929 leading to the Great Depression, the collapse of the US Savings and Loan industry circa 1990 and the sub-prime mortgage meltdown. The authors explain how circumstances surrounding these financial collapses led to stark differences in criminal prosecutions.

This review of prosecutions during three financial crises underscores the contingent nature of seeking criminal penalties for financial wrongdoing. The decision is influenced by a number of factors, including a prosecutor’s level of risk tolerance (probable win test); the potential economic impact of a successful conviction; the number of laws and regulations available in the prosecutorial tool kit; and the desired outcome which can range from new regulatory structures, to prosecutions that fix blame and satisfy the desire for scapegoats, to seeking financial penalties that shore up the government’s bottom line.

This study covers three crises and focuses on the US responses. A broader study could look across countries.

Regulators and lawmakers are interested in avoiding future crises. Because crises are not anticipated, responses are determined by conditions of the moment. A frequent result is that laws and regulations are not in place. Decisions about likely preferred responses would allow anticipatory legislation and regulations.

Financial crises obviously have major implications for ordinary citizens far removed from the centers of finance. Improved responses to mitigate or avoid disasters would have profound impacts on people’s quality of life.

The three crises have been studied individually. This work is different in that it examines the impact of a common set of factors over three crises covering a span of 80 years.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of banking stability in Africa.

The authors present four measures of banking stability embedding banks’ loan loss coverage ratio, insolvency risk, asset quality ratio, and level of financial development, thereby allowing analysis of banking stability determinants from four complementary perspectives: protection for downside credit losses, distress arising from insolvency risk, non-performing loans, and financial development. The authors use the regression methodology to estimate the impact of financial structure, institutional, bank-level factors on bank stability.

The findings indicate that banking efficiency, foreign bank presence, banking concentration, size of banking sector, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, investor protection, corruption control and unemployment levels are significant determinant of banking stability in Africa and the significance of each determinant depends on the banking stability proxy employed and depends on the period of analysis: pre-crisis, during-crisis or post-crisis.

Banking supervisors in African countries should consider the role of financial structure and institutional quality for banking stability in the African region.

This study is the first to examine banking stability determinants in Africa that takes into account institutional quality and financial structure.